THE TRANSVAAL OUTLOOK

by

ALBERT STICKNEY

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The TRANSVAAL OUTLOOK

WITH MAPS

by

ALBERT STICKNEY

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NOTE.

It is proper to state, that the first part of this paper, that on the Military Situation, was written prior to January 4th, 1900, and is printed as then written.

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LONGITUDE EAST FROM GREENWICH.

THE TRANSVAAL OUTLOOK.

I.

THE MILITARY SITUATION.

The thing of most absorbing public interest now before the civilized world is the war between Great Britain and the two South African Republics.

Its especial importance to the American people is to be found in the value to the British nation of American sympathy. That sympathy, down to the present time, has been largely on the side of our kinsmen beyond the sea. It has been assumed, with or without reason, that we had, during what has been termed the Spanish War, a manifestation of sympathy on their part, which went virtually to the extent of active intervention and support. It has also been generally assumed, that, although in the present contest the purely technical right of the situation on legal grounds is with the Boers, yet nevertheless, upon the whole situation, the British nation is entitled to the sympathies of the civilized world; that the present contest is really one between progress and stagnation; is a question of the spread of the realm of liberty and order; is, in fact, a struggle between democracy and oligarchic class rule. It has been assumed, in effect, that the Boers are resisting the march of civilization.

Public opinion seems, however, on these questions, to be gradually verging towards a condition of, at least, doubt. It is not now so generally assumed, as it was a short time ago, that the Boers are an obstacle to progress. It is evident, that we are beginning to examine the facts. The indications are, that the tide of sympathy is turning away from our nearest kinsmen.

However this may be, large numbers of persons are of the belief that, whichever of the contending parties may hold the meritorious side of the contest, yet there can be no question as to its outcome. It is generally assumed, that victory is sure finally to rest with the British, and after no very long period

of time. Consequently, it is also assumed, that it is more in the interests of mankind that the result should be reached quickly; and that the war should come to a speedy termination, by a great British triumph, which is generally believed to be a practical certainty.

It is, therefore, of prime importance to give careful attention to the military situation. If the facts of that situation should warrant the conclusion, either that the British will not succeed at all in the conquest of the South African Republics, or that success will be attained only at the end of a long and costly war, the situation would be essentially changed. If the war must in any event entail upon the British people an enormous expenditure of money and life, it will behoove them seriously to consider, whether they can, with safety to themselves, and with safety to their empire, afford to prolong the existing contest; whether it is not imperatively demanded, by their own interests, and the interests of the whole civilized world, that the war with the South African Republics should be brought to an immediate termination, even if that termination should result in the abandonment of the contest by the British Government.

The military situation, from this point of view, becomes one of principal interest. At all times the operations of war have an absorbing interest. At this particular time, however, the interest which they excite is exceptional; and arises from the fact, that the prospect either of a British failure, or of a British success which would come only at the end of a very long period of hostilities, will have the deepest significance.

In the Army and Navy Gazette, in the issue of October 14, 1899, there appeared an editorial entitled "War at Last." That paper is edited by the Honorable William Howard Russell, correspondent of the London Times during the Crimean War, and during the earlier portion of our own Civil War. The editorial in question amounted to a warm and hearty congratulation, to Mr. Chamberlain, on the fact, that his foreign policy had at last attained the object for which he had so strenuously labored, a war with the Transvaal Republic. It would seem natural, and even probable, that any person who had had, even to a slight extent, a personal observation of actual military operations would never have had the hardihood to emit a publica-

tion of the nature of the one just mentioned. However, Dr. Russell was guilty of that indiscretion. Its nature and extent will appear more fully upon the reading of his language.

"WAR AT LAST.

"Mr. Reitz, as Secretary of State of the Transvaal Government, has signed the declaration of war, which is to be effective if the Queen's forces are not withdrawn from the frontier and if the reinforcements now on their way are allowed to land, but he is only the instrument of Mr. Kruger's will. It is not in our line to interfere in the process, but it seems to us that the severance of the knot ought not to have been effected at this moment, yet it cannot be regarded by us with dissatisfaction as an untoward event from the political point of view. In fact, if we could read the 'inwards' of Mr. Chamberlain we think there would be found in characters of flame inscribed under his orchid, '*Heaven be praised! Kruger has declared War!*' From the Pretoria point of view the declaration may have been necessary. From the standpoint of the soldier, the politician, or the statesman, it must be regarded as a grievous blunder. It was too late. If the forces of the two Republics could have been set in motion six weeks or a month ago, there could have been an infinity of mischief to Natal and to the Cape Colony for them to inflict and revel in—an immense encouragement to the Boer Afrikanders—a great blow to the loyal colonists—and much possible obstruction to the concentration of the troops *destined in case of war to invade* the Republics. *We were not ready* and we were not strong. If there was no threatening movement or concentration of ours on the frontiers to justify the demands of the Republics *there was ample evidence that the British Government was preparing a great army to operate if necessary against them.* * * * It is not too much to say, that the declaration of war by the Republics must have caused the *utmost satisfaction to the millions of people who have supported the Colonial Secretary in the energetic policy he has pursued in dealing with the Transvaal Government,* and we hope sincerely that the results of *the success of our arms* in the field will be productive of the *benefits which are expected* from the *overthrow of the Boer Republics, confer honor on our leaders in the council and the field and give peace and prosperity to South Africa.*"

To us, with our later acquired knowledge from actual events, it seems almost impossible to realize anything more humorous than the preceding utterances, of one who presumably has kept in touch for the last forty years with military operations and current military literature. It is well, however, that we bear in mind the existence of the frank avowal contained in the foregoing paper, which may be deemed almost official, to the

effect that the British troops at the time of the publication of that editorial were near the boundaries of the Transvaal, "destined in case of war to invade the Republics." It is also interesting to observe the implied affirmation, that, although the British people six weeks or a month prior to the time of the Transvaal declaration "were not ready, and were not strong," nevertheless at the time of the publication, to wit, on the 14th day of October, 1899, the British people *were* "ready," and *were* "strong." It is equally interesting to note the point made in the next succeeding sentence: "From the standpoint of the soldier, the politician or the statesman, it must be regarded as a grievous blunder. It was too late." Dr. Russell's meaning is that it was the action of the Transvaal which was "too late." The implication is, that, for the purposes of the British Government, the declaration of war by the Transvaal Republic came in the very nick of time. Let us note also the further implication, when Dr. Russell says: "If the forces of the two Republics could have been set in motion six weeks or a month ago, there could have been an infinity of mischief to Natal and to the Cape Colony for them to inflict and revel in—an immense encouragement to the Boer Afrikanders—a great blow to the loyal colonists, and much possible obstruction to the concentration of the troops destined in case of war to invade the Republics.

In view of the fact, now apparent, that the South African Republic was in the highest state of preparation for the breaking out of hostilities, that this preparation had extended over a period of more than four years, and so far as now appears, had provided for almost every possible contingency, it becomes really ludicrous, to consider the state of absolute absence of counter preparation, at every material point, on the part of the British Government, which, as we now know, was forcing a war, virtually at the point of the bayonet, upon a people whom they thought to be much weaker than themselves, whom they thought to coerce by a mere demonstration of superior force, and who, as Mr. Chamberlain fondly imagined, would submit to any extortionate demands that might be conceived, rather than enter upon the prosecution of actual hostilities.

Even under the conditions existing to-day, as to the contest between the British Empire on the one hand, and that apparently feeble power, the South African Republic, on the other, it is a fact that the sympathies of the civilized world will be largely influenced by their opinion of the probable outcome. It is a sad condition of affairs, but it is nevertheless the truth, that a large portion of mankind is inclined in almost any contest to take the side of the strongest, or of the party which they deem to be the strongest, without very much reference to the justice or injustice of the position of either side. In view, however, of this fact of human nature, it becomes desirable to consider, with as much accuracy as conditions permit, the prominent features of the present military situation in the war between the Transvaal and Great Britain, and to figure, as far as is now possible, the probabilities as to the result of this present most unfortunate contest.

Especially will this inquiry be found interesting, if the result should be a conclusion that Great Britain is in this present contest somewhat overmatched, and that it behooves her, with a view simply to the preservation of the Empire within its present limits, to put an end to this most unnatural and unjustifiable struggle at the earliest possible moment.

SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.

It has for a long time been agreed by competent military authorities, that, under ordinary circumstances, the stronger position, in case of invasion, is that of the defense. It need not be said, that, under ordinary circumstances, the strongest defense is some form of attack. Bearing that in mind, however, it is quite well conceded among military authorities, that in case of an invasion the stronger position, generally, is that of the defense.

In this respect there has been no essential change in the principles or rules of military science during the last one hundred years. Yet the advantages on the side of the defense have been steadily increasing. They were sufficiently strong at the time

of the battle of Bunker Hill, when a handful of minute men, without drill or discipline, posted behind earthworks which had been hastily thrown up in a few hours, were able to defeat, for the time being, and so long as their ammunition lasted, the flower of the British Army. Even in the days of the old-fashioned smooth-bore musket, under ordinary conditions, the defense was much stronger than the attack. Starting only from that point of time, the chief improvement has been in the range and accuracy of weapons. The change has been one of degree, and not of kind. The principles applicable to problems of that nature have not been changed in their essence. No conditions have been introduced which are new in kind.

To come down a little later, to the days of our own Civil War, and comparing the conditions existing at that point of time with those existing at the present day, the changes between the relative positions of the attack and the defense are hardly worth mentioning. In the days of the Civil War the Springfield rifle was a weapon of fairly long range and accuracy. The increase in range and accuracy since that time is one which need have very slight consideration in any study of the principles of military science applicable to the questions of attack and defense. There has been, as said before, merely an increase in range and accuracy. The increase in rapidity of discharge is one to which military critics are inclined to attach great weight. But even this is less important than is commonly supposed. The fire of the old Springfield rifle was fast enough—for practical purposes in most cases. Under very exceptional circumstances, it was, no doubt, desirable that the firing should have greater rapidity. But the fire was rapid enough, to serve fairly well the needs of the men who used it. With it they accomplished very satisfactory results, that is, from a professional standpoint. From one point of view, the increased rapidity of fire is almost a disadvantage, in that it tends to cause an enormous waste of ammunition, with no adequate corresponding benefit. Smokeless powder is, no doubt, a thing of the greatest importance. But many of the advantages resulting from smokeless powder can often be had from the mere withholding of fire, until an enemy gets within easy range, as the Boers always do, as is always done by steady and skillful troops. So that these points of

rapidity of fire, and the use of smokeless powder, are of less importance than is some times supposed. They introduce no substantial change in the principles—of the military art.

The fundamental features which enter into the consideration of any military problem are to-day what they always have been. They are as follows:

1. Supply and Transportation.

Strictly speaking, these should come under one heading, that of supply. They concern ordnance, ammunition, clothing, medical and surgical appliances, commissary stores; together with what may be called the furniture of transportation, that is, wagons, animals and railways.

2. The Field of Operations.

Under this head come, of course, all questions relating to the actual area of the war, the mere surface distances, all matters of topography, such as streams and mountains; and all features bearing on transportation, such as railways, wagon-roads, paths, and places where railways, wagon-roads, and paths are possible of construction.

3. The Contending Forces.

Under this head are comprised, of course, all facts as to the quality of the individual units of an army; its organization; its discipline; its drill; but above all things, the quality of its commanders.

From this short statement, it is apparent that, for the solution of any military problem, the facts required are somewhat complex, and need very careful study. The omission of any one of them may cause a fatal defect in the conclusion to be deduced. The opinion of the most competent expert, therefore, on any existing military situation, may, in the event, be set at naught by the disclosure of essential features, which were at the time unknown to him, and which it was impossible for him to foresee.

THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF TRANSPORTATION AND SUPPLY, FOR ANY LARGE ARMY IN SOUTH AFRICA, EXCEPT BY LINES OF RAILWAY.

This Transvaal situation is one of the most interesting that has ever fallen under the observation of any military critic. Its controlling features are strongly marked; and although it is, of course, an impossibility for any man to have a thorough knowledge of them all, yet many points in the situation are so clearly beyond dispute, and have such a large military value, that a careful conjecture, at least, can be made as to the probabilities of the situation, and as to the possible result. It need hardly be said, that the entire complexion of a battle, or a war, is liable at any moment to be changed by the events of the hour, or the minute. A thunder storm, or the untimely illness of a commanding general, witness Waterloo, may easily turn possible victory into a crushing defeat. Contingencies of that sort must always be implied, in any endeavor to discuss any military problem. Bearing carefully in mind, however, the existence at all times of such contingencies, it will be interesting to note some of the features of the military situation in the present war.

In the first place let us consider the question of supply and transportation.

Here it is evident, that on one side, that of the Burghers, the question of supply has received the most careful attention, and the provision made therefor has been remarkably complete. We now know, that for several years past the Transvaal authorities have been importing large quantities of the munitions of war, of all kinds, comprising everything that could be needed in the prosecution of an aggressive or defensive campaign.

On the other hand, it is equally evident that the absence of

FIELD OF OPERATIONS
AROUND LADYSMITH
Copyright 1900, by RAND, MCNALLY & CO.
SCALE OF STATUTE MILES.
10 ½ Miles = 1 Inch.
EXPLANATION.
RAILWAYS
MAIN ROADS
OTHER ROADS AND PATHS
TELEGRAPH LINES
VOLKSRUST
WAKKERSTROOM
Charlestown
Majuba
Laings Nek
Mount Prospect
Ingogo
TRANSVAAL
UTRECHT
NEWCASTLE
VRYHEID
ORANGE FREE STATE
HARRISMITH
Ingagane
Dannhauser
Glencoe Jc.
DUNDEE
Waschbank
Wessels Nek
Elandslaagte
LADYSMITH
NATAL
Colenso
Chieveley
Frere
Weenen
Estcourt
Willow Grange
Highlands
Mooi River
Weston
Greytown
BASUTO LAND
Van Reenen
Albertina
Bester's
Helpmakaar
Pomeroy
Umsinga
Nelthorpe
Springfield
Spion Kop
Cathkin Peak 9560
Gray's Pass
Table Mt.
Mt. Ernestina
Seven Oaks
Rietvlei
Muden
Keate's Drift
Rorke's Drift
Tugela Ferry
Buffalo R.

preparation on the part of the British is quite as marked as its completeness on the part of the Burghers. Assuming, as is stated to be the fact, that the British authorities have massed at Ladysmith a considerable quantity of military supplies; assuming also, that they have large quantities of supplies at other points, for instance, Pietermaritzburg, Colenso, and Kimberley, yet it is very plain that Mr. Chamberlain did not anticipate real hostilities, but supposed that the mere demonstration of force on his part would be ample to prevent so much as a pretense of resistance on the part of the Transvaal Republic; and consequently, he deemed it necessary to make no very elaborate preparation for military operations. It is, therefore, fair to assume, that such supplies as may have been accumulated at the points above mentioned have neither the order nor the completeness necessary to make them adequate to the prosecution of military operations on a large scale.

In considering this question of supply and transportation, it will be necessary to note, at no great length, some features of the situation which more particularly belong to other topics, of the field of operations, and the numbers, and quality, of the two contending forces.

Let us take first the position in and around Ladysmith. Ladysmith itself is on the railroad leading from Durban through Pietermaritzburg, Newcastle, Charlestown, Standerton, and Elandsfontein to Pretoria. The distance from Durban to Pietermaritzburg is seventy miles; from Durban to Ladysmith is one hundred and eighty-nine miles; from Durban to Charlestown is three hundred and four miles.

These distances, it is seen, are considerable. They are such as to make the supply of any considerable armed force under existing circumstances impossible except by line of railway.

The nature and difficulties of the problem of supply, for large bodies of men, is a matter which has apparently had no careful study at the hands of the English army officers. However that may be, the operations of the two contending armies during our Civil War give us the fullest information on the points here involved. The science of transportation was developed during that war to a degree never before approached, or conceived as a possibility. It received

its development at the hand of masters. The matter of supply of large bodies of troops, as practiced by General Sherman in the Atlanta Campaign, just prior to the cross-country march to Savannah, is down to the present time the marvel in military history. To borrow a term from the sporting world, it holds the record. A few facts taken from the history of the military operations of that period will throw a strong light on the problems now to be solved by the British authorities in the South African campaign.

In fact, one of the chief reasons for the March to the Sea was this matter of transportation and supply. The real reasons and nature of that celebrated march have often been overlooked. One of the main moving considerations, which decided General Sherman to make that movement, was the practical impossibility of keeping open his existing line of railway communication to Nashville. Sherman's telegram to General Grant of October 9, 1864, says on this point:

"It will be a *physical impossibility* to protect the roads, now that Hood, Forrest and Wheeler and the *whole batch of devils* are turned loose without home or habitation."

On November 6th he again telegraphs:

"That devil Forrest was down by Johnsonville making havoc among the gunboats and transports."

In another telegram of November 6, Sherman says, apropos of Forrest's ubiquity:

"Forrest seems to have scattered from Eastport to Johnsonville, Paris and the lower Tennessee. General Thomas reports a capture by him of a gun-boat and five transports."

As a consequence of what Sherman called the "physical impossibility" of keeping open his railway communications, he said in one of his despatches to General Grant, "I propose we break up the railroad from Chattanooga and strike out with wagons for Savannah."

The reason for this impossibility of keeping open railway communication of so great length as General Sherman's line then was, will be more apparent when we look at a few further

facts. The length of that line was as follows: From Louisville to Nashville, 185 miles; from Nashville to Chattanooga, 151 miles; from Chattanooga to Atlanta, 137 miles; in all, 473 miles. The clearest evidence on this point is to be found in General Sherman's statement, which appears at page 398, Volume 2, of his Memoirs, as to the impossibility of supplying any considerable force of men with a line of such length by any other means than a railroad. His language is:

"Sherman's Memoirs," II, 398:

"The value of railways is also fully recognized in war quite as much as if not more so, than in peace.

"The Atlanta campaign would simply have been impossible without the use of the railroads: from Louisville to Nashville, 185 miles; from Nashville to Chattanooga, 151 miles; from Chattanooga to Atlanta, 137 miles."

Every mile of this 'single track' was so delicate that *one man could in a minute have broken or moved a rail.* But our trains usually carried along the tools and means to repair such a break. We had, however, to maintain strong guards and garrisons at each important bridge or trestle, the destruction of which would have necessitated time for rebuilding.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

"Our trains from Nashville forward were operated under military rules, and ran about ten miles an hour in gangs of four trains of ten cars each. Four such groups of trains daily made one hundred and sixty cars, of ten tons each, carrying sixteen hundred tons, which exceeded the absolute necessities of the army, and allowed for the accidents that were common and inevitable. But, as I have recorded, that single stem of railroad, four hundred and seventy-three miles long, supplied an army of one hundred thousand men and thirty-five thousand animals, for the period of one hundred and ninety-six days, viz.: from May 1 to November 12, 1864. To have delivered regularly that amount of food and forage by ordinary wagons, would have required *thirty-six thousand eight hundred wagons of six mules each,* allowing each wagon to have hauled two tons twenty miles each day, *a simple impossibility in roads such as then existed in that region of country.* Therefore, I reiterate that *the Atlanta campaign was an impossibility without these railroads;* and *only then, because we had the men and the means to maintain and defend them, in addition to what were necessary to overcome the enemy.* Habitually, a passenger-car will carry fifty men with their necessary baggage. Box-cars, and even platform-cars, answer the purpose well enough, but they should always have rough board seats. For sick and wounded men, box-cars filled with

straw or bushes were usually employed. Personally, I saw but little of the practical working of the railroads, for I only turned back once as far as Resaca; but I had daily reports from the engineer in charge, and officers who came from the rear often explained to me the whole thing, with a description of the wrecked trains all the way from Nashville to Atlanta. I am convinced that *the risk to life to the engineers and men on that railroad fully equaled that on the skirmish line,* called for as high an order of courage, and fully equaled it in importance."

It is also to be borne in mind that at that time General Sherman had, so long as his communications were open, not only a line of railway, but the two rivers, the Cumberland and the Tennessee; the Cumberland at parts of the year being available for water transportation as high as Nashville; and the Tennessee as high as Chattanooga. So that, practically, General Sherman, at the time that he speaks of the impossibility of keeping open his communication at Louisville, had not only a line of railway, but two navigable rivers. No such aids are possible for the operations of the British force in South Africa.

Let us now see how this line of communication was handled.

General Forrest started from Verona, Mississippi, on the 16th of September, 1864, on his celebrated march into Alabama and Tennessee. He left Cherokee on the morning of the 21st of September. He reached that place on his return on the 6th day of October. During that expedition, according to his official report dated October 17, 1864, he accomplished the following results:

"I captured 86 commissioned officers, 67 Government employees, 1,274 non-commissioned officers and privates, and 933 negroes, besides killing and wounding in the various engagements 1,000 more, making an aggregate of 3,360, being an average of one to each man I had in the engagements. In addition to these I captured about 800 horses, 7 pieces of artillery, 2,000 stand small arms, several hundred saddles, 50 wagons and ambulances, with a large amount of machinery, commissary's and quartermaster's stores, all of which has been distributed to the different commands. The greatest damage, however, done to the enemy was in the *complete destruction of the railroad* from Decatur to Spring Hill, with the exception of the Duck River Bridge. *It will require months to repair the injury done to the road,* and may possibly be the means of *forcing the evacuation of Pulaski and Columbia,* and thus relieve the people from further oppression."

The destruction of the railroad was very complete; it covered

a long distance. General Forrest's anticipation was that its restoration would "require months."

We will now see how the problem was handled upon the side of the United States Army. The report of General Daniel S. McCallum, Director and Manager of Military Railroads, dated October 13, 1864 (Official Record, Series 1, Volume 39, Part 1, page 507), reads as follows:

"SIR :—I have the honor to transmit the following statement in regard to the effect of the late raid by the Rebel General Forrest upon the military railway lines in the Division of the Mississippi: 1 engine and 12 cars, burned on a trestle near Decatur Junction, all destroyed, 3 cars, burned between Huntsville and Stevenson. *All the bridges and trestles between Pulaski and Athens, a distance of 30 miles, destroyed.* This embraces Duck River Bridge and the most formidable trestle on the Decatur and Stevenson Line, *1100 feet long and 90 feet high;* and about *two miles and a half of track partially destroyed.* Between Spring Hill and Columbia three bridges destroyed and *two to three miles of track.* The Chattanooga line is uninjured, excepting the tearing up of one or two rails by small guerrilla parties. High water on the Chattanooga and Atlanta line has *carried away the bridges over the Chattahooche and Oostenaule Rivers, and two or three between Chattanooga and Dalton. The Rebels have turned up several miles of the track.*"

Then follows General McCallum's statement of the time required for reconstructing the railroads, rebuilding the bridges, and restoring the line of communication, a work which General Forrest had estimated would "require months." As to that point General McCallum's statement is:

"Altogether, it will take until the 20th of the present month [seven days from the date of his report] to restore communication between Chattanooga and Atlanta. Many engines have been thrown from the track by the removal of the rails, but *no very serious accidents* have occurred."

As to the nature and amount of this work of construction carried on by the Engineers' Department in Sherman's army, we have the report of Captain Poe, Chief Engineer. The report says:

"Operations connected with the march of General Sherman's Army, extending over a great portion of the Southern States, were of a very rapid character. Such of them as legitimately belonged to the Engineer Department were so intimately confounded with the whole that it is impossible to separate them. In order to explain clearly why bridges were built and roads made in the locations where they were, it will be neces-

sary to give the movements of the army in detail, when the reasons will generally be evident. The Corps of the Engineers were directed to facilitate these movements, and always with a distinct idea of their object."

* * * * * * * * * *

"In the Army of the Cumberland, each corps, division and nearly every brigade, was provided with an officer detailed from among the commissioned officers of the infantry regiments, whose duty it was to make such surveys and reconnaissances as might be wanted. The other two armies were not so well provided, but had a single organization to do all that was requisite."

* * * * * * * * * *

"I may make the general remark here that whenever it was deemed necessary to use a bridge for a greater length of time than 48 hours, pontoon bridges were invariably replaced by wooden trestle bridges constructed by the materials at hand, either by the Engineer troops or the pioneer forces. The object of this was to preserve the canvas covers of the batteaux, even at the expense of considerable labor, since we had the latter in greater abundance than the former."

The quantity of the work done under Captain Poe's directions coming down only to the date of September 2d, 1864, is stated as follows:

"In describing these operations I have gone somewhat into detail in order that they might be clearly understood, deeming it peculiarly the province of the engineer to call attention to such brilliant manœuvres as those which *enabled a river to be forded in the very face of the enemy with the loss of less than a platoon of men, and those which placed six army corps upon the enemy's line of communication in opposition to a single corps.*

"In accomplishing these results the Engineer Department provided the following special labor: 10 pontoon bridges built across the Chattahoochee River, averaging 350 feet in length, 3,500 feet; 7 trestle bridges, built out of material cut from the bank, across the same stream, of which 5 were double track and two were single, 350 feet long each, 2,450 feet; 50 miles, estimated, of infantry parapet, with a corresponding length of artillery epaulement; 6 bridges over Peach Tree Creek, averaging 80 feet long each, 480 feet; 5 bridges over Flint River, averaging 80 feet long each, 400 feet; also many smaller bridges built and many miles of road repaired. The topographical branch of the Engineer Department worked efficiently; surveys were made of all the routes passed over by the infantry columns, together with the lines prepared by the Bureau, and a map on the scale of four inches to one mile illustrating the siege, so-called, of Atlanta has been forwarded to the Engineer Bureau, in which these surveys are filed, from the passage of Peach Tree Creek, July 19, to the beginning of the movement upon the enemy's line of communication, August 25, and a general map, photographic copy, illustrating the entire campaign from Chat-

tanooga to Atlanta. I have also forwarded to the Bureau a complete set of photographic views illustrating the military operations about Atlanta.

"From the Map Department 4,000 copies of maps were issued to the proper officers to facilitate military operations. * * * I can only return my thanks to those *officers of Volunteers who did equally well the topographical work.* They did their duty, and did it well. I must leave to the Chief Engineers of the several armies to which they belonged to do them justice."

Is the British Army organized, equipped, and trained, for work like that? Is any European continental army equal to it? Has anything like it ever been done by any army in the world, other than our own, our army of volunteers, which the European critics have all affected to despise?

While these engineering operations were going on, it is to be noted, that they were carried on in the face of an active enemy during a completely continuous period of fighting. From the many evidences of this fact it is necessary to make a selection of only one, which is taken from the report of General Thomas, dated September 13, 1864, as to the operations of the Army of the Cumberland, one sentence of which are merely specimens of numberless others:

"During these four months of active campaign, hardly a day has passed that some portion of this army was not engaged either in skirmishing or in actual battles with the enemy."

In this connection it will give us some additional assistance to consider the general bearings of the question of transportation to active military operations as they are stated by General Cox in his history of the Atlanta campaign. At page 9 he says:

"The difficulty of sustaining an army more than 200 miles from its base, from which it was separated from the rugged mountains over which there were only a few roads, and these scarce better than pack mule tracks, was fully felt by all military men who had studied the problem."

At page 7 he says:

"For the experience of war had demonstrated that *no considerable army could subsist depending upon the wagons and common country roads for more than a few miles from the railway depots.* A rapid march could be made living upon the country if it led to a point where military stores could be reached or captured; but *protracted operations are indis-*

solubly tied to the railway and water lines which can be depended on in all weather and to any extent."

As to these same matters General Sherman states in his report of September 15, 1864:

"I must bear full and liberal testimony to the energetic and successful management of our railroads during the campaign. No matter when or where a break has been made the repair train seemed on the spot and the damage was repaired, generally before I knew of the break. Bridges have been built with surprising rapidity, and the locomotive whistle was heard in our advance camps almost before the echo of the skirmish fire had ceased. Some of these bridges—those of the Oostenaula, the Etowah and Chattahoochee—were fine substantial structures, and were built in an inconceivably short time, almost out of the material improvised on the spot.

"Colonel W. W. Wright, who has charge of the construction and repairs, is not only a most skillful but a wonderfully ingenious and industrious and zealous officer and I can hardly do him justice. In like manner the officers charged with running trains have succeeded to my entire satisfaction, and have worked in perfect harmony with the Quartermasters and Commissaries bringing forward abundant supplies with such regularity that at no one time have we wanted for provisions, forage, ammunition or stores of any essential kind,

"Colonel L. C. Easton, Chief Quartermaster, and Colonel A. Beckwith, Chief Commissary, have also succeeded in a manner surprising to all of us in getting forward supplies. I doubt if ever an army was better supplied than this, and I commend them most highly for it, because I know that more solicitude was felt by the Lieutenant-General commanding and by the military at large on this than any other one problem involved in the success of the campaign. Captain C. G. Baylor, Chief Ordnance Officer, has in like manner kept the army supplied at all times with every kind of ammunition. To Captain O. M. Poe, Chief Engineer, I am more than ordinarily indebted for keeping me supplied with maps and information of roads and topography, as well as in the more important branch of his duties in selecting lines and military positions."

"My own personal staff has been small but select. Brigadier General W. F. Barry, an officer of undoubted capacity and great experience, has filled the position of Chief of Artillery to perfection, and Lieutenant E. D. Kittoe, Chief Medical Inspector, has done everything possible to give proper aid and direction to the operations of that important department. I have never seen a wounded man removed from the fields of battle, cared for and afterwards sent to the hospitals in the rear with more promptness, system, care and success than during this whole campaign, covering more than 100 days of actual battle and skirmishing. My Aides de Camp, Major J. C. McCoy, Captain L. M. Dayton and Captain J. C. Audenried, have been very zealous and most efficient, carrying my orders, day and night,

to distant parts of our extended lines, with an intelligence and zeal that ensured the proper working of machinery covering from 10 to 25 miles of ground, when the least error in delivery and explanation of an order would have produced confusion ; whereas, in a great measure owing to the intelligence of these officers, orders have been made so clear that these vast armies have moved side by side, sometimes crossing each other's tracks through a difficult country of over 138 miles in length, without confusion or trouble. * * *

"My three armies in the field were commanded by able officers, my equals in rank and experience—Major General George H. Thomas, Major General J. M. Schofield and Major General O. O. Howard. With such commanders, I had only to indicate the object desired, and they accomplished it. I cannot over-estimate their services to the country, and must express my deep and grateful thanks that, coming together from different fields, with different interests, they have co-operated with a harmony that has been productive of the greatest amount of success and good feeling. A more harmonious army does not exist."

The difficulty of the operations covered by these statements will perhaps appear with some additional clearness if we consider the casualties of that army during the months of May, June, July and August, 1864. The total is:

"Killed, officers, 352; men, 4,636;
Wounded, officers, 1,145; men, 22,682;
Missing, officers, 123; men, 4,585;
Aggregate, 34,514.

To which should be added the causualties for September 1st to 15th in the Army of the Cumberland, 2,567, making the aggregate 37,081."

The result of these operations is stated by General Sherman as follows:

"We must concede to our enemy that he made these efforts patiently and skillfully, but at last he made the mistake that we had waited for so long, and sent his cavalry to our rear, far beyond the reach of recall. Instantly our cavalry was on his only remaining road, and we followed quickly with our principal army, and Atlanta fell into our possession as the fruit of well concerted measures, backed by a brave and confident army. This completed the grand task which had been assigned us by our Government, and your General again repeats his personal and official thanks to all the officers and men composing this army for the indomitable courage and perseverance which alone could give success. We have beaten our enemy on every ground that he has chosen, and have wrested from him his own Gate City, where were located his founderies, arsenals and workshops, deemed secure on account of their distance from the base and the seemingly insurmountable obstacles intervening.

"Nothing is impossible to an army like this."

General Cox states in his history, at page 83:

"Foreign officers visiting the army often expressed their amazement at seeing the troops of the line doing the incidental work, and without engineering assistance, what was earlier done by a corps of sappers under the direction of a scientific staff."

The ease, even at that time, of destroying railroad tracks is made evident by a despatch of General Sherman to General Rousseau of July 7, 1864:

"When you reach the road, do your work well. Burn the ties in piles; heat the iron in the middle, and, when red hot, let the men pull the ends so as to give a twist to the rails. If simply bent, the rails may be used, but if they are twisted or wrenched, they cannot be used again."

The speed with which the work of reconstruction was carried on in Sherman's army, where lines of railway had been destroyed, will appear by the following quotations from original documents. On the 10th of July, 1864, in his despatch from Roswell of that date, General G. M. Dodge advised Sherman as follows:

"My troops are arriving and crossing. I have been here three hours and in company with General Newton have thoroughly examined the country. I will occupy and fortify to-night a tete-de pont half a mile from the river and extending on and down one mile, covering the entire ford, bridge and roads leading to them; the ford is for a mile or two in extent very rough and impracticable except for troops. To bridge the stream I will have to build over 650 feet in length. I shall use the old piers and trestle. We have a strong picket out three miles covering the forks of road leading to McAfee's Bridge, 8 miles up the river and covering the forks of road that leads to Atlanta. It is too far out to take the command until the river is easily passed by the artillery and trains."

That despatch was sent by telegraph at 1.30 P. M. July 10th. At 8 P. M. General Dodge telegraphs as follows:

"Major General Sherman: Forces are all over river. Start at work fortifying. Have got batteries over also. *Have built a floating bridge. Road bridge is a pretty big job* but will work away on it. No forces in my front that we can hear of. G. M. Dodge, Major General."

General Sherman answers in part as follows:

"I have been out all day. Am just back Have received General Garrard's and your despatches. I design that General McPherson's whole army shall go to that flank, and you are to prepare the way. General

Newton will stay with you till you feel all safe, when he will rejoin his corps, now in support of General Schofield eight miles below you. General Garrard will picket the roads, and I want you to fortify a tete-de-pont and bridge. * * * Keep me well advised by courier to Marietta and telegraph."

Some light is thrown upon the general nature of the situation by General Sherman's telegram to General Garrard of the same date, July 10:

"Signal officer reports railroad and wagon road bridges burning. If this be so, of course the enemy is on the other side. The truth will be ascertained at once; in the meantime be watchful."

Further light as to the nature of the construction work then on hand appears from General Dodge's despatch of July 11, to General McPherson, in which he says:

"I will work hard on the bridge here and finish it as soon as possible. It is a big job, as you will perceive from the length. *Everything was burned up here that we could see*—houses, mills, lumber and all."

On the same date, July 11, General Sherman says in his despatch to General Dodge:

"I know that you have a big job, but that is nothing new for you. * * * I know the bridge at Roswell is important, and you may destroy all Georgia to make it good and strong."

On the same date, July 11, General Dodge telegraphs to General Sherman:

"All quiet this morning. I had no fear about being able to build the bridge, but thought you might expect it finished sooner than possible. As it was twice as long as I expected to find it. and twice as long as the river is wide, down at Santown, I have over 1,000 men at work on it day and night. It is already well under way. I have planking for floors now on the ground, and not one minute shall be lost in pushing it forward. Every man that can work on it shall be kept at it."

General Sherman answers on the same day:

"I have no doubt you will have the bridge done in time."

On July 12, General Dodge telegraphs:

"I pushed my mounted infantry down five miles to-day to the crossing of Nancy's Creek, where we found the enemy's cavalry in force, and they followed us back one-half mile. The bridge at this place is a ferry, and will be a good place to put in a pontoon. We will if you should desire.

The river is about 300 feet wide. *I will have the bridge at this place finished to-morrow.* All the bents are up to-night, stringers on and planked one-third the distance across. When done it will take safely over any number of troops and their trains. All quiet here. River slowly rising."

The next day, July 13, at 9 P. M., General Dodge telegraphs: "Bridge is built; is double track."

No further notice was taken of the matter in despatches on either side. It was a mere everyday affair.

But has any other army than ours ever done such work? Yet that is the kind of work now before the British Army. Have they ever given any indication that they are equal to it?

Even laymen are well aware, that the matter of supply, in other words, of transportation, is the vital and essential one, in the conduct of active military operations by any large body of troops. Troops must be well fed, if they are to do good work. Ammunition, in all cases, must come from the rear. In order to have military operations efficient, the supply of food, clothing, ammunition, and all other things needed by troops in the field, must have complete regularity, and great speed. It is obvious, then, that the matter of supplying the wants of a large army depends on having the Quartermaster and Commissary Departments very perfect, in their personnel and organization. In fact, the mere term "organization," if used with accuracy, implies the existence of a sufficient number of men, especially of officers, who have the requisite ability, and experience, for the discharge of their duties, together with such an arrangement and adjustment of those men and officers as will make them a harmonious working force. Assuming, then, that it is possible for a government to command the services of a sufficient number of experienced men and officers in the quartermaster's and commissary departments, even after that, in order to convert those men and officers into a smoothly working body, requires time. If, however, there is no such previous supply of men of training and experience, if the men for the quartermaster and commissary service must not only be found, but must be educated, it is quite plain that the time required for organizing those most essential departments of an effective army must be considerable.

THE EXTREME EASE OF DESTRUCTION OF RAILWAY COMMUNICATIONS IN THE PRESENT SOUTH AFRICAN FIELD OF OPERATIONS.

The field of operations is most remarkable. Especially so, when considered with reference to the military purposes of the South African Republic, and the most admirable choice of military positions which has been made by the commanding officers of their forces. This choice was, of course, to a great extent dictated by the positions and movements of the British troops. Taken in connection with those positions and movements, it is difficult to see how anything better could have been devised on the part of General Joubert.

The South African Republic itself has within its limits a large area of open country, fitted at some times of the year to the movements of cavalry and the easy handling of considerable bodies of troops. The movements of a modern army would, in some respects, be easier within the limits of the Republic itself than at almost any other point in South Africa which can become the field of active operations.

It was, therefore, wise, for that reason, if for no other, that General Joubert decided to conduct his operations on the enemy's territory, that is, in Natal and the Cape Colony, rather than to allow the British troops to have the comparatively open country of the Republic itself, whereon to move and operate. Another reason for his course is doubtless to be found, that the British authorities had accumulated a considerable supply of military stores at Ladysmith, which it would be desirable for the Burghers to capture and apply to their own use. Another point to be noticed is, that, for the sake of protecting Mr. Rhodes' diamond mines, a considerable British force had been posted at Kimberley, and another at Mafeking. It was, of course, desirable that these two bodies of troops should be

isolated, and that their capture at no distant date should be made as certain as possible. Moreover, the nature of the country south of the Transvaal frontier, its mountains, its streams, its lack of available wagon roads, furnished other conclusive reasons, why the Republics should make their first line of defense south of their own frontiers. For these reasons, taken in combination, General Joubert evidently decided to make his objective points in the first instance the three bodies of British troops at Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking. The movements of Lord Methuen and General French also made it necessary for him to concentrate forces of Burghers to the south of Kimberley; between Kimberley and Orange River, to meet Lord Methuen; and in and around Naauwport, Steynsburg, and Molteno, to meet the advance of General French.

Bearing these facts in mind, we have next to note that the country around Ladysmith, and along the line of the railroad to the north as far as Charlestown, is very mountainous, and that the road, for all practical purposes, runs through one continuous defile. Such a position is the strongest known for the purposes of the defense. At the same time, the roads available for the passage of any considerable number of troops are very few, and almost follow the line of the railway itself. From Ladysmith to Dundee, a station on the railroad forty-seven miles northeast of Ladysmith, there is a road which follows substantially the line of the railroad, crossing it at one point or another, and having a length not very different from that of the railroad line itself. From Dundee to Newcastle the wagon road continues to follow the line of the railroad, crossing it at different points. Between Ladysmith and Newcastle a wagon road goes with comparative directness, forming roughly the diameter of a semicircle, the semicircle itself being the railway track. On the other hand, to the east and right of the railway is another road making a considerable circuit from Ladysmith to Dundee. A very few small and inferior wagon roads go between these main roads just mentioned at a few points; but they hardly deserve consideration from the military standpoint. From Newcastle to Charlestown there is for all practical purposes only one wagon road, which follows irregularly the line of the railroad for a distance, and then strikes off to the northeast to Wakkerstroom.

DIAGRAM

Showing mileage and altitudes of Stations on Main Line between DURBAN AND CHARLESTOWN.

Scale { Horizontal 8 miles = 1 inch. Vertical 1000 feet = 1 inch.



We will next look at the altitudes. These are especially important, for the reason that they give us some idea of the heavy grades upon the railway, which constitute a very important feature in the question of transportation. At the same time they show the extreme ease of destruction to the railway line. At Pinetown, not over 20 miles from Durban, the railroad already reaches an altitude of 1,125 feet. At Camperdown the altitude is 2,297 feet. Thornville Junction has an altitude of 3,006 feet. Pietermaritzburg, only 70 miles from Durban, has an altitude of 2,218 feet. At this point it is to be noted, that from Thornville Junction, the station last mentioned, to Pietermaritzburg, a distance of less than 20 miles by rail, the fall in the altitude is about 800 feet. From Pietermaritzburg to Howick, a distance of 17½ miles, we have a rise which brings us at Howick to the altitude of 3,439 feet. At Balgowan, only a few miles further on, we have an altitude of 4,183 feet. At Weston we reach 4,506 feet. At Estcourt we are down again to 3,833 feet. At Frere station, less than 20 miles further, we have a further descent of 400 feet, taking us down to an altitude of 3,436 feet. At Chieveley the altitude is 3,520 feet. At Colenso, 3,106; at Ladysmith, 3,285 feet; at Dundee, 4,100 feet; at Dannhauser, 4,430 feet; at Ingagane we reach 3,900 feet; at Newcastle, 3,892 feet, and at Charlestown, in the immediate vicinity of Majuba Hill and Laing's Neck, we have the altitude of 5,385 feet. From these figures it is easy to see how severe must be the grades on the railroad, what a high degree of power must be required in the locomotives, how narrow will be the limits of weight possible for transportation by steam power, and how easy it will be to interfere with the movements of trains.

Another feature which will be apparent from a glance at the map has almost greater importance; it is the large number of streams, and of rivers of considerable size, which the railway crosses by bridges. This point would be one that we could infer, from the mere fact that the railway line runs through a very mountainous region, even if we had no assistance on the point from the map. An examination of the map, however, makes the fact much more apparent. Taking no point nearer Durban than Pietermaritzburg, at that point the railroad crosses the Umsundizi River. At Howick it crosses the Umgeni. Near

Balgowan station it crosses the Lion River. Near Weston it crosses the Mooi River; at Estcourt, Bushman's River; at Frere Station, the Blaauwkraas River; at Colenso, the Tugela River; at Ladysmith the Sand River; just north of Elands Laagte we have the Sundazi River; at Waschbank Station, the Waschbank River; at Ingagane, the Ingagane River; at Newcastle, a branch of the Buffalo River. In addition to these rivers that have been mentioned, the railroad, according to the maps, crosses a considerable number of smaller streams.

Each one of these rivers and streams, of course, has a bridge. Each bridge is a point of easy destruction. In the days of our Civil War the destruction of bridges, nearly all of them being trestle bridges made of wood, was ordinarily accomplished by burning. To-day the destruction of a bridge is a thing of much greater ease and speed. Two or three cartridges of dynamite applied to the embankment or masonry at either end, will do in a second the work of destruction that under the methods used in our Civil War would require perhaps several hours. At the same time it is to be noted, that a few dynamite cartridges can be carried by a single man, with no addition to his burden, and with no decrease in his ease of movement. A party of four or five men, or even a single man, can destroy any bridge on that line of railway with entire ease.

Destruction of the British communications, therefore, is for the Burghers a matter of the greatest ease. The derailing of trains, where the line of railway has heavy grades, and many curves, is a matter of comparative ease. If no other means were available, it is not a very difficult matter to roll down large masses of rock at opportune times. But in a region like South Africa the methods of destruction are many and simple.

On the other hand, the work of construction, or rather re-construction, by the British troops, in cases of interruption of the railway line, will be one of extreme difficulty, and is in all human probability one for which they have thus far made not a particle of preparation.

Even in our Civil War, destruction was comparatively easy. In our Civil War the method in use was the one described in General Sherman's report of September 15, 1864, in the following language: "I then ordered *one day's* work to be expended

in destroying that road, and it was done with a will. *Twelve and one-half miles* were destroyed, the ties burned and the iron rails heated and twisted by the utmost ingenuity of old hands at the work. Several cuts were filled up with trunks of trees, logs, rocks and earth intermingled, with loaded shells prepared as torpedoes to explode in case of an attempt to clear them out."

Further light on this point is thrown by a few words from the report of a field officer, Col. Ario Pardee, Jr., which reads as follows: "I have the honor to report that in compliance with instructions received yesterday I destroyed the railroad from the City of Atlanta to a point 250 yards beyond the fourth mile post, in all about two miles and three-quarters of track. The ties have been burned and the rails bent and twisted so as to render them useless."

But the means available to-day for the destruction of railroads are vastly more efficacious and speedy than those which were used by our troops in the Civil War. This is due mainly to the recent development of the science of explosives. With the modern explosives, of superior power and greater compactness, it is now a comparatively simple and easy matter to destroy many miles of railroad with a comparatively small number of men, moving and operating in very small parties. A few cartridges of dynamite, judiciously applied at the end of any bridge, will wreck it so as to make its reconstruction a matter of great difficulty and delay The mere moving of the spikes from the outer rail on any curve, leaving the rail undisturbed, will be pretty certain to run a train off the track, destroying the train, and rendering the road impassable for a considerable period of time. Especially is this the case, in any mountainous region, where grades are heavy and curves are numerous. The ease and facility of the destruction of lines of railroad under such conditions is easily apparent.

On the other hand, this increase in ease and rapidity of destruction makes an immense increase in the burden resting upon any force which must depend for its daily supply on a railway line.

Taking then into consideration the long line of railway upon which the British forces must depend for their supplies of rations, forage, and ammunition, it is quite plain, that if the

Burghers are handled with reasonable skill and alertness, if they make reasonably good use of the immense advantages of their position, they will be able to cut the British lines of communications almost at will, and without any great expenditure of life or material. They will be able to make the problem of supply almost an impossible one.

The statements already made as to the difficulty of maintaining long lines of railway communication in a hostile country have been somewhat general in their character. In South Africa, however, that is, in the portion of it which is for the present to be the field of military operations, the difficulties are exceptional. Their nature and extent will appear from the following consideration of existing conditions.

The field of operations in South Africa is decidedly different from any that has ever been heretofore used in the handling of large bodies of troops. The European Continent, during the last few centuries during which it has been the scene of so many wars, has been a country thickly settled, having a large number of roads available for the movements of large bodies of troops. It has also had a sufficiently dense population, to make it possible for armies of considerable numbers to live on the country. Requisitions upon large towns and cities can be easily made to supply a reasonably large force for a considerable period of time.

So, too, in our Civil War, although the country was rough, and the roads difficult, yet the roads available for wheel transportation were sufficient to allow the movement over them of large bodies of troops. For instance, General Sherman had no serious difficulty in supplying his army of 60,000 men during his march to the sea, mainly by foraging on the country.

As General Howard stated in his despatch to General Sherman of November 1, 1864: "We marched to this place by *two good roads* from Cave Spring. Hood took much. But there is *plenty of corn and some pigs.*" As General Sherman himself put it, in his despatch to his Commissary, Colonel Beckwith, on November 10, 1864, just before the beginning of the march to Savannah: "When I start I propose to move with great rapidity. Faster than cattle can possibly gain on us.

They are now five days behind, and could not possibly catch up, as I will break the Etowah and Chattahooche bridges in passing, and those streams are now too high to cross without bridges. We can safely rely on the country for half rations of meat. *Where a million of people live I have no fear of getting a share.*"

He further said, in his despatch to General Thomas of November 11: "You may act, however, on the certainty that I sally from Atlanta on the 16th inst. with about 60,000 men, well provisioned, but expecting to live chiefly on the country."

But this matter of supplying a large army from the country through which it moves has its limitations. In the first place it must be used with great caution in a friendly country, or in a country where it is desired to keep the inhabitants on friendly terms. In the second place, it is limited in point of time. In an ordinary agricultural region, the amount of supplies that can be collected from any available area is soon exhausted. No dependence therefore can be put upon it as the means of supplying the subsistence needs of a large force for any considerable period.

We are thrown back, therefore, on this question of the subsistence of large bodies of troops, to the impossibility of depending upon anything other than transportation by railroads.

But, as stated before, the question of supply lies at the foundation of all military movements. The matter of transportation lies at the foundation of the question of supply. This fact is now at last becoming understood in England. An extract from the London Times reads as follows:

"Limitation upon England's Campaign

"Col. Hanna, who is an eminent military authority, has published what seems to me to be a very sensible letter in TheTimes. Our military authorities meet any check in South Africa by sending out an additional division. The Colonel points out that in all countries, and especially in South Africa, *where the distances are enormous and the country that we propose to conquer so devoid of any supplies on which an invading army can count, we ought to deprecate any large increase on the present number of our soldiers.* In support of this he quotes the Duke of Wellington's dictum that *war is a question of commissariat, and that commissariat is one of transport.* Where everything has to be transported from a distance the Colonel holds

that we cannot trust to railroads, as they *may at any time be cut by mobile forces like those of the Boers*, in which case we should have to fall back on pack animals, bullock carts, &c. *The number that we can employ in active war, therefore, is limited by the number that we can feed.*

"I am not a military man, but what Col. Hanna says had occurred to me. Napoleon's expedition to Moscow broke down, not so much from the inclemency of the climate as from *the impossibility of feeding such a mass of men as he threw into the country;* and, up to a certain point, our *advance on Pretoria is analogous to that of Napoleon on Moscow.* Pretoria, according to all accounts, is so strongly fortified that it could not be taken without a regular siege, It is not likely that the Boers would resist our advance by a battle of Borodino. They would be more likely, after occupying, after their wont, successive positions from which they can kill or wound many of our men, to fall back into the veldt on either side, and then to *harass our communications.* These we should have to defend along a line *as long as the road from London to Newcastle.* Even if the railroad were not cut, it is laid down in the German military works that *a railroad with two lines of rail can only supply 40,000 men, and no South African railroad beyond the Orange River has more than one line."*

THE ABSENCE OF PREPARATION ON THE PART OF THE BRITISH ARMY FOR THE HANDLING OF THE PRESENT PROBLEM OF TRANSPORTATION AND SUPPLY.

We have seen how vital to the operations of any army is the problem of transportation and supply, and how impossible it is to handle this problem, for any large body of troops, especially in such a region as the one which is now the field of operations, except by lines of railway. We have also seen how easy it is in that region to destroy any line of railway, and how overwhelmingly difficult will be the work of rebuilding destroyed railway lines, and consequently, of keeping open any line of communications for the supply of any large armies.

Such being the situation, it is easily seen that the only possibility of the British Army conducting successfully any campaign of invasion depends on the efficiency of their commissary and quartermaster service, and of their engineer service.

Now it happens to be the fact, that Great Britain to-day is practically destitute of men of experience for service in the

Quartermaster and Commissary Departments, for any new troops which may be now raised for service in South Africa. Upon this point the evidence is very explicit, and is contained in the following article from the Army and Navy Gazette of October 7, 1899. That article may be deemed, for all practical purposes, to be almost equivalent to an official declaration. Moreover, it is an admission against interest, and consequently entitled to the highest weight as evidence. It reads as follows:

"TRANSPORT IN SOUTH AFRICA.

"The mobilization of the Army Service Corps for supplying one army corps for South Africa will, it is to be hoped, clearly demonstrate how disgracefully under-manned this important branch of the Service is. That the authorities should have permitted such a state of things is to be deplored, for it is *culpable neglect, and might involve the country in some dire national disaster. The stations have been drained to the dregs of officers, warrant officers, non commissioned officers and men. The district staff offices have been denuded of clerks, and companies of the corps left without officers or warrant officers, and all this to supply merely one army corps.* What would be done if a second or a third army corps were required, or if mobilization for home defense became suddenly necessary? Even to secure enough Army Service Corps of varying grades to proceed to South Africa, a special increase to the establishment has had to be resorted to.

"At the commencement of last session, Parliament decided that an augmentation of some forty officers was required, with an increase of a certain number of transport companies. We find, however, that only a few quartermasters have as yet been added, and but four new companies, without the addition of any of the forty officers required. From the Army List it seems that over seventy subalterns are still wanted to complete the corps. What is being done to secure and train them? Is it that candidates are shy of coming forward to fill the vacancies? And, if so, why? If the rate of pay is inadequate it should be increased. Candidates, and of the right sort, must be found as rapidly as possible, in order to fill the depleted cadres. Surely, by distributing young officers amongst the companies of the corps left at home, they could commence to learn the rudiments of their duties, and their training could be completed as opportunity offers at the technical school of instruction at Aldershot.

"When the seventy or so officers are found the existing establishment of the Army Service Corps will require to be gradually raised. More companies must be created, and each company should always have within its ranks two officers and a warrant officer. *For years past the Army Service Corps companies have been starved; rarely have they had even their full complement of officers.* The number of captains has been dangerously weak, and the number of subalterns and warrant officers wholly inade-

quate to meet even peace requirements. The 'establishment' of clerks, bakers, and butchers is in the same lamentable condition; *practically the whole of the clerks in the home offices have been drained for South Africa*, and promotions to higher ranks suddenly made at the moment of mobilisation.

"In Indian campaigns good service in supply and transport is done by regimental officers, and seeing that the existing strength of the Army Service Corps is so lamentably weak it would seem desirable to take regimental subalterns to serve in South Africa with the transport companies, setting free those of the corps for duties at home, where they are much needed. The administration of the corps is evidently faulty, otherwise such calls as are now made might have been foreseen and provided for. It is far better to spend a certain sum annually in preparation for contingencies than for the War Office to be 'found wanting' at a critical moment, for then money is recklessly spent and no really tangible good results to anybody. *The supply and transport bears so important a part in warfare* that, cost what it may to maintain it efficiently in peace, a sufficiency of officers should always be available so that they may be able to fall into their places when war comes. To leave companies without officers, and stations and districts without either officers or clerks, is reprehensible to a degree, and a department which allows such things to be can scarcely be defended. We object strongly to the 'we told you so' form of journalism, but in this particular detail of administration there is literally no excuse for the War Office, as the officials in Pall-Mall have for years past been warned of what would happen if war suddenly came. The difficulty in the Transvaal can scarcely be said to have arisen suddenly, yet *the unpreparedness of our supply and transport arrangements is beyond dispute*, admirable as the system is which we owe to the organizing capacity of Sir Redvers Buller. The system, in fact, is so perfect that the *existing breakdown* is the less to be excused. We trust, however, that the new quartermaster-general will take steps immediately to represent in the strongest terms the *seriousness of our position* and obtain permission to fill with all possible despatch the full cadre of officers, so that there may be no repetition of the existing scandal."

The only force in the entire British Army at present existing, for the purpose of transportation and supply, consists of the Royal Engineers, the Departmental Corps, and the Army Service Corps. The figures of those different branches of the service, according to the latest reports, are as follows:

	Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers, Drummers, &c.	Rank and file.
Royal Engineers.....	601	1,312	5,834
Departmental Corps.....	195	1,426	3,166
Army Service Corps.....	245	751	2,807

But here we come on another fact of even greater significance.

Not only is there this total dearth in the British army of men of experience for the branches of the service just mentioned, but, in addition to that, it is a strictly accurate statement, that no officer in the British Army has had any practical experience in handling any difficult problem of transportation in opposition to a modern civilised army.

The two men, who come nearest to meeting the requirements of the situation, are Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener.

Let us see what their experience in actual active service has been.

Lord Roberts' experience in handling any difficult question of transportation may be summed up as consisting in the command of a single small expeditionary force on the Kabul-Kandahar march. That march occupied twenty-two days. It was not interrupted by active fighting. He had no opposition. There was no interference whatever with his communications. His entire moving body, including both troops and camp followers, amounted only to about 21,000 men, including 8,000 camp followers, with 8,000 animals. They lived on the country during the whole of the march. There was no practical difficulty in the matter of rations or forage. The distance covered was only 313 miles. At the end of the march Lord Roberts had what has been euphemistically termed a battle, which lasted a few hours, and in which Lord Roberts' force, numbering 14,800 men, suffered a loss of 40 killed and 210 wounded.

From these facts it is easily apparent, that the famous Kabul-Kandahar march, of which so much has been made by English writers, can hardly call for serious consideration as a military operation. It can scarcely be considered as the march of an army in the face of a real enemy, and should be graded almost as the movement of a small body of troops in a friendly country. The experience of Lord Roberts, when we consider the actual problems that confront any commander who has resting upon him the burden of supplying a large army, amounts to practically nothing.

Lord Kitchener's experience, so far as concerns the question now under consideration, is limited to his expedition up the Nile. His experience, too, is virtually the only one that has

been had in recent times by any English Army officer in the handling of a line of communications of any considerable length. From this experience considerable light will be thrown upon the problem now before the British forces in South Africa.

The essential fundamental feature of his situation, moreover, is to be found in the entire absence of an enemy capable of causing any serious interruption to the work of construction which is hereafter detailed.

In a book lately published entitled "The Sudan Campaign, 1896 to 1899, by An Officer," (London, Chapman & Hall, Ld., 1899), there is the following statement of the problem of transportation and supply which Lord Kitchener had to solve:

"How was the force to be supplied on the march to the battle, and more especially after it? Behind there would be 100 miles of continuous cataract, preventing the supplies being brought by river. To bring them by camel over 100 miles of bad road through the Sahara Desert, where not an ounce of food would be got, would mean a stupendous number of camels for even a small force. A baggage camel will carry 300 pounds 20 miles a day. He eats 10 pounds of food a day; he occupies 10 days in going 100 miles and back, in which time he eats 100 pounds. So he only brings but 200 pounds for the force. He must have rest every now and again, and he will die on the least provocation. To take a month's supply 100 miles for 10,000 men, about 15,000 camels are required. And then when a further advance of 1,200 miles is made to Dongola and Merowi, what is to be done then?

"The Sirdar hit on exactly the right solution. He determined to take every advantage possible of the river, to carry supplies on it wherever it could be done, to supplement it with camel transportation where it could not be done, and *to make a railway.* This meant gradual advance at first, an advance to the furthest limit that alternate boat and camel service would supply, and as the railway advanced push on the boats and camels."

It will readily occur to the reader that the problem of original construction of a railway differs in no essential feature from the problem of re-building a railway that has been destroyed.

We proceed with the further statement of Lord Kitchener's method of railway construction:

"The Sirdar's plan, therefore, was to advance to Akasheh a small force and entrench it there to cover the railway construction. This small force could be supplied by camel convoys, which marched every night and entrenched days, and were convoyed by a guard. When the

railway had proceeded as far as safety permitted, he would rapidly bring up his whole force and drive the dervishes out of Ferket and Suarda. As they were just as much governed by the questions of supply, they would then be unable to keep any permanent force north of Hannek, and he could safely continue the construction of his railway to Falket, while in the meantime camels worked between railhead and the force. When the railway reached Ferket, he would bring up a big reserve of supplies, wait till high Nile, then put it into boats which could sail right up to Dongola, Merowi and Kassinger, thus supplying the force.

"To carry his force across the river, to tow barges on the calm days and scout up the river, to bombard river forts preliminary to landing, to enfilade fortifications, to make life in the river-bank unbearable for the enemy; to do all these things, he would have gunboats drawing two feet of water. When the river rose gunboats lying at Halfa were to be pulled up cataracts to Ferket, and three new ones should be taken in sections by rail to Ferket and launched. Thus he would have complete command of the river, and could supply a big force, and when the time came he would move swiftly to the destruction of the Dervishes.

"It looks a simple plan, but it needed a man who knew the country and the enemy to make it, and a mistake in the scheme would be heavily paid for. Anyone who has seen the inhospitable, barren, grilling Batn el Haggar will understand what a mistake in the supplying of a force would mean. It stopped the Romans, Greeks and Persians. Simple as the plan looks, it was not so simple to execute, but luckily Sir Herbert Kitchener was as capable to execute as he was to plan."

From what has been said it is apparent that the possibility of interference with the work of construction on the part of the Dervishes was within the contemplation of Lord Kitchener. Moreover, if the Dervishes had been at all conversant with the methods of modern warfare, such interference would no doubt have taken place. It turned out to be the fact, however, that no such interference was had. This appears from a further statement contained in the work from which quotation has just been made, at page 14, which reads as follows:

"It was considered certain that the Dervishes would attack the convoys, and if they had, they certainly would have done considerable damage. There was no road for the convoys; they had to clamber in long straggling line up and down steep and rocky hills, and it would have been quite possible for the Dervishes to get at one end or other of the convoys before the escort could interfere. The escort could not be scattered too much or they would be beaten if attacked. There

were some splendid opportunities for the Dervishes, *but they never took them.* No doubt they found it hard to get unobserved through our cavalry and camel screen. Daily the cavalry used a scout from Akasheh towards Ferket, and were in constant touch with the Dervish cavalry scouts. A cavalry officer told me he never had such a good time as during this outpost duty. He said it was like going out hunting every day. One never knew what would turn up; one day they would be trying to outride and catch a weaker patrol; the next they would be dodging and watching a stronger one."

It is easy to see what the difficulties would have been in the face of an alert and active enemy, conversant with the methods of serious warfare.

A further quotation from the same book, page 17, shows the difficulty of the work of construction under the comparatively easy conditions which existed at the time:

"It was necessary, therefore to utilize the railway material on the spot at once, and to supplement it as quickly as possible with the many things that it wanted. Measures were taken to procure engines, trucks, sleepers, rails, machinery for shops, fitters and workmen, foremen, platelayers, and all the various accessories for a railway. The gauge of the existing thirty-three miles was three feet six inches, so this determined the gauge of the railway—in many ways a convenient one, but inconvenient for a military railway, because since the railway at the Cape is the only other one in the world, I believe, of the same gauge there is no ready-made supply of locomotives and rolling stock; everything had to be made to order, shipped to Alexandria, and then taken 1,000 miles up river, the greater part of the way by sailing boats, with three trans-shipments between Alexandria and Halfa. Naturally this took time. In fact the new engines only came into use during the last month of the expedition in September, and then they were very disappointing. The new trucks arrived quickly, but in the meantime all the old engines and rolling stock long since condemned were patched up and made to struggle on, to the imminent danger of all concerned. A railway batallion was formed by enlisting under the Conscription Act several hundred of the Fellaheen, who had no more idea of how to lay a railway than to fly. To superintend them several so-called platelayers were sent up from lower Egypt. Naturally they proved, with few exceptions, to be all the useless scoundrels discharged from the lower Egypt railways; the same with the engine drivers, they were nearly all native stokers with the most limited knowledge of how to drive or look after an engine, and with the most reckless disregard of consequences. When one puts an ignorant but reckless native engine driver on a patched up condemned locomotive, with no brakes, to drive a train of worn out trucks along a track laid by men who have never

seen a rail and don't understand a straight line or the necessity for exactitude; and when this track climbs up and down and in and out among switchback gradients and sharp corners, then you get all the elements required to produce the most exciting and exhilarating railway travelling."

This is a fair specimen of the kind of difficulties which will exist in the re-construction of the South African railways, whenever they shall be destroyed at any point by the Burghers at such time as may suit their military necessities.

The statement continues, page 18:

"To lick this mob into shape, to teach them to lay a proper track, and to lay it fast; to make good the accidents caused by these sporting native engine drivers; to put order and organization into the railway, the Sirdar got five Royal Engineer Subalterns, and the one he put in charge of the whole happened to be, with the *'Sirdar's usual luck*, the very man for the post. Lieutenant Girouard, R. E., knew exactly what was wanted, and had the head and energy and the pluck to do it. He was here, there and everywhere, instructing, swearing, shoving things along, *gradually getting organization and system to take the place of chaos*, and under his able guidance everyone became slowly but noticeably more proficient at the work; but it was real hard work for him, and the officers and men under him."

The statement then continues as to the matter of transportation during the construction of the railway. It is as follows:

"While the railway is hammering steadily forward, we will turn to the organization of transport service. As soon as the campaign began, veterinary surgeons were sent to the camel districts to buy camels. The natives soon heard that camels were wanted. It was a bad time of the year to buy, because camels were in great requisition to carry the crops to the railways, but still sufficient were produced, and all day long the veterinary officers were examining and passing camels. They were marched up to Wady Halfa. The personnel of the transport corps was, like the railway battalion, raised by using the Conscription Act to enlist the required number of Fellaheen."

Then follows a statement of the difficulties of transport service by means of camels, from which it is here unnecessary to quote.

The following paragraph gives a statement as to the line of communications of Sir Herbert Kitchener from Cairo to Ferket:

"It will be interesting to examine the line of communications at the time that we had advanced to Ferket from the base at Cairo. Stores

were forwarded for 390 miles by rail to Naghamadi. There an English officer was in charge of a gang of men who took them off the railway and put them into boats, which sailed 145 miles to Assouan. There another English officer was in charge, who had the stores loaded on to a train, which took them four miles around the cataract to Shellal, where they were again put into boats. This work was entirely done by convicts. At Shellal some of the boats were lashed alongside the stern-wheel steamers thus loaded, and towed 240 miles to Halfa, while the remaining boats sailed. From Halfa the railway carried them 68 miles to Ambigol Wells, where they were loaded on camels and carried about 35 miles to Ferket."

From this statement it is seen that the maintenance of communications had difficulties, even under the comparatively easy conditions which actually existed. Those difficulties, however, once surmounted, ceased to be serious, unless there was active interference with the communications by an active enemy. Throughout the whole of Kitchener's advance, and this is the fundamental fact underlying the nature and difficulty of his entire operations, there was virtually no interference with the work of construction on the part of any hostile force. From the statements already quoted it is quite apparent that the entire situation would have been essentially changed, if the work of construction had been interrupted by any active alert force of men supplied with modern explosives, and at the same time possessing knowledge as to their use.

No doubt Sir Herbert Kitchener showed remarkable capacity and energy, and fertility of resource in surmounting the difficulties of transportation and supply which were the preliminaries to his final engagement with the Dervishes. He evidently has the capacity for organization, untiring energy, combined with great skill in the selection and handling of men. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that the work which he prosecuted to its successful termination was not seriously interfered with at any point of time. No one knows better than he, how essentially different would be the conditions in case of opposition on the part of an alert and skillful foe.

Taking the conditions as they existed, however, with the river at his command, which made the problem of construction and supply comparatively simple and easy, Kitchener required from March, 1896, to June, 1898, for the construction of 550 miles

of railway to Atbara. At that point a flotilla of steamers and sailing boats was collected; the Nile was nearly high, and nothing more was wanted to complete the preparation for the advance on Khartum. The line of communications from Cairo at this point was as follows: From Cairo by rail to Assouan, 535 miles (36 hours); from Assouan to Halfa, 220 miles, in barges towed by steamers, (4 days); from Halfa to Adbara, by rail, 385 miles (36 hours); that is to say, from Cairo to Adbara, seven days, sometimes eight or even nine.

At the end of the British advance came the battle of Omdurman, in which the Dervishes were so obliging as to attempt a direct front attack on a well-drilled and well-disciplined force of men supplied with all the modern weapons of precision. The description of the situation on the front, given by the officer from whom quotations have already been made, is as follows:

"The fire discipline of the British throughout the action was a treat to watch; exactly as on parade they changed from volley firing to independent, and back to volley firing, as might be ordered, coolly and without any hurry. Their shooting, too, was admirable; they handily knocked them over at 900 yards, and within 300 nothing could live. The Egyptian troops were as steady, but they cannot shoot so well. Although the Dervishes were falling in hundreds, their advance seemed at first to be unchecked; numbers dropped, but others were rushing on and coming nearer and nearer, till it almost seemed as if they would reach us; but within 300 yards of the British, and within 200 of the Egyptian Brigade, scarcely a Dervish could live, and few camels escaped till within 50 yards or so, and then one or two daring horsemen calmly stood within 100 yards imploring their men to come on. * * * Now and again the enemy would try to rush forward from their cover, always with the same result."

The officer continues:

"So rapid was our fire that above the sound of the explosions could be heard the swish of our bullets going through the air, just like the swish of water; it literally swept away the line of charging Dervishes. One or two horsemen got within 100 yards, and it really looked as if they would reach us."

The real nature of the battle of Omdurman is easily seen from the statements already quoted, and from the following figures of the losses on either side. The entire casualties of the British side were:

"About 500, of which about 150 were killed." * * * "Of the Dervishes quite 15,000 were killed. Officers sent out next day counted 11,800 dead on the battle field; to these must be added those killed by the bombardment in Omdurman and in the Desert during pursuit. Several thousand more were wounded and taken prisoners." * * * "The smallness of our loss was due to the facts that the Dervish fire was extraordinarily inaccurate, and that the openness of the ground enabled us to keep the greater part of the enemy at a distance. Had the Dervish stayed in entrenchment and fought there as pluckily as they fought in the open, or had they made a night attack, the casualty list would have been very different."

In the operations in South Africa thus far, it will be noted the conditions have been reversed. The selection of position has been assigned to the Burghers. The making of a front attack on a force admirably posted, fully equipped with modern arms and ammunition, has been allotted to the British. The result has been what might have been expected—heavy loss to the attacking forces, with comparatively slight loss on the part of the defense.

But the point of principal interest in the story of the Soudan expedition is to be found in the fundamental problem already so many times mentioned—that of transportation and supply. That is the problem which the British forces in South Africa have now to encounter. But the conditions will be essentially different from any that they have heretofore encountered. The reason is the difference in the character of the country, and the character of the enemy.

THE REASON FOR THIS ABSENCE OF PREPARATION ON THE PART OF THE BRITISH ARMY.

The reason for this most astounding absence of preparation on the part of the British Army is to be found in the ignorance, and the incompetence, of the British War Office.

But that statement only takes us back one step.

What is the reason for the ignorance, and the incompetence, of the British War Office?

The answer to that question is somewhat complex. It is to be found in a number of facts, taken in combination. It is an old story. At its foundation lies the principal fact of the incapacity of hereditary kings, and hereditary classes, to do the severe steady hard work, which is absolutely essential to the proper handling of affairs of state in general, and of army affairs in particular. To that fact is to be added the further one, that efficient army administration is an absolute impossibility, when it rests in the hands of an ever-shifting group of ignorant laymen, selected at uncertain times, for uncertain periods, from a legislature, whose time and labor must always be given in the main to the manipulation of a majority in the House of Commons. These last are the conditions which exist under what is termed "parliamentary government."

Let us consider some of the historical facts, as to the conduct of the British War Office, under the royal and parliamentary regimes. For it will be found that they have both been characterized by the same essential features.

From that most interesting book "England at War," by W. H. Davenport Adams, the following quotation is made:

"The military history of the reign of Charles I begins as that of James I closed, with a record of a failure.

"Charles and his confederate, the Duke of Buckingham, had committed themselves to a war with Spain; but Parliament showed little inclination to support it, and refused to grant the necessary subsidies until at all events the just grievances of the people had been redressed. After much wrangling it was induced to grant a subsidy, and Charles in a burst of sudden anger dissolved it, declaring that he knew how to govern without its assistance. He proceeded to make good his words. Orders were issued to the Lord Lieutenants of the country to raise by way of loan the money of which he stood in need. They were to apply to the wealthy for contributions and to transmit to the Court the names of those who refused or delayed compliance. The response, nevertheless, was reluctant and limited; but Charles and Buckingham pushed forward their military preparations, and a fleet of 90 sailed carrying 5,000 seamen and 10,000 soldiers, which under Sir Edward Cecil (created Viscount Wimbledon) as General and Admiral, and the Earl of Essex as Vice-Admiral—neither of whom had had any experience of naval warfare,—was despatched to intercept the Spanish treasure ships and to attack Cadiz.

"Ill-officered, ill-manned, ill-provisioned, the expedition brought disgrace upon the English flag. The men 'raised by press,' half starved,

badly paid and without training, had no stomach for fighting, and disregarded the orders of their officers; while the officers, though not wanting in bravery, were absolutely devoid of military knowledge."

The conditions do not at present seem to have been essentially changed.

Mr. Adams continues:

"On the 22d of October the fleet arrived in Cadiz Bay. A counsel of war was held at which some gallant spirits proposed an immediate attack on the great Spanish seaport; but the majority were frightened at so daring a venture, and resolved to take the fort of Putnal, which guarded the entrance to the main Harbor where lay the Spanish merchantmen, twelve tall ships and fifteen or sixteen galleys. The fort quickly surrendered, but meanwhile the garrison of Cadiz had been largely reinforced. Wimbledon, however, landed his troops and began his march upon Cadiz; but in his haste no thought had been given to the army's supplies, and his men tramping forward under a hot sun began to grow faint with thirst and hunger. Wimbledon good naturedly ordered a cask of wine to be brought out of a neighboring house for their refreshment. 'Even a little drop would have been too much for their empty stomachs, but the houses about were stored with sweet wines for the use of the West India fleets. In a few minutes casks were broached in every direction, and well nigh the whole army was reduced to a state of raving drunkenness.' Next morning as the men could not be kept longer without food, Wimbledon marched them back to Ponto, and on the 27th re-embarked."

Mr. Adams gives a short narration of the next adventure of the King and his Minister. It is as follows:

"Untaught by this deplorable failure, King and Minister next turned their inglorious arms against France. They found a pretext in the persecution which the Hugenots were undergoing." (The close resemblance between that feature of the situation and the pretense now put forward for a wholly unprovoked active aggression on the Burghers will appear more clearly from the facts hereafter given.) "Whose last stronghold Rochelle, was besieged by the Royal Army, and its downfall would consummate the ruin of the French. It was hoped that a religious war would be popular with the Nation, and a general loan was therefore ordered. But the anticipated enthusiasm did not show itself; in every county Charles' Commissioners met with refusals. The refusants were harshly dealt with; but the refusals continued. * * * At length a fleet and an army were got together, and Buckingham took the chief command. His instructions were to maintain the English dominion of the seas and relieve Rochelle. With 100 ships, carrying 6,000 foot and 100 horse he sailed from Stokes Bay on the 27th of June. No enemy appeared, and Buckingham could not ful-

fill the first part of his instructions to sweep the French and the Spanish from the seas, for the same reason that the audience in Sheridan's Critic could not see the Spanish fleet—because they were not in sight. * * * On the evening of July 10th Buckingham cast anchor off St. Martins, the principal town of the Isle of Rhe, the forts of which hold in check the commerce of Rochelle. He landed his troops on the 12th, though not without loss, and on the 17th laid siege to St. Martins. About the middle of August the work of investment had been completed; but the French garrison maintained a sturdy resistance, and Buckingham soon discovered that he had undertaken a task beyond the means of his rapidly wasting little army. He was wanting neither in courage nor intelligence; but he had no military capability, and could not cope with the difficulties of his position. In fairness it must be said that with some of these a greater commander might not have coped successfully. He asked for re-enforcement, but none were sent. His men were deplorably straightened for provisions, and he had no money with which to purchase supplies. His officers were disaffected and insubordinate. The condition of affairs was thus combining about Sir Edward Conway, with mid-September; 'the army grows every day weaker; our victuals waste, our purses are empty, ammunition consumes, winter grows, our enemies increase in number and power; we have nothing from England.' A month later and things had gone from bad to worse; the weather was cold and wet; the men half starved, and in rags suffered grievously in the trenches. The officers were 'looking themselves blind' by sweeping the horizon with their telescopes for the first signs of re-enforcement from England, as in the old days of the Crete Republics the soldiers of Nicias gazed across the Sicilian Sea for the expected Trirenes of Demosthenes; but the re-enforcement came not, and on the 27th of October Buckingham gave orders that the citadel should be stormed. After suffering a heavy carnage he was compelled to recall his men; and on the 8th of November he re-embarked his army, though not without a sharp attack of the French, in which he sustained cruel loss. The siege had probably cost the lives of nearly 4,000 men. At all events on the 20th of October the muster-roll showed 6,884 soldiers drawing pay; when the fleet arrived at Portsmouth and Plymouth their numbers had sunk to 2,989."

It is interesting to note the close resemblance between the history of that expedition and that of the operations in the Crimea two centuries later.

"The English public, with grim humor, called the Isle of Rhe, which had swallowed up so many lives, the 'Isle of Rue.' 'Every man knows,' wrote Denzil Holles, 'that since England was England it received not so dishonorable a blow; four Colonels slain, besides the colors lost; thirty-two taken by the enemy.'"

In one of his next chapters Mr. Adams gives the story of a foreign expedition by a British armed force of a very different quality, which gave very different results. It is needless to say that the narration which follows concerns a small force of 6,000 auxiliary, "the immortal 6,000," as Sir William Temple calls them, sent out by the Lord Protector, who were engaged in the battle of the Dunes on the 14th of June, 1657. Just before the engagement began the Prince of Condé, who was on the other side, turned to the young Duke of Gloucester, who was serving with him, and asked the Duke if he had ever seen a battle. "No," replied the Duke. "Well, then," continued Condé, "in half an hour you will see one lost." Mr. Adams' narrative is this:

"The action was begun by the English, who led by Major-General Morgan—for Lockhart was too ill to leave his carriage—advanced eagerly against the Spanish right, and climbing the dunes with push of pike swept the foemen clear of the very summits and down their crumbling slopes, exhibiting such a combination of fire and coolness that Don John exclaimed—'the French fight like men; these English like devils.' * * * The Spaniards ran, andTurenne's victory was complete. In no small measure was it due to the steady courage and fierce attack of the English soldiers."

From that time to this the record of the achievements of British valor has been unvaried. There has been at the same time complete lack of variety in the record of the incompetence and ignorance of the British War Office.

Coming down to the time of the Crimean war, we find the following conditions, according to Lord Wolseley. He has written of it as follows (Nineteenth Century, March, 1878, p. 436, *et seq.*):

"The history of the Crimean war is still fresh in the memory of those who took part in it. Never was any expedition planned by a home government with more reckless ignorance of war and its requirements than that which landed at Eupatoria. At the beginning of the campaign our Treasury was as parsimonious as it was subsequently lavish in expenditure. About twenty-four thousand British soldiers—no finer body of men have ever worn Her Majesty's uniform—were hurled ashore *without the means of carrying their wounded*, and even *without sufficient tools to bury their dead.* British discipline in two or three hard-fought battles won for England a brilliant but a short-lived success; and when, through the *military ignorance* of those in Downing street, *who planned the campaign,*

that devoted little army dwindled down almost to a *handful of half-starved scarecrows*, those who had starved us through their ignorant parsimony sent out commissioners, whose avowed business it was to select a victim from among our generals on whom to cast the blame. They selected the ablest of them as their scape-goat, and held him up to public opprobrium because he had not made a road from Balaklava to the camp, although they knew full well he had *neither the tools nor the labor* at his disposal *for such an undertaking.*"

* * * * *

"I have alluded to the *military ignorance of our ministers* in the Crimean war ; here is an example of it. A letter was read in the House of Parliament one evening from an officer in the field, in which he referred to the want of all means for conveying our sick and wounded to the ships for embarkation, adding that our army had to depend upon the French *acolets* lent to us for that purpose. The English minister who was responsible for army affairs at once got up and indignantly denied the statement, adding that he knew it to be untrue, because he had the best authority for asserting positively that there were a hundred hospital panniers at that moment in the Crimea. He might just as well have said there were so many toothpicks there—as a hospital pannier, which he evidently thought was a conveyance of some sort, is nothing more than a wicker-work basket, made in a peculiar manner, for the reception of medicines, operating instruments, and other medical appliances. The page of Hansard which records that reply is the gravest of all possible satires upon *our war administration* of that time."

* * * * *

"Curious stories without end might be told to illustrate my statement as to the *inefficiency of many of those who composed the staff* which originally embarked in 1854. Here is one as it was told me by an eye-witness : While the army was in Turkey, before it left for the Crimea, an important military operation had to be undertaken. A few days before that named for the operation my friend went to a staff officer in high position, who was his immediate superior, and whose duty it was to make all the necessary arrangements, and to draw up instructions for all the departments and general officers concerned, and asked if he had any orders to give. The reply was : 'No, I have not yet thought over the matter, but I will see to it by-and-by.' The next day the question was repeated with a similar result, and upon the third day—the day before this very complicated and difficult operation was to have taken place—as my friend repeated his question he saw that his superior was whittling a piece of stick. That superior was an *amiable old gentleman and an excellent carpenter.* He listened calmly to my friend, who was rather excited, seeing that nothing was ready for the move, and that no attempt had as yet been made to prepare for it. After a pause, the man on whom for the moment a great national responsibility rested, looked up and said : 'Perhaps, Cap-

tain———, you do not know what I am doing.' 'No, sir,' replied my friend. 'Well,' said the old gentleman, 'upon strolling about here this morning I perceived that there was *no latch or bolt to Lord Raglan's cupboard,* and I am making one as an *agreeable surprise* for him.' Here was an army about to begin a most serious undertaking, the preparations and arrangements for which could only be made by this high official; but so utterly was he incapable of taking in the serious responsibility that rested on him, so *ignorant was he of the duties attached to his position* that he employed his time in carpentering when all his intellect, all his energies, should have been devoted to the great duty which devolved upon him."

Lord Wolseley says further:

"During the epoch I have referred to (the period before the Crimean war), *the army of England was unworthy of being classed as a fighting implement fit to be employed against an enemy more formidable than a Kaffir or an Asiatic,* and, even when so engaged, gained its ends always with difficulty, and not always without discredit and disaster. It was a *police force dressed in the guise of soldiers.* It was a body—a fine *muscular body* certainly—*without a soul.* All ranks were full of *courage*—without doubt the first and greatest factor in military excellence—but *all other warlike instincts were wanting.* Its generals, men of Peninsular experience, were old in body and *old fashioned in mind,* while its regimental officers were *entirely ignorant of their profession.* They would have made the *finest private soldiers* in the world, but they were *as little acquainted with the art and science of war as the rank and file they were commissioned to lead.*"

It is quite apparent from the events thus far in the South African war, that there has been no substantial change in this respect.

The British transportation service in the Crimea broke down under a line of communications of the length of seven miles. The reason was, as is very apparent from the quotation from Lord Wolseley already made, the absolute incompetency and ignorance of the British War Office, and of British officers. Some further facts will throw light on the condition of things at that time. The English commanding general, as events proved, had practically no knowledge or information as to the numbers of the opposing forces, or the field of operations. After he had been in the Crimea for several months, it was learned that the fortress of Sevastopol, which he was expected to invest and capture, still had regular communications open from the

Crimea to the main land, by a bridge. This bridge had been built for at least four or five years. But no one in the British army, or the War Office, had learned of its existence, until it was found on a map "sent home by the captain of a vessel, who obtained the information from some of the Tartars."

The dearth of maps in the British Army was the same then as to-day. They have learned nothing.

Men were dying in the British army from cold and starvation, when abundant supplies of food and clothing lay in the Harbor of Balaklava, less than ten miles away. The road from Balaklava to the British camp, on which the army depended for all its supplies, had completely broken down. It was quite apparent to an officer of ordinary intelligence that that condition of affairs was practically certain to come. The result was a degree of suffering and deprivation, which for the time being largely destroyed the efficiency of the British troops as a fighting organization. Strange to say, this condition of affairs was officially unknown to the head of the War Office. Such a statement would appear incredible, if it were not supported by the most conclusive testimony. Such testimony is to be found in the evidence of the Duke of Newcastle himself, who was at the time the head of the British War Office.

The Duke of Newcastle testified before the Roebuck Committee:

"Qu. 14,426. And I am bound to say that some *four or five months afterward we ascertained what was not before known in this country* or elsewhere before that time, that the Russians had another means of access into the Crimea, some miles to the eastward of Perekop, *by a bridge* * * * a bridge which was commenced by the Russians some *four or five years ago*, by which they had *obtained a good road* * * * I have seen a *plan which was sent home by the captain of a vessel* who obtained the information *from some of the Tartars.* * * *

* * * "Is there no other information? A. No."

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"Qu. 14,588. *Were you ever informed* that the troops were ill-fed, and that the horses had *little or insufficient forage?* A. Of course, I *received that information.* As I said before, *in common with the rest of the world.* I was painfully aware of it.

"Qu. 14,589. I mean *officially?* A. *No, I think not.*

"Qu. 14,590. You obtained all that information from the newspapers, did you? A. No; from *complaints principally* from persons that had suffered.

" Qu. 14,591. You were *not informed that the failure on the part of the commissariat to feed the troops was occasioned by the failure of other departments* in their duties? A. *Not officially.*

" Qu. 14,592. When did you *first receive information of the breakup of the road from Balaklava to the camp?* A. I do not remember the exact date ; it was one of those facts that *unfortunately grow upon one* as events follow one another; and it was *seen by its consequences* that things were *not carried to the front.*

" Qu. 14,593. Can you tell whether any *information was given you of the probable failure* of the road *before the failure took place?* A. *Certainly not.*

" Qu. 14,594. So that you *remained altogether in the dark as to the chance of the non-supply* of the troops arising from the failure of the road? A. *Yes.*

" Qu. 14,595. So soon as you heard of the failure of the road *you took steps,* did you not, *to have a road made* of some sort or another ? A. *No, I cannot say that I* did ; because *it was impossible for me to be able to judge* whether the thing was practicable then. There are things which it is *absolutely necessary to leave to officers on the spot.*"

Lord Roberts also gives us in his autobiographical " Forty-One Years in India," an account of the difficulties which have always surrounded this problem of transportation in India. The first incident, which he narrates, concerns the expedition under Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Napier, to Abyssinia. The expeditionary force numbered a little less than 14,000 men.*

" Profiting by the *experience of the Crimean War* the Government was determined that the mobility of the force should not be hampered by want of food and clothing. Stores of all descriptions were dispatched in unstinted quantities from England, and three of the steamers in which they were conveyed were fitted up as hospital ships. But food, clothing and stores however liberally supplied *would not take the army to Magdala without transport.*

" The question as to the most suitable organization for the Land Transport Corps occupied a good deal of Sir Robert Napier's attention while the expedition was being fitted out, and caused a considerable amount of correspondence between him and the Bombay Government. *The Commissary-General wished to keep the corps under his own orders, and objected to its being given an entirely military organization.* Sir Robert Napier preferred to establish the corps on an independent basis but was at

* The numbers actually despatched from India were 13,548, of whom 3,786 were Europeans. In addition a company of Royal Engineers was sent from England.

first overruled by the Bombay Government. While acting in accordance with their orders, the Commander-in-Chief wrote : 'I believe that the success of systems depends more on the men who work them than on the *systems themselves;* but I cannot accept without protest a decision to throw such a *body of men as the drivers of our transport animals* will be (if we get them) on an *expedition in a foreign country* without a very *complete organization to secure order and discipline.' Eventually* Sir Robert got his own way, but *much valuable time had been lost,* and the *corps was organized on too small a scale ; * the officers and non-commissioned officers were not sent to Zula in sufficient time to take charge of the transport animals as they arrived.*

"A compact, properly supervised train of 2,600 mules, with serviceable, well-fitting pack-saddles, was sent from the Punjab, and from Bombay came 1,400 mules and ponies, and 5,600 bullocks, but, *these numbers proving altogether inadequate to the needs of the expedition,* they were supplemented by animals purchased in Persia, Egypt, and on the shores of the Mediterranean. The *men* to look after them were supplied from the same sources, but *their number, even if they had been efficient, was insufficient, and they were a most unruly and unmanageable lot.* They demanded double the pay for which they had enlisted, and *struck work in a body* because their demand was not at once complied with. They *refused to take charge of the five mules each man was hired to look after,* and when that number was reduced to three, they insisted that one should be used as a mount for the driver. But the *worst part* of the whole *organization,* or, rather, *want of organization,* was that there had been *no attempt to fit the animals with pack-saddles, some of which were sent from England, some from India, and had to be adjusted to the mules after they had been landed in Abyssinia,* where there was *not an establishment to make the necessary alterations.* The consequence was that the wretched *animals became cruelly galled,* and in a *few weeks* a *large percentage were unfit for work, and had to be sent to the sick depot.*

"Other results of having *no properly arranged transport train* and no *supervision or discipline,* were that *mules were lost or stolen, starved for want of food, or famished from want of water.* The condition of the unfortunate animals was such that, though they had been but a *few weeks in the country,* when they were required to proceed to Senafe, *only sixty-seven miles,* a *very small proportion were able to accomplish the march; hundreds died on the way, and their carcases, quickly decomposing in the hot sun, became a fruitful source of dangerous disease to the force."*

* * * * *

It was the same old story—the thing which almost invariably happens, the inevitable breakdown in transportation, that regu-

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* At first it was thought that 10,000 mules with a Coolie corps 3,000 strong would suffice, but before the expedition was over it was found necessary to purchase 18,000 mules, 1,500 ponies, 1,800 donkeys, 12,000 camels and 8,400 bullocks.

larly takes place with a British foreign expeditionary force. It arises always from the same cause—the ignorance and the incompetence of the British War Office.

We come next to Lord Roberts' account of the conditions when he took command of the Kuram field force:

"It was a proud, albeit a most anxious, moment for me when I assumed command of the Kuram Field Force ; though a local Major-General, I was only a Major in my regiment, and, save for a short experience on one occasion in Lushai, I had never had an opportunity of commanding troops in the field. Earnestly longing for success, I was intensely interested in ascertaining the qualities of those who were to aid me in achieving it. To this end, I lost no time in taking stock of the several officers and corps who were to be associated with me, some of whom were personally known to me, while others I had never met before ; and in endeavoring to satisfy myself as to their qualifications and fitness for their several posts, I could not help feeling that they must be equally anxious as to my capability for command, and that the inspection must be of nearly as great moment to them as to me.

"The results of a very close investigation were tolerably satisfactory, but there were weak points in my armour which gave me grave cause for anxiety.

"I came to the conclusion that the force was not numerically strong for the heavy difficult task before it—in the first instance, the occupation of the Kuram valley and the expulsion of all Afghan garrisons south of the Shutargardan Pass, and in the second, as opportunity might offer, the pushing my reconnaissances into the Khost valley, and, if military considerations wouldadmit, the dislodging the Amir's administration from that tract of country, so as to prevent the Kobul government drawing supplies from it. Finally, I was directed to explore the roads leading to the unknown region beyond Khost.

"The Shutargarden was not less than 180 miles from Khost, the garrison of which station would, on my departure, be reduced to a minimum, and Rawal Pindi, the nearest place from which aid could be procured, was 130 miles still further off, separated from Khost by an execrable road and the swiftly flowing river Indus, crossed by a precarious bridge of boats. It had to be taken into account also that the various Afridi tribes were watching their opportunity, and at the first favourable moment, in common with the tribesmen nearer Kuram, they might be expected to take advantage of our weakness and attack our convoys and the small posts which had necessarily to be established along our line of communication.

"The attitude of the Mahometan sepoys, of whom there were large numbers in four out of my six Native Infantry regiments, was also a cause of considerable anxiety, for I was aware that they were not altogether happy at the prospect of taking part in a war against their co-

religionist, the Ruler of Afghanistan, and that the mullas were already urging them to desert our cause.

"Furthermore, I discovered that *my only British Infantry regiment*, the 2nd Battalion of the 8th Foot, was sickly to a degree, and therefore in an *unserviceable condition. It was largely composed of quite young, unacclimatized soldiers. peculiarly susceptible to fever*, that terrible scourge which fills the hospitals of our Punjab stations in the autumn of each year. I rode out to meet the battalion on its way into Kohat, and was *horrified to see the long line of doolies and ambulance-carts by which it was accompanied.*

"The *inefficient state of the transport* added to my anxieties. Notwithstanding the *difficulties experienced in former campaigns from the same cause, the Government had neglected to take any steps for the organization of a proper transport service while we were at peace;* consequently, when *everything should have been ready for a start, confusion reigned supreme in this all-important department. Large numbers of camels, mules and bullocks* arrived daily, *picked up at exorbitant prices from anyone who would supply them;* but most of these animals were *quite unfit to enter upon the hard work of a campaign*, and with a *totally inexperienced and quite insufficient staff of officers to supervise them, it was evident that the majority must succumb at an early date.*"

THE POSSIBILITY OF A SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF TRANSPORTATION BY THE BRITISH ARMY, UNDER EXISTING CONDITIONS.

Here, of course, all that can be done is to state conditions.

Results, especially the results of a serious and bitterly contested war, are beyond the knowledge of finite human beings.

The conditions, however, that we have thus far ascertained to exist in South Africa to-day are these:

I. The impossibility of handling the problem of transportation and supply, for any large army in South Africa, by any means other than by railway.

II. The extreme ease of the processes of destruction, with the extreme difficulty of the processes of construction, of railway communications, in the present South African field of operations.

III. The absence of preparation, on the part of the British Army, for the handling of the present problem of transportation and supply.

IV. The fact, that the reason for that absence of preparation is to be found in the immense and dense ignorance, and incompetence, of the British War Office.

In the face of these existing conditions, we come to a further question: What are the probabilities, as nearly as we can forecast them, that the British War Office will be able to solve the transportation and supply problem, within any reasonable period of time? In case of a prolonged war, they will have many other problems to solve. But what are the probabilities, as to their being able to solve this one, that is, to solve it within any reasonable time? For it is hardly to be deemed within the reasonable probabilities, that the entire civilised world, especially these United States, will quietly sit by and wait for the British Government to pursue to the end a war of extermination, even on the assumption, that the British people would be willing to carry the cost of such a war, in men and money. The British people, be it noted, have not as yet uttered their judgment on the existing situation. Assuming, however, that they are willing to pay the cost, in men and money, of a war of extermination against the South African Republics, what are the probabilities, even then, of success to the British Government?

Bearing in mind, at all times, the almost infinite margin, that must be allowed for the contingencies of war, let us look at some of the remaining features of the situation which have not as yet been fully considered.

The first of these features is to be found in the extreme mobility of the forces of the Burghers, in contrast with the extreme immobility of the British. The contrast is overwhelming. On the one hand, the Burghers, most of them mounted men, operating in a friendly population, accustomed to long journeys on short rations, having a thorough knowledge of the country, can move in small bodies, in all directions, almost at will. Especially, they can move with the greatest ease in the small detachments, which will be needed for a war on railway communications.

On the other hand, the British forces, operating in a hostile population, with their ignorance of the country, without cavalry, compelled to move in comparatively large bodies, will be chained to the lines of railway by the necessities of the problem of transportation and supply. No doubt, they can send out reconnoitering and scouting parties for short distances from the railroad. But for the present, they will be unable to move any considerable bodies of troops for any considerable distance from the line of the railways.

The situation, in this respect, is almost that of a contest between a man who has complete freedom of movement and one who is weighted by a ball and chain. We may go even further, and say, that it is a contest between a light and agile boxer and a giant chained to a railway track.

The immobility of the British troops under present conditions is made still more clear, if we consider the matter of wagon roads.

Taking first the situation around Colenso and Ladysmith, if we look at the map, we see that there is only one main road from Colenso to Ladysmith direct. To the west of that there are roundabout roads of an inferior character; one leading through Underbroek; another from Frere, through Springfield and Dewdrop; another by Zunckles and Bethany, through Acton Homes and Dewdrop. Taking the other side of the main road, on the east, the only road of any kind is the circuitous one through Weenen, Weenen being on the main road from Weston to Ladysmith. The distance by this other easterly route from Colenso to Ladysmith through Weenen, according to the map, roughly, must be as much as seventy miles. The region about Colenso and Ladysmith is one of mountains and streams. Movements by troops are a virtual impossibility in such a country, except by roads. Artillery and supply wagons must have roads of good quality, if the movements of troops are to have any reasonable degree of celerity. The roads in Natal are not of good quality. Any body of troops that moves in that country with any considerable number of wagons, or with any considerable force of artillery, must necessarily move slowly. Any attempt at an advance by the British over any road in that district is certain to come im-

mediately to the knowledge of the Boer forces. It is a probability so strong as to amount to a virtual certainty, that every road of importance was long ago blocked by some kind of entrenchment. Even if that be not so, the construction across any road of field-works which if manned by fairly steady troops will make an impassable barrier to any advance from the front, is a thing which can be accomplished in a very short space of time. It is evident, therefore, that the British advance from Colenso to Ladysmith, no matter by what route it may be attempted, must of necessity be an advance against entrenchments on the front. We have of late heard much of "traps," set by the Boers for the British troops. That term is an entire misnomer, for the reason that no soldier of ordinary intelligence would have supposed that officers in any civilised army would be guilty of the mad indiscretion of plunging their troops against earthworks manned with good steady riflemen in front, without skirmishers thrown out in advance who should apprise the main body of infantry of the conditions which they were approaching. The simple fact is, that a large number of the British army officers, who hold the positions of high command, are so ignorant of the most elementary rules and principles of the art of modern warfare, that they neglect all the ordinary precautions that would be adopted in a campaign against any alert enemy, on any military field. It is not that the Boers have been remarkably wily, but that the British officers have been remarkably stupid and ignorant. It was mere madness to push forward solid lines or solid columns of infantry, without scouts or skirmishers, until they got within very short range of well-manned fieldworks. But the fact that they did so, as before stated, is an evidence not of superior astuteness on the part of the Burghers, but of immense and intense dullness and ignorance on the part of the British officers.

The fundamental consideration, however, is that the immobility of the British troops is a necessary result, not merely of the ordinary impossibility of supplying any large force by any other means than a line of railway, but of the absence of any reasonable number of good roads, in the newly settled country which is the present field of operations.

Precisely the same considerations apply to the operations on

FIELD OF OPERATIONS

ON THE LINE OF

LORD METHUEN'S ADVANCE

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SCALE OF STATUTE MILES.

10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50

30 Miles = 1 Inch.

EXPLANATION.

RAILWAYS.....

ROADS.....

Lord Methuen's line of advance at Modder River. At that point the map shows that practically there is no route by which troops can move towards Kimberley except the line of the railroad. The railroad the Burghers have already blocked, so that it is apparently impossible for it to be carried by any British force at present available. The only roads laid down upon the map from the Modder River to Kimberley are two; the comparatively direct one, east of the railroad, and the more circuitous one, through Jacobsdal.

It is a virtual certainty, that both of these roads have been strongly entrenched by the Boers. It is evident from the events that have already taken place, that any advance by Lord Methuen is at present a virtual impossibility. In this region, too, as well as in the region around Ladysmith and Colenso, movements of British troops in large bodies are made practically impossible, by reason simply of this fundamental fact, the lack of practicable roads.

In both these regions, moreover, and in every portion of South Africa which is likely for a considerable time to be the field of military operations, the further point already mentioned is to be noted in this connection, and that is, the large number of rivers and smaller streams. It has already been mentioned, that, as to railways, every stream makes a point of vulnerability in its bridge.

Quite aside from that fact, however, is the further one, most material, that every stream makes a strong line of defense. Lord Methuen has already found out that fact to his cost at Modder River. But this entire region is a series of rivers. Each one of them will be an obstacle as difficult of passage as the Tugela and the Modder, of which Lord Methuen and Sir Redvers Buller have already had experience. If we were to assume, that Sir Redvers Buller could get his army across the Tugela River at Colenso, he would next have to get over the Sand at Ladysmith; thereafter he would have to force Sundays River north of Elandslaagte; and thereafter still, the many rivers which have already been mentioned, which appear upon the maps.

It is easily seen, that the advance of British troops through the South African country will be one of a greater difficulty than has ever been encountered by any modern army. General

Sherman's advance through Tennessee was through a country which was almost a river bottom, level, and fairly supplied with roads. The roads, no doubt, were inferior. Still they were passable for artillery and wagons. Then, too, as has been before stated, General Sherman had the inestimable advantage of two large rivers as lines of transportation and supply. Nothing of that sort exists in South Africa. It is hardly too much to say, that the region which is now the scene of conflict between the British and Burgher forces, is one almost ideal for the purposes of defense. In fact, the region between the two Republics and the seasoast may be considered almost as a series of natural fortresses, each one of which has to be carried by an invading force, before actual entry can be made upon the territory either of the Orange Free State or the Transvaal.

The next point is to be found in the contrast between the degrees of knowledge possessed by each of the contending armies of the movements of the other. The current discussions of the present South African military situation deal very copiously with the matters of front attacks, flank movements, turning movements, and other things too numerous to mention. Generally, they make an omission of a feature of the military situation, which in actual operations is entitled to some weight; and that is, the force, and the position, of the enemy. This feature is one generally ignored by British soldiers. Nevertheless, as they are beginning to find out to their cost, it is a feature which cannot be ignored with due regard to safety.

As to this vital fundamental factor, in every military situation, in all military movements, the force and positions of the enemy, the Burghers have at all times an immense advantage over their adversaries. Every farm house is for the Burghers a bureau of intelligence, is a branch office of their secret service. In any mountainous district, a system of signals is a thing of ease. The Burghers, however, have telegraph lines in abundance. At every point, thus far, their knowledge of the movements of the British has been apparently most complete. Equally complete has been the British ignorance.

So far as we can judge, this ratio of equality, between the knowledge of the one side and the ignorance of the other, will continue to the end of the war.

The next point to be noted is as to the fighting capacities of the two contending forces, so far as it concerns the quality of their strategy.

Here let us ask ourselves two questions:

What has been the quality of the strategy on the two sides thus far?

Is there any sufficient reason for thinking that there will be, in this respect, any considerable change in the future?

Those two questions every man can answer for himself.

But let us look at some of the facts, which tend to throw light on the answers to these two questions.

The most prominent characteristics to-day of the British War Office, and of the ordinary British Army officers, are arrogance, and indocility. Absolutely confident of their own superiority to the rest of the world, civilised and uncivilised, with an innate imbedded conviction impossible to dislodge, of the completeness of their knowledge on all subjects, and of the impossibility of their learning anything from other men, the inability of the British War Office, or of the ordinary British officer, to adapt themselves to the modern methods, of modern warfare, is almost beyond conception. For it must be steadily borne in mind, that the present fighting methods of the British Army are essentially mediæval. They are antiquated. They are out of date. The sum and substance of the typical British strategy of to-day is a rush with the bayonet. Practically as an army, they have learned nothing since Waterloo, where they won only by a combination of chances. The saying attributed to the Duke of Wellington, that his officers got their training for war at Eton and Harrow, gives the most accurate evidence of the fundamental conception of strategy held by the Duke in his time, and by the average British officer to-day. That idea is that war is a game of football—to be won by a front rush. A rush—at one point or another, that is the present prevalent typical British idea of war. It stands out in nearly every despatch sent home from the present field of operations.

On the other side, however, it is well understood, that war to-day is a contest, not of brawn, but of brains. Transportation and supply, position, full and accurate information as to the forces and positions of your enemy,—these are the factors that

enter into any problem of modern scientific war. And these problems are to be handled, not by brawn, but by brains. These facts are well understood, and are made matters of practical study, by the Burghers.

British valor needs not to be put in evidence. Single individual soldiers, of a high order, are no doubt to be found to-day in considerable numbers in the British Army. But the British Army of to-day, as a fighting organisation, as a machine for the needs of modern scientific warfare, is not a subject of serious consideration. Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener are very able men. Lord Kitchener, according to all the indications, is an admirable organiser, and a most efficient executive. If he were put at the head of the War Office, *and were given a free hand,* he probably could—in time—convert the British Army into a modern fighting organism. But the time required would be large. First and foremost, he would have to get rid of an enormous mass of excrescences and dead wood. The conditions which he would have to exterminate are those which Lord Roberts describes as existing in the British Army in India.

"That the long-existing discontent and growing disloyalty in our Native army might have been discovered sooner, and grappled with in a sufficiently prompt and determined manner to put a stop to the Mutiny, had the senior regimental and staff officers been younger, more energetic, and intelligent, is an opinion to which I have always been strongly inclined. Their excessive age, due to a strict system of promotion by seniority which entailed the employment of Brigadiers of seventy, Colonels of sixty, and Captains of fifty, must necessarily have prevented them performing their military duties with the energy and activity which are more the attributes of younger men, and must have destroyed any enthusiasm about their regiments, in which there was so little hope of advancement or of individual merit being recognized. Officers who displayed any remarkable ability were allowed to be taken away from their own corps for the more attractive and better paid appointments appertaining to civil employ or the irregular service. It was, therefore, the object of every ambitious and capable young officer to secure one of these appointments, and escape as soon as possible from a service in which ability and professional zeal counted for nothing."

Upon the question of the time required to organize, drill and discipline an ordinary force of British soldiery, we may quote

Napier as to the capacities of the British soldier in his day. He says, speaking of the British soldier: "When completely disciplined (and three years are required to accomplish this) his *port is lofty, and his movement free.*"

What delicious naiveté!

In this connection we may also cite the language put in the mouth of the Earl of Oxford by the great novelist, which expresses in the clearest way the actual conditions as they have existed at all times of her military history, with one exception, concerning the organization and maintenance of a British army in any foreign country:

"Look, therefore, at this English Army. Winter is approaching; where are they to be lodged? how are they to be victualed? by whom are they to be paid? Is your Highness to take all the expense and labor of fitting them for the summer campaign? For, rely on it, an English army never was, nor will be, fit for service, till they have been out of their own island long enough to accustom them to military duty. They are men, I grant, the fittest for soldiers in the world; but they are *not soldiers* as yet, and *must be trained* to become such at your Highness' expense."

In view of all these facts, what are the reasonable possibilities which can be accomplished in South Africa by Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener? Or by any other two or three individuals, even if they were Napoleons.

The essential difficulties of the situation lie further back—in the British War Office.

But taking the situation, as it exists in South Africa alone. How long will it take, to organise, equip, and supply an army adequate for a successful invasion of the two Republics? How much distance in advance have the British Armies surmounted since the opening of the war? At the same rate of progress, or at any rate of progress which is at all within reasonable probability, how long will it take the British Army to reach Pretoria?

Especially, what will be the cost, in money, and in men?

Then comes another question, which looms up in the background—WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN INDIA?

These are questions, to which the entire British people will do well to give their mind, their best thought.

It is not the part of prudence to leave them to be decided by a Birmingham ward politician.

II.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION BETWEEN BOERS AND BRITISH.

The redress of the grievances of the Uitlanders, of the "intolerable grievances" of the Uitlanders—that is the pretext, which has been put forward as the real reason for the latest act of invasion, and attempt at conquest, by the British Government of the Transvaal Republic.

It becomes, therefore, a matter of interest to ascertain who these Uitlanders are.

Many persons no doubt suppose, that the Uitlanders consist in the main of Englishmen and Americans, who have been always accustomed to liberal institutions, who are intelligent law-abiding citizens, who earnestly desire the most advanced facilities for education, with all the concomitants of the most modern civilisation.

As a matter of fact, Johannesburg, where the Uitlanders live, is a mining camp, with all that the term implies. Its population is a mining population. Mr. Bryce describes its residents as "a crowd of English, Australian and American miners, employed by capitalists, mostly of Jewish extraction." In another passage Mr. Bryce describes them in this way: "Nearly all of the latter [the recent emigrants] were gathered in the mining district around Johannesburg, which is practically an English, or rather an Anglo-Jewish, city, with a sprinkling of Australians, Americans, Germans and Frenchmen." In these quotations Mr. Bryce has omitted one of the chief elements of the Johannesburg population, that is, a collection of over forty thousand Kaffirs, who are held in what is practically slavery by this collection of liberty loving adventurers.

The idea, that the denizens of this mining camp care anything for religion, or education, or free representative govern-

ment, so long as they are allowed to pursue their regular vocation of gold mining, is simply ridiculous. These men went to the Transvaal for gold. They are engaged in digging gold. All that they care for, the large majority of them, is gold. They intend to leave the Transvaal, as soon as each of them has collected his bag of gold. If the Johannesburg mines should cease profitable production, practically the whole of this motley crowd would leave the Transvaal as soon as they could get out of it. They have never signified any wish, or intention, the large majority of them, to take upon themselves any of the burdens of citizenship in the Republic, or to give up the benefits of citizenship in the countries which they have left. All of this talk about the desire of the Uitlanders to be admitted to citizenship in the Transvaal is a mere manufacture for foreign consumption, for the purpose of justifying the aggressions of Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Chamberlain. It has no foundation in fact. Mr. Chamberlain is well aware of this. So is Mr. Rhodes.

So late as the 27th day of January, 1899, the British Resident at Pretoria, who was stationed there for the express purpose of protecting the rights of British subjects, who was fully conversant with their situation and needs, had written officially of the political conditions of the Uitlander population. It is now well understood, that the real purpose of all this agitation about the Transvaal franchise has been the ultimate overthrow of the present Transvaal government. The purpose has been, to get the franchise for this large number of foreigners who live in Johannesburg, in order thereafter to get the control of the entire government of the Transvaal Republic. In other words, the purpose of Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Chamberlain has been to compel a fundamental change in the existing institutions of the Transvaal Republic; to require the government of that Republic to make a complete subversion of its existing constitution in its most important feature, that is, in the conditions on which new-comers can have the rights of citizenship. In view of this fact, it will perhaps be somewhat of a surprise to persons who have not taken the trouble to investigate the official documents, to learn that the British Resident at Pretoria so late as the 27th of January, 1899, in an official letter, gave a statement of the

political desires of the Uitlander population in the following words:*

"The Acting British Agent, Pretoria, to the High Commissioner, Cape Town.

HER MAJESTY'S AGENCY, PRETORIA, JANUARY 27, 1899.

SIR :

I have the honor to enclose a summary of the *Annual Report of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines for the year 1898*, as well as an able essay upon the general situation of the gold *mining industry* and its *relations with the Government*, which was read by the President, M. Rouliot, at the annual meeting on the 26th instant.

The principal points dealt with in the Report, and by the President, are the regret of the mining industry at the recent refusal by the Volksraad to consider the Chamber's proposal, for the formation of a local board, even composed only of government nominees, to control the workings of the laws dealing with *native labour supply, liquor traffic, and gold thefts*, although the Chamber acknowledges that it has *hopes of better things* if the *recent proposal to* place the control of the detective department under the State Attorney is *approved by the Raad.* Suggestions are again made for the reduction of railway rates, and the dynamite monopoly is again attacked at considerable length by M. Rouliot, who warns the Volksraad in the strongest terms against the recent scheme—to be laid again before the Volksraad in February—for prolonging for fifteen years beyond the present concession, what can only bring loss both to the State and to the industry, a proposal which M. Rouliot terms iniquitous. The accusation which has been brought against the mining companies of late, namely, that they keep up depression in trade by ordering their supplies direct from abroad, to the detriment of the Transvaal merchants, is refuted by convincing statistics ; and I may add that I myself have heard no good reason alleged in proof of this accusation, which I regard as wholly unfounded. The *recent gold taxes* are likewise discussed, with the conclusion that the *principle* of a gold tax may be a *reasonable* one, but not under existing circumstances here, when more *revenue is not needed* by the State, but *only better financial administration*, and when no reductions in existing taxation have been effected in compensation for the increased burden from the gold taxes. The failure of recent State loan proposals is touched upon in connection with the assertion that *the industry might have helped the government to obtain the capital it required;* and reasons are given why *such assistance was not forthcoming*, not the least of which was that it was not asked. The supposed *connection between political agitation and the capitalists is repudiated*, and I myself believe this repudiation and the proofs given to be the

* British Blue Book, C. 9345, p. 49.

truth in every respect. The *Chamber*, in fact, states again emphatically that it *takes its stand upon a purely economic platform*, and *has no desire to alter any of the institutions of the country*, if only its voice against monopolies, concessions, and other well-known abuses, were listened to. In conclusion, M. Rouliot alludes to a recent *campaign* carried on by some of the Government subsidized organs, *against the capitalists*, and points out the *near connection between this campaign and the existence of the wealthy syndicates who support the illicit liquor traffic, which is perhaps at present the chief enemy of the capitalist*, and the one they certainly mean to be untiring in their efforts to attack. I regret to say that I myself entirely agree with M. Rouliot that all *those attacks upon the capitalist* here (without whom not one mine in the Transvaal could be worked at a profit) are *merely the outcome of the wealthy influence of the Jews, who grow rich in a few years by the enormous profits of the sale of poisonous alcohol to the native labourers on the mines*, a traffic which incapacitates perhaps a permanent twelve per cent. out of 88,000 natives from doing any work. *The Volksraad even threatened to introduce a flogging, to help the enforcement of the liquor laws ;* and the *illicit dealers* have now combined to utilize the press, of a certain shade, in order to *attack the capitalist* who makes their evil deeds so patent. The whole *report and speech of the President* are very *instructive summaries of the industry's position* both *politically and economically*, and the statistics for the last year's gold production being also laid out at considerable length in the enclosed speech.

I have——

EDMUND FRASER.

His Excellency the High Commissioner."

In short, the topics, which engrossed the minds of the Uitlanders, were labor, rum and gold.

That statement is of authority. It is made by an official of the British government. It is made with complete fullness of knowledge. The fact is, that at no time since the opening of the Johannesburg mining camp has there been the expression of a wish, on the part of any considerable number of the inhabitants of Johannesburg, for any considerable reform of the laws or institutions of the Transvaal Republic, except in the matter of taxation. It is no doubt the fact, that they have asserted that taxation pressed unduly upon the mining interests. They have also, at one time and another, complained of the inefficiency of the administration of existing laws. On many occasions, however, they have formally conceded that the laws were reasonably good,—were as good as could have been expected under existing circumstances, and that the only practical difficulties

of their situation lay in the inadequate enforcement of those laws.

That fact is one of which complaint has been made in many of the cities of the United States. No one will pretend that a matter of that nature furnishes the slightest ground for the interference of a foreign power in the internal affairs of the South African Republic.

It is time that we heard the last of this talk of the grievances of the Uitlanders. The Uitlanders knew whether or not they had grievances. The British Agent at Pretoria knew whether or not they had grievances. What the Uitlanders wanted was gold. They came to the Transvaal for gold. They were getting gold—with rum—to the full measure of their wishes. They cared nothing for the franchise, or religion, or for education, in either language, English or Dutch. These continued assertions, reiterated month after month by Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Rhodes, and by many Englishmen who honestly believe the truth of the assertions, are manufactured out of whole cloth. No doubt, there have been petitions and manifestoes, signed by men who have lived in Johannesburg, asking for the franchise, and for many other rights and privileges. No doubt, too, there have been public meetings, in Cape Colony and elsewhere, protesting against the "intolerable grievances" of the Uitlanders. Those petitions and manifestoes, and those public meetings have been got up by Mr. Rhodes and his friends, aided in London by Mr. Chamberlain, by dishonest means, for dishonest purposes. They do not represent the genuine wishes, or acts, of any considerable number of honest men.

THE BOERS, AND THEIR RIGHTS.

But then we come to other questions: Who are the Boers? What is the nature of their title to the territory which they now inhabit? Whereon do they rest their right to self-government?

The answer to these questions requires a statement, at no

great length, of some historical facts. The statement will be taken entirely from British sources,—from sources of authority.

To the full consideration of these questions it will be necessary to give a short history of the relations between Briton and Boer during the last century. The facts stated are gathered from British sources. As to the history of the earlier years down to the discovery of the Rand gold mines, the facts stated will be taken in the main from books written by two high British officials—from "The Story of the Great Boer Trek" by the Honorable H. Cloete, LL. D., Her Majesty's High Commissioner for Natal in 1843 and 1844—and the "Story of South Africa," by George M. Theal of the Cape Colonial Civil Service. Both books are recognized as authorities. As to the events since the discovery of the mines, and especially as to the Jameson Raid, the statements of chief importance here made will be based on original documents from the British Blue Books.

The authorities for the statements, then, would seem hardly open to question.

The first question, which we must answer, is, Who are the Boers?

As to ancestry, as to blood, the Boers are Dutch and French Huguenots. Their blood is that of lovers, and defenders, of civil and religious liberty for centuries. In this respect, their record is without a break. It furnishes a striking contrast to the record of the British hereditary official class. Of this last—the record has been one of continuous cruelty and tyranny, in their own land, and in other lands. In this respect, and throughout this study, we must at all times keep clearly before our minds the essential fundamental distinction between the English hereditary official class, and the grand old liberty loving English people. But the Boers, in the persons of their ancestors in Europe, and in their own persons in South Africa, have at all times been the bulwarks of civil and religious freedom.

We come, then, to the history of the political relations of Boers and Britons.

Any history, however short, of the relations of the Boers to British rule would omit nearly the most important feature of their story, if it gave no account of the exhibition of British

cruelty and barbarism at the execution at Slagter's Neck in 1815. Here is Mr. Theal's account of the scene, when men were put to death, whose only crime had been an attempt to escape from British oppression:

"All, except Martha Taber, widow of Jan Bezindenhout, were to be conveyed to the place on Van Aardt's farm where William Krugel had taken the oath in the name of the men under his command, and there Hendrik Prinsloo, Corneles Taber, Stephanus Botma, Abraham Botma, Thennis de Kleck and William Krugel were to suffer death by hanging. The remaining thirty-two, *after witnessing the execution*, were to undergo various punishments ranging from banishment for life to imprisonment for one month or a fine of fifty-six dollars.

"The sentences were in accordance with the letter of the law; but it was generally supposed that the Governor would use his power of mitigation to prevent the penalty of death being inflicted, as no blood had actually been shed by any of the prisoners. Banishment would have been equally effective as a warning to the others and it seemed to most people then as now that something was due to the burghers who aided the government, and who were afterwards horrified at the thought that they had helped to pursue their deluded countrymen to death. *There was an opportunity for the English Government to secure the affections of these people, by granting to them the lives*—though not the liberty—of the chief culprits; but Lord Charles Somerset did not avail himself of it. On the intercession of Landdrost Cuyler, who represented the services that Krugel had rendered in the last Kaffir war and his uniform good conduct before he permitted himself to be led astray by the leaders of the insurrection, that individual was spared, but the Governor's fiat was affixed to the sentences of the other five.

"On the 9th of March, 1816, they were executed at Captain Andrews' post on Van Aardt's farm. The Reverend Mr. Herrold, of George, attended them in their last moments. Before ascending the scaffold they requested to be allowed to sing a hymn with their late companions and friends, and upon permission being granted, their voices were clear and firm. After this Stephanus Botma—whose ancestor of the same name was the first burgher in South Africa—addressed those present, advising them to be cautious in their behaviour, and take warning from his fate. To outward appearance, they were all perfectly resigned to die. When the drop fell, four of the ropes snapped, and the condemned men rose from the ground unharmed. The great crowd of people standing round, regarding this as an intervention of God, raised a cry for mercy, which Landdrost Cuyler, who was in command, was powerless to grant. Three hundred soldiers guarded the scaffold, and prevented confusion until all was over."

Thereafter came the Great Trek, as it has been called, the exodus of the Boers from Cape Colony. Historians are gener-

ally agreed, that the Boers were driven from their homes into exile by the oppression and cruelty of the British authorities.

The cause of the emigration is thus stated by Mr. Fitzpatrick, in his book entitled "The Transvaal from Within." Mr. Fitzpatrick was a member of the so-called Johannesburg Reform Committee. He will therefore not be charged with partiality in favor of the Boers in his statements.

He says (p. 4):

"The Boers have produced from their own ranks no literary champion to plead or defend their cause, and their earlier history is therefore little known, and often misunderstood; but to their aid has come Mr. George McCall Theal, the South African historian, whose years of laborious research have rescued for South Africa much that would otherwise have been lost. In his 'History of the Boers' Mr. Theal records the causes of the great emigration, and shows how the Boers stood up for fair treatment, and *fought the cause, not of Boers alone, but of all colonists. Boers and British were alike harshly and ignorantly treated by high-handed Governors,* and an ill-informed and prejudiced Colonial Office, who made no distinction on the grounds of nationality between the two; for we read that *Englishmen* had been *expelled the country, thrown in gaol, and had their property confiscated,* and their *newspapers suppressed for asserting their independence, and for trifling breaches of harsh laws.*"

Mr. Theal's statement* of the causes of the Great Trek is as follows:

"To people in England one of the strangest events of the present century is the abandonment of their homes by thousands of Cape colonists after 1836, and their braving all the hardships of life in the wilderness for *no other cause than to be free of British rule.* Yet there is nothing to cause surprise in the matter, if the character of the Dutch people is considered. These colonists were of the *same blood as the men who withstood the great power of Philip II of Spain, who laid the richest part of their country under water rather than surrender it to Louis XIV of France.* They were not the men and women to submit to what they believed to be misrule, if there was a possibility of successful resistance or a chance of making their escape.

"Many of them, as we have seen, were accustomed to live in wagons and to subsist to a large extent upon game, so that moving deeper into the continent was in itself no great difficulty. Before them was a great waste swarming with wild animals. What wonder that they should move into it with such powerful motives to urge them on.

"Let us look again briefly at the grievances which determined their conduct. First, there was subjection by a foreign unsympathetic government.

* "The Story of South Africa, by George M. Theal, of the Cape Colonial Civil Service," p. 195.

Second, there was the prohibition of their language in the public offices and courts of law. Third, there was the superintendent of the London missionary society, their ablest and most relentless opponent, in possession of boundless influence with the British authorities. Fourth, there were the slanderous statements made by the philanthropic societies in England concerning them. Fifth, there was the sudden emancipation of their slaves without adequate compensation. Sixth, there was the whole mass of the coloured people placed upon a political footing with them, and that without a vagrant act being put in force. Seventh, there was no security for life or property in the eastern districts, which were exposed to invasion by the Kosas, as the Secretary of State took part with the barbarians. These were the chief causes of their great emigration, and there were many others of less importance.

"And now all over the frontier districts the great wagons were laden with household goods and provisions and ammunition, and bands of people set out to seek a new home in the north. Each party was usually made up of families related to each other, and the man of greatest influence in it was elected its leader, with the title of commandant. The horned cattle, horses, sheep and goats were driven slowly on, and often when the pasture was good the caravans would rest for weeks together. They went up from the grass-covered hills along the coast and the bare Karoo farther inland, till they came to one or other of the steep passes into the elevated basin drained by the Orange and its numerous tributaries. With twenty to thirty oxen before each waggon they struggled up, and then went on without difficulty down the long slope to the river and across the wide plains of the present Orange Free State.

"North of the Orange the emigrants regarded themselves as beyond English authority, for *over and over again it had been officially announced that Great Briain would not enlarge her possessions in South Africa.*"

Here is the Declaration issued at the time, of the motives and purposes of the Great Trek.

"GRAHAM'S TOWN,
January 22, 1837.

"1. We despair of saving the colony from those evils which threaten it by the turbulent and dishonest conduct of vagrants who are allowed to infest the country in every part; nor do we see any prospect of peace or happiness for our children in a country thus distracted by internal commotions.

2. To complain of the severe losses which we have been forced to sustain by the emancipation of our slaves, and the vexatious laws which have been enacted respecting them.

3. We complain of the continual system of plunder which we have for years endured from the Kaffirs and other coloured classes, and particularly by the last invasion of the colony, which has desolated the frontier districts, and ruined most of the inhabitants.

4. We complain of the unjustifiable odium which has been cast upon us by interested and dishonest persons, under the name of religion, whose testimony is believed in England, to the exclusion of all evidence in our favor; and we can foresee, as the result of this prejudice, nothing but the total ruin of the country.

5. We are resolved, wherever we go, that we will uphold the just principles of liberty; but, whilst we will take care that no one is brought by us into a condition of slavery, we will establish such regulations as may suppress crime, and preserve proper relations between master and servant.

6. We solemnly declare that we leave this colony with a desire to enjoy a quieter life than we have hitherto had. We will not molest any people, nor deprive them of the smallest property ; but, if attacked, we shall consider ourselves fully justified in defending our persons and effects, to the utmost of our ability, against every enemy.

7. We make known that when we shall have framed a code of laws for our guidance, copies shall be forwarded to this colony for general information ; but we take the opportunity of stating that it is our firm resolve to make provision for the summary punishment, even with death, of all traitors, without exception, who may be found amongst us.

8. We purpose, in the course of our journey, and on arrival at the country in which we shall permanently reside, to make known to the native tribes our intentions, and our desire to live in peace and friendly intercourse with them.

9. We quit this colony under the full assurance that the English government has nothing more to require of us, and will allow us to govern ourselves without its interference in future.

10. We are now leaving the fruitful land of our birth, in which we have suffered enormous losses and continual vexation, and are about to enter a strange and dangerous territory ; but we go with a firm reliance on an all-seeing, just and merciful God, whom we shall always fear, and humbly endeavor to obey.

In the name of all who leave the colony with me.

P. Retief."

Mr. Theal gives us the following account of the original organization of the Transvaal Government:

"On the 6th of June, 1837, a general assembly of the emigrants was held at Winburg, when a provisional constitution, consisting of nine articles, was adopted. The supreme legislative power was entrusted to a single elective chamber termed the volksraad, the fundamental law was declared to be the Dutch, a court of landdrost and heemraden was created, and the chief executive authority was confided to Mr. Retief with the title of commandant-general. The strong feeling of antagonism that Dr. Philip had roused is shown in one of the articles of the constitution, which provided that every member of the community and all who should thereafter join them must take an oath to have no connection with the

London missionary society. That body was regarded by them as purely a political institution, advocating and spreading principles of anarchy ; and they regarded it as something like blasphemy to speak of its superintendent in Capetown as a minister of the gospel."

So much for the exodus of 1836—as to its causes.

The Boers took refuge in a wilderness,—in a land that no civilized people inhabited, or wished to inhabit, for the reason that it had at that time no known value. It was partially occupied by sporadic and nomadic savages. It may be assumed, that in their treatment of those savages the Boers were themselves guilty of many acts of cruelty and injustice. That is the result of the infirmities of human nature. That is a feature which has disgraced our own conduct towards the North American Indian, and has characterized the conduct of all the dominant races in the world's history, whenever they have come in contact with races weaker than themselves. Whoever may have the right to reproach the Boers on this account, certainly the right does not belong to Americans, or Englishmen.

Assuming, therefore, that the Boers' treatment of the savages whom they displaced was harsh, and even cruel, the fact still remains, not open to question or criticism on the part of Americans or English, that the Boers established themselves in a wilderness, opened it, cultivated it, planted there their homes, and have lived there ever since. Their right—to dwell in that land, and to govern themselves, and all newcomers, in their own way, is one not open to question on any reasonable grounds, by any Englishman or American. It never has been seriously questioned by Englishmen. It has on several occasions been formally acknowledged by the British Government by solemn treaties. No doubt, Englishmen and Americans who enter the Boer territory are entitled to that degree of protection for life, liberty, and property, which should always be secured by the government of every civilized people to the citizens of other governments who come within its territories. It has not been made matter of serious complaint against the Transvaal Government, that British citizens have not had due protection for life, liberty, and property. That has not been put forward as a ground for the aggressive action of the British Government. Unless, therefore, there be other circumstances not yet disclosed, the

right of the Transvaal people to establish and maintain their own government, for themselves and all newcomers in their territory, is fully established by the fact that they opened, and settled, a territory which had theretofore been occupied by no civilized race. Their title to their territory, and their right to independent self government, rests on precisely the same grounds with the same rights vested in the English and American peoples.

This right of the Boers to self government, however, as against the British Government, rests on additional and stronger grounds. On four distinct occasions it has been guaranteed by the British Government in solemn treaties. That fact has never been questioned. The language of the treaties is clear, and its meaning is free from all possible doubt. By the Sand River Convention, as it is called, made in the year 1852, the British Government guaranteed to the Boers "the right to manage their own affairs, and to govern themselves according to their own laws without any interference on the part of the British Government." In 1854 this Convention of 1852 was confirmed by another Convention. The Boers' right to complete self government was even then placed beyond legal question.

Here is Mr. Theal's statement:

"Under these circumstances the governor decided to acknowledge the independence of the Transvaal emigrants, as the imperial ministers had announced their determination not to add another square inch of ground in South Africa to the Queen's dominions, and advantages which could be obtained by a convention were not to be had in any other way. Two assistant commissioners — Major Hogg and Mr. Owen—were therefore sent to make the necessary arrangements with Commandant Pretorius and a number of delegates from the Transvaal people. The conference took place on a farm in the Sovereignty, and there, on the 17th of January, 1852, a document—known ever since as the Sand River convention—was signed, in which *the British Government guaranteed to the emigrants north of the Vaal the right to manage their own affairs without interference.* The convention was confirmed by the secretary of state for the colonies, and was ratified by the Volksraad, so that thereafter the South African Republic—as the country was named—had a *legal as well as an actual existenece in the eyes of the British Government.*"

"For some time the imperial government had been undecided whether to retain the Sovereignty of a British possession or not, but as soon as intelligence of the engagement with the Basuto reached England a decision was formed. The next mail brought a despatch from the secretary of state for the colonies that *the territory was to be abandoned.*

"To carry this resolution into effect, Sir George Clerk was sent out as special commissioner. He called upon the European inhabitants to elect a body of representatives to take over the government; but when the representatives assembled, they objected in the strongest terms to be abandoned by Great Britain, for even while they were debating, Moshesh was crushing Sikonyela and another of his opponents, and adding their territory to his own. In effect, the representative assembly said to Sir George Clerk that they held England in honour bound *to reduce the great barbaric power she had done so much to build up. When that was done,* they would not need military assistance, and *would be prepared to take over the government of the country,* though they wished to remain permanently connected with the British empire. The special commissioner, however, was prevented by his instructions from paying any attention to language of this kind, and was obliged to term those who used it 'obstructionists.' The assembly then sent two delegates to England to implore the queen's government and the parliament not to abandon them, but those gentlemen met with no success in their mission.

"Sir George Clerk now encouraged the remnant of the party that was at heart opposed to British rule to assert itself openly. With his concurrence, one of its ablest leaders returned from beyond the Vaal, and went about the country addressing the people and arguing that connection with England meant nothing but restraint, for no protection whatever was received. In the special commissioner's phraseology, Mr. Stander and those of his way of thinking, who used language to that effect, were 'well disposed.'

"This party elected a body of delegates, who met in Bloemfontein, and opened negotiations with Sir George Clerk. The 'obstructionist' assembly protested, and was thereupon dissolved by the special commissioner, when most of its members and supporters, finding resistance to the will of the British government useless, went over to the 'well disposed' side, and tried to get as good terms as possible. Gold was freely used to suppress complaints—it was termed part compensation for losses—and nothing that was possible to be done was neglected to make the abandonment acceptable to the people generally. The result was that on the 23rd of February, 1854, a convention was signed at Bloemfontein by Sir George Clerk and the members of the 'well disposed' assembly, by which *the government of the territory previously termed the Orange River Sovereignty, thereafter the Orange Free State. was transferred, and its future independence was guaranteed.*

"There were now in South Africa five distinct European governments, namely of—

1. Cape Colony,
2. Natal.
3. British Kaffraria,

} British Possessions.

4. *The South African Republic,*
5. *The Orange Free State,*

} *Independent Republics."*

But later, in the year 1873, came the discovery of the Transvaal gold fields. Then the territory of the Burghers became more inviting to outsiders. Then came the beginning of a series of acts of unlawful unjustifiable aggression on the part of the British Government.

In the year 1877 Sir Theophilus Shepstone, the Commissioner of the British Colonial Office, issued a Proclamation, so-called, whereby he stated that he *"annexed"* the Transvaal Republic to the dominions of the British Crown. Sir Theophilus Shepstone alleged, that this act of his had the secret approval of some of the high officials of the Transvaal Republic. But no official of the Republic had any authority to assent to such an act. Nor was any official action in the way of an assent to the annexation ever taken by any public officer, or authorized body, acting on behalf of the Transvaal Government. So far as concerns any point of legal validity, the Act of Annexation was an act of bald spoliation, an act of purely arbitrary, illegal, and unjustifiable aggression, against the sovereignty of a free independent State. So far as concerned any point of law, or right, Sir Theophilus Shepstone might as well have made a proclamation annexing the City or the State of New York. The so-called Proclamation—as matter of law—was not worth the paper on which it was written. No doubt, the Transvaal Government had not at that time become a very efficient working organization. But the doctrine that inefficiency on the part of a government furnishes ground for some other government, or unauthorized government official, to come in and "annex" an entire people, with their territory, and put them under the dominion of a foreign power, would introduce somewhat novel principles and rules of international law.

A protest was immediately made in London against this high handed lawless act of aggression.

Of course, British officials of the time made their statements that this action on their part was taken for the purpose of protecting the Boers against the savages! But the Boers had conquered the country from the savages, and had protected themselves against the savages for forty years, when they were fewer in numbers and weaker than in 1877. Moreover, it is to be noted, that this charitable protecting British hand was not out-

stretched during the time of the trekkers' early struggles, but came most opportunely after the discovery of gold.

For a time the Boers submitted to superior force. At that time—they were too weak to venture on a contest at arms with the great British Empire.

But then came a fresh series of abuses at the hands of British officials, of the same kind with those which had originally driven the Boers to leave the Cape and go into the wilderness. Those abuses are thus described by Mr. Fitzpatrick:

"The real mistakes of the British Government began after the annexation. The failure to fulfil promises; the deviation from old ways of government; the appointment of unsuitable officials, who did not understand the people or their language; the neglect to convene the Volksraad, or to hold fresh elections, as definitely promised; the establishment of personal rule by military men, who treated the Boers with harshness and contempt, and would make no allowance for their simple, old-fashioned ways, their deep-seated prejudices, and, if you like, their stupid opposition to modern ideas; these things and others caused great dissatisfaction, and gave ample material for the nucleus of irreconcilables to work with."

Meantime two deputations had been sent to England to protest against the lawless action of Sir Theophilus Shepstone.

In April, 1879, Sir Bartle Frere held a conference with a deputation of the Boers to consider their grievances at the hands of the British authorities. His account of that conference is as follows:

"If I may judge from the gentlemen composing the deputation, and others of their class, whom I have had the honour of meeting since coming to the Transvaal, the leaders are, with very few exceptions, *men who deserve respect and regard* for many *valuable and amiable qualities* as citizens and subjects. * * * *

"Of the results of our meeting it is impossible at present to say more than that it must have cleared away misconceptions on all sides. If they have learnt anything as to the finality of the act of annexation—that I have no power to undo it, and do not believe that it will ever be undone-in the only sense in which they will ask it—I have, on the other hand, been shown the *stubbornness of a determination to be content with nothing else*, for which I was not prepared by the general testimony of officials who had been longer in the country, and who professed to believe that the opposition of the Boers was mere bluster, and that they had not the courage of their professed opinions. * * * I feel assured that *the majority of the Committee felt very deeply what they believed to be a great national wrong.*"

Then came war.

Even in those days of their weakness, that war, so far as it went, resulted in signal victories of the Boers. Those victories were followed by the Pretoria Convention, made in August, 1881,—by which the British Government again formally and expressly conceded, by solemn treaty, what they never had any right to question, the right of the Boers to self government. The Convention of 1881 also stated that this right was conceded subject to the "suzerainty of Her Majesty." The only clauses of that treaty, which are here important are the following:

"Her Majesty's Commissions for the Settlement of the Transvaal territory, duly appointed as such by a Commission passed under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet, bearing date the 5th of April, 1881, do hereby undertake and guarantee on behalf of Her Majesty that, from and after the 8th day of August, 1881, *complete self government*, subject to the suzerainty of Her Majesty, her heirs and successors, will be accorded to the inhabitants of the Transvaal territory, upon the following terms and conditions, and subject to the following reservations and limitations:"

* * * * *

"Her *Majesty reserves* to herself, her heirs and successors, (a) the right from time to time to *appoint a British Resident* in and for the said State with such duties and functions as are hereinafter defined; (b) the right to *move troops through the said State in time of war*, or in case of the apprehension of immediate war between the Suzerain Power and any Foreign State or Native tribe in South Africa; and (c) the *control of the external relations* of the said State, including the *conclusion of treaties* and the conduct of *diplomatic intercourse* with Foreign Powers, such intercourse to be carried on through Her Majesty's diplomatic and consular officers abroad."

* * * * * * *

"On the 8th day of August, 1881, *the Government of the said State, together with all rights and obligations thereto appertaining*, and all State property taken over at the time of annexation, save and except munitions of war, *will be handed over to Messrs. Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger, Martinus Wessel Pretorius and Petrus Jacobus Joubert*, or the survivor or survivors of them, who will forthwith cause a Volksraad to be elected and convened, and the *Volksraad*, thus elected and convened, will *decide as to the further administration of the Government of the said State.*"

The right of the Transvaal State to self-government was again recognized, and put on a firm basis, by the later London Convention of 1884. That Convention expressly recognized

the existing government of the Transvaal State under a new title, that of the "South African Republic." All mention of the suzerainty was omitted; and the only clause contained in that Convention of 1884 restricting in any respect the powers of the Republic as an independent government, is to be found in Article 4 in the following words:

"The South African Republic will conclude no treaty or engagement with any state or nation, other than the Orange Free State, nor with any native tribe to the eastward or westward of the Republic, until the same has been approved by Her Majesty the Queen.

"Such approval shall be considered to have been granted if Her Majesty's government shall not within six months after receiving a copy of such treaty (which shall be delivered to them immediately upon its completion) have notified that the conclusion of such treaty is in conflict with the interests of Great Britain or of any of her Majesty's possession in South Africa."

The right of the British government to move troops through the Republic in time of war, "and the control of external relations" of the Republic, including the conclusion of treaties and conduct of diplomatic intercourse with foreign powers, which had been reserved under the prior Convention of 1881, were abrogated, as matter of law, by the terms of the later Convention, and no right was reserved to the British government, by implication or otherwise, to interfere in any form in the internal administration of the government of the Transvaal State.

No breach of the obligations of the Republic under that Convention has been charged.

So it is clear, that as to all internal affairs, the right of the Transvaal Republic to complete self government, free from "any interference on the part of the British Government" was, and is, beyond question. It was as undoubted as the same right, of the "United States of America," or any one of our separate States. In those internal affairs the British Government had, and has, no more right to intervene than it has in our affairs.

That fact has never been questioned by any responsible British official. It has been more than once formally conceded by Mr. Chamberlain.

Mr. Chamberlain has stated in the House of Commons:

"I do not say that under the terms of the Convention we are entitled to force reforms on President Kruger, but we are entitled to give him *friendly counsel.* * * * If this friendly counsel was not well received, there *was not the slightest intention on the part of her Majesty's Government to press it.* * * * *I am perfectly willing to withdraw it,* and to seek a different solution if it should not prove acceptable to the President. The rights of our action under the Convention are limited to the *offering of friendly counsel, in the rejection of which, if it is not accepted, we must be quite willing to acquiesce.*"

On another occasion Mr. Chamberlain said:

"What is the policy which the honorable gentleman would put forward if he were standing here in my place? We know what it would be. He would send, in the first place, an ultimatum to President Kruger that unless the reforms which he was specifying were granted by a particular date the British Government would interfere by force. Then, I suppose, he would come here and ask this House for a vote of £10,000,000 or £20,000,000—it does not matter particularly which—and would send an army of 10,000 men, at the very least, to force President Kruger to grant reforms in regard to which not only this Government, but successive Secretaries of State, *have pledged themselves repeatedly that they would have nothing to do with its internal affairs.* That is the policy of the honorable gentleman. *That is not my policy.*"

Mr. Chamberlain is always ready to eat his words. He does not forget them.

Meantime, however, came fresh discoveries of gold. The diamond mines of Kimberley, too, became known, and fell into the control of Mr. Cecil Rhodes, under the ownership, as commonly reported, of the Rothschilds. Thereafter Mr. Rhodes formed his scheme for the Cape to Cairo railway. A certain Birmingham ward politician, too, became possessed with the idea of British imperialism. Mr. Rhodes formed the purpose, in which he was afterwards aided and abetted by Mr. Chamberlain, of again attempting the action of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, by making a conquest, and an annexation, of the Transvaal Republic.

The means by which Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Chamberlain sought to accomplish their purpose was the celebrated Jameson raid.

Mr. Chamberlain, with his political friends and supporters, has persistently repeated the statement, that the Jameson raid was really only an incident to a revolution; that there was a

revolution within the Republic, on the part of the Uitlanders, the foreign population of Johannesburg, to redress grievances suffered by them at the hands of the Transvaal Government; that those grievances had then become " intolerable "; that the people of Johannesburg had exhausted all lawful and peaceable means to get redress; that those means had failed; that the Johannesburghers had resorted to arms only after that failure; and that the Jameson raid was only a movement of sympathy from without—in aid of armed rebellion within—a movement to succor a deeply wronged and suffering people.

The facts are directly the reverse. The population of Johannesburg did not revolt. They did not wish a revolution. They were not in favor of the Jameson Raid. No doubt, there were many things in the Transvaal public administration, which were not thoroughly satisfactory to the Uitlanders. But they did not consider that their grievances were " intolerable." Nor did they consider, that they had exhausted their peaceable and legal remedies. On the contrary, their efforts to get improvement in governmental methods had been very successful. The evils of which they complained were of precisely the same nature, though much less gross, with those endured so patiently for many years by the people of the City of New York. The complaints of the Johannesburg population were almost wholly as to matters of taxation. They thought that the government raised more money than it needed. They charged that some of that money was misused. They even charged, that there were some corrupt officials. But no considerable portion of the people of Johannesburg went so far as to even allege, that such abuses as existed reached the extent which similar abuses had for many years reached in the City of New York, that the abuses warranted revolution, or that they were " intolerable." We have heard much from Mr. Chamberlain and his supporters, as to the dreadful injustice which the Uitlanders suffered in the matter of education, in the fact that instruction in the public schools was given only in the Dutch language. The Uitlanders cared nothing for education. That is, no considerable number of them cared for it. Johannesburg was a mining camp—a heterogeneous collection—of Kaffirs, Chinamen, Japanese, Italians, Germans, Frenchmen, Englishmen and Americans. It is fair to

assume, that some of them wished their children to have some kind of education. But the statement that any considerable number of the Johannesburg miners were willing to have a war, or even a Jameson Raid, over a question whether the instruction in the public schools should be in English or Dutch, if such a statement had been made in Johannesburg, would have produced no result more serious than laughter. Such a statement might easily be made in the British House of Commons by Mr. Chamberlain. But that any well informed person should make the statement truthfully, in the House of Commons or elsewhere, was quite impossible. No doubt, there was, as an adjunct of the Jameson Raid, the publication of a manifesto, purporting to be from the downtrodden Uitlanders, demanding the franchise, civil and religious liberty, purity of public administration, liberal education, and in general an ideal condition of public affairs far above anything at the time existing in Great Britain or the United States* But that alleged petition was only a special manufacture for the London market. It was never intended to be used as a genuine public document. It first saw the light when Dr. Jameson was waiting on the border of the Transvaal Republic, four days before his invasion of the Transvaal territory. It was a spurious paper, concocted for use in

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*This remarkable paper, as printed in Mrs. Hammond's "A Woman's Part in a Revolution," at page 4, is given as follows :

"The Leonard Manifesto was published, *December 26th*, setting forth the demands of the Uitlander.

'We want,' it reads:—

'1. The establishment of this Republic, as *a true Republic.*

'2. A Grondwet or constitution which shall be framed by competent persons selected by representatives of the whole people and framed on lines laid down by them; a constitution which shall be safeguarded against hasty alteration.

'3. An equitable Franchise Law and fair representation.

'4. Equality of the Dutch and English languages.

'5. Responsibility to the Legislature of the Heads of the great Departments.

'6. *Removal of religious disabilities.*

'7. Independence of the Courts of Justice, with adequate and secured remuneration of the Judges.

'8. *Liberal and comprehensive education.*

'9. An efficient Civil Service, with adequate provision for pay and pension.

'10. Free Trade in South African products.'"

England, as a pretended justification for the overthrow of the Transvaal Government, after the overthrow of that government should have become an acomplished fact. It was never used, or intended to be used, as a genuine petition for relief against real grievances.

The Jameson Raid was an operation organized, paid for, and carried out, by Mr. Cecil Rhodes, aided and abetted by Mr. Chamberlain. It was not an operation for the relief of oppressed Uitlanders. It was merely an attempt on the part of Mr. Rhodes and a few men who were associated with him in his financial enterprises, to overthrow the Transvaal government, and thereby get the control of the Transvaal taxation, and of the laws which should affect mining properties. No evidence has ever been presented, which has come to the knowledge of the writer, that there was any considerable degree of discontent on the part of the Uitlanders in Johannesburg prior to the Jameson Raid. No evidence has ever been presented, that any considerable number of the inhabitants of that town desired a revolution, or a resort to arms. No evidence has ever been presented, that any considerable number of them considered that they were in any respect oppressed by the Transvaal government. The growth of Johannesburg has been very remarkable. Necessarily there were in Johannesburg a considerable number of orderly business people, who desired to have perfect political conditions. But the abuses and imperfections of government in Johannesburg, or in the mining region, were only those that exist in every new community, especially in every new mining community. There was a large mass of ignorant disorderly population. It was a matter of course, that there was some degree of inefficiency in the administration of the laws. But the condition of public affairs in Johannesburg at the time of the Jameson Raid was far superior to that in many of the mining camps in the United States. However that may be, and whatever may have been the condition of public administration in and around Johannesburg, the idea that it furnished any legal justification for interference by any outside government, is simply ridiculously absurd. Even Mr. Chamberlain never ventured to take that position, until he had decided upon the second Raid of 1899, when it became necessary for him to

make excuses for his second attack upon the Transvaal Republic.

Prior to the Jameson Raid, moreover, no attempt had been made by any considerable body of men in Johannesburg for any substantial reform in the existing laws, or in the existing administration of those laws.

The Jameson Raid was organized from outside, by Mr. Rhodes. Mr. Rhodes, as is well known, was at that time Prime Minister of the Cape Colony. The troops that were used in that expedition were almost entirely the Mashonaland Mounted Police and the Bechuanaland Border Police. To all intents and purposes, those troops were part of the British Army. They were under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Sir John Willoughby, of the Royal Horse Guards. Associated with him in those operations were Major Hon. Robert White, of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, Major C. Hyde Villiers, of the Royal Horse Guards, Captain Kincaid Smith, of the Royal Artillery, Captain Kennedy, of the British South African Company's Service, Captain E. Holden, of the Derbyshire Yeomanry, Surgeon Captain Seaton Hamilton, late 1st Life Guards, Lieutenant Grenfell, of the 1st Life Guards, Captain Lindsell, late Royal Scots Fusiliers, Major J. B. Stracey, of the Scots Guards, Lieutenant Harry R. Holden, late Grenadier Guards. In command of the Bechuanaland Border Police was Lieutenant-Colonel Raleigh Grey, 6th Dragoons.

That these officers in the British regular army took part in this expedition without leave of absence from the War Office, and without the full knowledge and approval of the home government, is not for an instant to be believed. They were men of high Army rank. It is not open to reasonable doubt, that the British War Office were fully cognizant of the move these men were then undertaking. It is not open to reasonable doubt, that Mr. Chamberlain, at least, of the British Home Government was fully apprised of the fact that these officers were going to South Africa for the purpose which they afterwards attempted to execute. Sir John Willoughby *made an official Report to the War Office in London,* according to the statement of Mr. Fitzpatrick in his book entitled "The Transvaal from Within," of the operations of his command on what is termed the Jameson Raid. So far as has ever appeared, those officers

from the British Regular Army, who have here been named, have never been called to account by the War Office for their act of lawless armed aggression against a friendly government with which Her Majesty was then at peace. Nor have they received any punishment at the hands of the authorities of the British Army for their act in levying war upon a foreign power. For the Transvaal Republic, as to these questions, was undoubtedly a foreign power.

Let us now consider the real nature of the operations on which these officers, with Dr. Jameson, embarked in what has been termed the Jameson Raid.

Taking that expedition on the simple uncontradicted facts, it was an expedition for the purposes of mere robbery and murder. It was so understood by Dr. Jameson, by every one of the officers who were associated with him, by Mr. Cecil Rhodes, and by Mr. Chamberlain. Especially Mr. Chamberlain was well aware, that there was no legal ground, on which the acts of those British officers could be defended. He was well aware of the legal and political nature of their action. Robbery and murder are the strictly accurate terms, and are the only accurate terms, which can be used to characterize the action of Dr. Jameson, and the British officers who took part with him in that expedition. Upon the evidence thus far disclosed by Mr. Chamberlain himself, as to those operations, the conclusion of every reasonable man must be that, as to these crimes of robbery and murder, Mr. Chamberlain was an accessory before the fact.

Moreover, until the action of Mr. Chamberlain in regard to the Jameson Raid be disavowed by the British Nation, the British Nation is to-day an accessory before the fact to the crimes of the Jameson Raid,—in other words, to the crimes of robbery and murder.

The Jameson Raid, as is now a matter of history, met with speedy and crushing defeat. The men who conducted it were children, playing with a giant. They had fondly fancied, that their so-called military operations, petty and contemptible as they must be deemed from one standpoint, were certain of speedy success. As a matter of fact, everything they were doing was well known to the Pretoria authorities. Every move

that they made was met with the most careful preparation. They were allowed to go just so far as to make it impossible thereafter to conceal the real character of their action. When it became a pronounced fact, that those men had been engaged in a mere act of lawless aggression, in an unjustifiable attempt at robbery and murder, then the Transvaal military forces were found to be, as they have been in the present war, at precisely the right point, at precisely the right time. Sir John Willoughby's Report of those so-called military operations was merely a premonition of the reports that have been made by Sir Redvers Buller of the operations of this present war.

The result was the unconditional surrender of the entire force.

The Jameson Raid was merely the culmination—of a series of lawless and unjustifiable aggressions on the part of the British Government; of a series of attempts at bald conquest. It would have been strange, if this last act of British aggression and British brutality had not revived in the minds of the Republicans all the memories of previous wrongs; memories which had to some extent become softened by lapse of time, and which would have entirely disappeared, if the British Government had at any time treated the Republics with common decency and justice. Of course—the Jameson Raid revived all those memories of past oppression and cruelty. Of course—the Jameson Raid revived the recollection of all those old British outrages and injustice. The citizens of the Republics would have been more than human, if they had been able after this latest invasion of their territory to take a calm judicial view of the political situation between them and the British Government.

Notwithstanding all this, however, the treatment by President Kruger and his government, and by the entire people of the Transvaal Republic, of the men who had been engaged in this latest attempt to devastate their country, destroy their homes, and take their lives, was characterised by a degree of magnanimity, and delicacy, which it is hard to parallel in the historical records of civilised races. The Jameson invading force were nothing but a band of robbers and murderers. There was no pretense of a justification in law for their action. They were outlaws. Except that the term "pirates" is ordinarily

applied to men who rob and murder on the high seas, they were a band of "pirates." They were well aware of that fact, as will hereafter appear.

In view of these features of the situation, it would have been lawful, highly natural, and quite reasonable, if the Transvaal government had visited the crimes of the Jameson force, at least in the case of some of its leaders, with the punishment of death.

On the contrary, however, President Kruger insisted on a policy of clemency; and, with great difficulty, finally accomplished his purpose, of surrendering all the members of the Jameson force to the British Government, to be dealt with by them in accordance with British law. Undoubtedly President Kruger was conscious at the time, that those men would escape with only a nominal punishment. We may be sure that he was not deceived, as to the results that would follow from this remarkable generosity, on his part, and on the part of his government. It is seldom, however, that any government has adopted a policy so forbearing, so generous, and so magnanimous, under the most extreme provocation, as was adopted by the Transvaal Republic in the disposition of the prisoners taken at the end of the Jameson Raid.

So much for the action of the Transvaal Government.

But let us see what was the action of the Burghers, the individual citizens of the Transvaal Republic. Mr. Poultney Bigelow, in his book entitled "White Man's Africa," at page 12, gives us some extracts from the diary of a surgeon who took part in the Jameson Raid. The diary of that surgeon, speaking of the scene immediately after the surrender of Jameson's forces, reads as follows:

"Nothing could exceed the kindness of the people, both Dutch and English, who came up afterwards. Milk, brandy, meat, and bread were sent for the wounded, and ambulance carts came out from Krugersdorp. On Saturday, 11th January, 1896, about 9 A. M., a guard of the Pretoria Volunteer Cavalry came down, and we were marched up to the railway station in two separate lots, and put into two special trains, which left Pretoria about noon. We were very well treated here, and a Dr. Saxton, Surgeon to the Staats Artillery, was sent with us, as well as a strong escort of Pretoria Volunteer Cavalry. We officers were put into first class carriages, and were supplied with fruit and liquor. *We were cheered as we left the station, and at every station as we passed.*"

Historical records will be searched in vain for many instances of forbearance and generosity shown by conquerors to conquered, which can compare with the story here just given. Consider for a moment what would have been the treatment of the Boers by the Jameson bandits, if the result had gone the other way. We know well, from our own experience, what is the treatment of their prisoners by British soldiers, and by the British Home Government. Does any one believe, that there would have been this high degree of courteous consideration, or any consideration, for the comfort of their victims, if Sir John Willoughby and Dr. Jameson, and their titled associates, had succeeded in their attempt at murder and conquest, dealing as a conquering British force with people they deemed their inferiors, as they deem most people their inferiors? Does any one believe, that Sir John Willoughby and his band of outlaws, would have shown a magnanimity and courtesy for the defeated which would in the slightest degree compare with that shown by the Transvaal Burghers for their captives? To find a parallel to the tender delicacy of the treatment of the British by the Transvaal Burghers, we have to go back to the story of Sidney on the battlefield of Zutphen. But the British of later years, when they have been conquerors, so far as my reading goes, have on no occasion shown any tender consideration for the persons or rights of the conquered. To get the real essence of their treatment of the Transvaal Burghers, we are compelled to go back to the scene at Slagter's Neck.

It is interesting to give the ensuing incidents after the completion of the Burghers' victory, as they are told us by Mr. Bigelow. Those incidents were as follows:

"When the Boers had silenced the firing of Jameson's men, and had saved their country from what they feared might prove an invasion disastrous to their independence, they did not celebrate the event by cheers or bonfires. They fell upon their knees and followed the prayers offered by their elders; they gave praise to Almighty God for having protected them. They searched their hearts and prayed to be cleansed from the spirit of boasting. They prayed for Jameson and his men, that they might be guided by the light of justice and Christian fellowship; and thus they prayed while some of the dead lay yet unburied about them."

These are the men who are mediæval in their natures and

methods, who are a barrier to the movements of civilisation, and the growth of free government.

Mediævalism of that kind—the more we have of it, the better. Barriers of that kind—the more we have of them, the better.

When it comes to a choice, between the civilisation of the Transvaal Burghers and that of the English hereditary official class, my vote is in favor of the civilisation of the Burghers. It is more in consonance with the spirit of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

At this point it is interesting to give Mr. Bigelow's account of a Transvaal Burgher whom he met on the railway train, who had taken part in the skirmish with the Jameson bandits. Mr. Bigelow says: "He spoke English well, could repeat Shakespeare and Longfellow by the hour, and loved his native country; in short I found him an interesting companion."

How many were there of the men in Dr. Jameson's band, in the Johannesburg mining camp, or even among the titled officers of the British Army who took part in that expedition of robbery and attempted conquest, who could "repeat Shakespeare and Longfellow by the hour"? No doubt, they were authorities on horses and grouse.

We are reminded of the account given by Tocqueville of the family that he found in a frontiersman's log cabin on his visit to this country in 1831, the chief furniture of which consisted of copies of Shakespeare and the Bible.

These peoples that are brought up on the Hebrew Bible are factors of danger, in any political situation whereof the end is oppression and conquest. Mr. Green, if my memory serves me rightly, gives a chief place among the influences which have created the English people, to the King James Bible, and its predecessor versions.

Thereafter came the present war, which, if it were not already so dreadful, ought to be termed the Chamberlain Raid. It was not brought to redress any grievances, of the Uitlanders, or of any other persons. It is a war of mere lawless conquest, for land and gold. It is a war of the pure mediæval Spanish type, promoted by a stock jobber and a tawdry politician. It has not yet become a war to which the British people is a party. It

will become such, if they do not speedily disown Mr. Chamberlain, and disavow his acts.

When we have seen the action of the British people, then we shall be able to form our final judgment of the merits of the situation between Boers and Britons.

III.

THE PRESENT OUTLOOK.

The British troops at this present writing have fully established the fact that British valor is what it ever was. That fact hardly needed any further evidence. It was not necessary, in order to establish that fact, that there should have been a war of unprovoked aggressive invasion in South Africa.

But we have now had a signal British defeat, instead of a series of signal British victories, which were confidently anticipated by the British War Office, in case there should be anything that deserved the name of war. The British War Office had jauntily assumed, that there would be no serious contest, that the British troops would have a holiday march into Pretoria, followed by a speedy return with flying colors.

That anticipation has been disappointed. There is now no good reason for anticipating any speedy considerable British success. It is now quite apparent, that the want of preparation on one side, taken in connection with the very complete preparation on the other side, together with the wholesale incapacity of the officers in high places in the British army, give a very strong probability of further British reverses, with something almost approaching a certainty, that there will be no considerable success to the British arms in South Africa within any reasonable period.

This being the situation, we may consider some further fundamental facts, which bear upon the entire outlook.

The first of those facts to command our attention is the essential quality of the British army, as a fighting organization, as it has been now developed by the operations since the first of October. The preceding pages of this paper on the military situation were written long before the movement of General Buller from Frere and Chieveley to

the westward, from which it was anticipated that there would be such important results. That movement, with its ending, has given us much further light on the real present condition of the British army. Taken in connection with the facts previously known, from the former history of the so-called British wars during the nineteenth century, we can now more confidently analyze the real present condition of the British Army as an organization fitted, or unfitted, for the requirements of modern scientific warfare.

The first point to be noted in this connection in regard to the British army of to-day is its lack of brains.

By this is meant the lack of adequate mental power in the men at the head. It is the men at the head, who must in any army always have the control of its active operations. Brains, to be of service, must be in the head. Else they do not serve as brains. It may be conceded, that the British army has among its commissioned officers a considerable number of single individuals, who are men of intellect, who have given time and labor to the study of the principles and practice of modern warfare. At the same time the fact remains, that these men are not the men who are to-day in positions of high command. Especially, the men who hold the high places in the British army now serving in South Africa, with the exception of Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener who alone can accomplish little, have clearly demonstrated their incapacity to conduct active military operations in the field. They have shown their utter ignorance of the most elementary principles and practices of war.

This fact is due to the practice, which has obtained to a large extent for centuries, of giving the positions of high command in the British army to men who have shown little or no fitness for those positions, but who have received their commissions for purely family reasons. The British Government, in all its branches, has been a close corporation, in the hands of a few powerful families. No doubt it has at times happened, after months or years of active service in the field, that the meritorious men have gradually fought their way to positions of high command in the British army. Nevertheless, it has generally been the rule in the times of peace, and

in the beginning of any war, that the positions of high command have been given, not by reason of the known fitness of men, but from what must be termed, if language is used with accuracy, reasons of mere family favoritism.

That condition is absolutely fatal to the efficiency of any army, for the elaborate operations of modern scientific warfare.

The next point to be noted in the British army of to-day is its lack of organization.

Organization means something more than the mere possession of a large mass of valuable raw material. It means, that, throughout the entire body of individuals who taken together compose an army, the right man must be in the right place; and every man must have training, for the duties of the place which he holds. More than that, after individuals are thus adjusted, the different smaller bodies of which an army is composed must learn to work together as a harmonious whole. They must have training, and experience, as the component parts of one single organism. Organization, using the term in any correct sense, even with a mass of the finest raw material, is generally the result only of active service in the field for a considerable period, even with the most adaptable and resourceful of men.

Organization of the kind that has here been stated is, in the British army, only conspicuous by its utter absence. It is practically an unknown quantity.

Last, and not least, comes the immense dense intense ignorance of the British army, as an army, of the principles and practice of modern scientific warfare.

Here again it may be assumed, that there is a considerable number of single individuals who have made the military art a subject of conscientious study. But the British Army to-day is still full of younger sons, who do not know what study is; or what work is. We have, too, the further fact that no officer of the British army to-day has had any experience deserving mention in actual modern warfare. Their previous experiences in India, in Abyssinia, on the Nile, and in South Africa, have none of them risen to the dignity of war. There have been only contests, with superior weapons and superior organization, against savages, who were wholly unequipped with the machinery, and were ignorant of the methods, of modern

warfare. None of the contests in which British troops have heretofore been engaged since the year 1815 deserves to be classed as an operation of war. The Crimean campaign was so limited in its character, and consisted of operations on so small a scale, that it deserves no serious consideration in this respect. Moreover, the Crimean men are nearly all of them superannuated. They count for nothing in any practical consideration of the British army of to-day.

It is, therefore, the fact, singular as it may at first appear, that the British army, as an army, however high may be the degree of professional accomplishments of some of its individual members, still wholly lacks, as a body, any thorough or systematic knowledge of the principles or practice of modern scientific warfare.

To these facts must be added the further one, of extreme immobility.

The fighting quality of any army depends on its capacity for quick movement. It is like the case of a boxer; he has no efficiency as a fighter, unless he is a quick hitter and stopper, and unless he is quick, with his hands, and on his feet. Of all things, in order to make an army an efficient fighting organism, it must be a good marcher; it must have the capacity of covering long distances in a short space of time.

That capacity the British army essentially lacks, by reason of its complete absence of experience, in any considerable movements of troops in large numbers. Especially it has never learned the matter of reducing to the lowest terms its *impedimenta*. No more signal instance of its ignorance in this respect could be given than is found in the Cabul-Kandahar march of Lord Roberts, which has been before alluded to. On that march Lord Roberts' fighting force consisted of 9,986 men of all ranks, and 18 guns. *The camp followers numbered 8,134!* Of these only 4,698 are stated to have belonged to the "transport and other departments." Doolie bearers numbered 2,192. Private servants and *saices* of native cavalry regiments numbered 1,124. Each European officer was allowed a mule; every eight officers for mess was allowed a mule; to each staff officer for office purposes was allowed 80 pounds of baggage; each native officer was allowed 30 pounds of baggage; each British soldier was allowed

for kit, and camp equipage, including great coat and waterproof sheet, 30 pounds; each native soldier was allowed 20 pounds. These allowances were in addition to the supplies of all sorts that were taken, including food, spirits, delicacies, ammunition, hospital equipment, and "carriage for foot-sore soldiers and followers"! Lord Roberts' force, marching after these methods, required 8,000 animals!

It is easily seen that anything like mobility, with habits of this nature, is an impossibility. But that is the method adopted by the British army, and the only one permitted by its present traditions.

It is quite apparent, that anything that deserves the name of light marching order is a thing wholly unknown to the British troops, as a matter of practical experience. That is a thing they have yet to learn. It is only one of many points, wherein they must have the hard training that comes only from a considerable experience in active operations in the field. They have, in fact, yet to learn nearly everything, as to practical campaigning..

We come then to the further most serious fact of all, that the War Office *has now exhausted all its resources in the way of men, which are available to-day for operations in South Africa, or which will be available within any reasonable period.* They have already taken from India more men than they dared to withdraw. They have taken from Great Britain and Ireland every available regular. As to men—they are at the end of their rope, for a long time to come. The militia and volunteers cannot be taken out of England without their consent. It is already open to grave doubt, whether any considerable number of them will volunteer. Conscription in the present temper of the British people, is a very improbable resort. There is no reasonable prospect that the British government will be able to carry on this war by using paid mercenaries, the method which for a considerable time past has been their method of carrying on any large military operations in which they have been engaged in foreign lands.

Bearing this fact steadily in mind, that there are no more available troops which the British government can place in South Africa within a period of several months, we have the further vital fact, well established by recent events, that the

numbers of the British forces now in the field are entirely inadequate to any active aggressive operations.

In addition to the impossibility under which the British government labors, of furnishing any adequate number of troops properly equipped, disciplined and organized within the period of several months, we further have the fact, that for any new levies of new men the British government has no trained and experienced officers capable of converting those men into serviceable soldiers.

Any one who remembers the conditions existing at the beginning of our Civil War is well aware, that on both sides, North and South, the fact of most importance for the organization and discipline of an army, was the existence of a considerable number of trained and experienced soldiers. Both North and South had at their disposal a supply of West Point men who had seen active service in the field; men accomplished in their knowledge of the military art, and familiar, at least, with the handling of troops in small numbers. But the British government has no such material at its disposal. Officers, as well as men, for any new bodies of troops which they might raise, will have to be educated. With the inadaptability of the British nature, a year is a very moderate estimate of the time that would be required for the organization and discipline of any considerable number of new troops.

The probability is very great, that before that time the further reverses of the British army in South Africa would be accompanied by intervention, in one form or another, assuming that the British nation were willing to make the expenditure of men and money, which would be absolutely required for the further prosecution of the present war.

General Buller is now virtually in retreat. His operations of advance have been a failure. There is no reasonable prospect that they will be soon resumed. As has been before shown, any active aggressive movement by him is virtually a military impossibility, except by a line of railway. On the lines of railway the Boers have a large number of positions of defense, which are under existing conditions practically impregnable.

The conclusion to which we are led by these facts,—lack of brains, lack of organization, lack of practical knowledge of the

principles and practices of modern scientific warfare, immobility for the purposes of the present conflict in South Africa,—is that *the British army, as an organization for the purposes of modern scientific warfare, has to-day no existence. It is not an army, in any serious sense of the word. It is only a mass of magnificent raw material, which might be made into a superior fighting organization, if it had the right men at the head, if those men should be given an entirely free hand.* If, moreover, which is the most serious point of all, they had for the purposes of reconstruction and reorganization an unlimited amount of time.

We come next to the consideration of the military situation in the immediate future, as nearly as the facts can be now ascertained.

Here the first point, which it is important for us to consider, is the one already so many times repeated, of the impossibility of advance for active operations in South Africa otherwise than by a line of railway.

The ordinary impossibility of supplying troops in large numbers otherwise than by railway, is immeasureably increased in South Africa by the absence of good wagon roads. The movement of troops in large bodies must be on roads. Especially is this the case, in hilly and mountainous regions. Even if the British forces were already amply supplied with wagons and animals, they would be unable to use transportation by wagon for any considerable distance from a railway, by reason of the absence of adequate roads. Army wagons cannot move across lots. Poor roads soon get cut up by heavy wagons. The consequence is, that, in the absence of a sufficient number of good roads, the impossibility of moving troops in large bodies without railways becomes infinitely increased.

The combination of these two facts, the impossibility of supply for troops in large numbers except by rail, with the absence of adequate wagon roads in South Africa, adds another feature to the advantages of the defense, in that it gives to the Boers almost invariably the selection of the positions of conflict. The advance of the invading force being necessarily along a line of railway, or of some existing wagon road, and the movements of troops being practically impossible elsewhere, the defense has the greatest possible latitude in the selection of the positions

where it will make a stand. Especially is this so in a mountainous region. So that the combination of these two facts constitutes another feature which goes to make the entire position of the Boers well nigh impregnable.

The Boers are able to convert their opponents' flanking and turning movements into frontal attacks. The reason of it is, that with few and poor roads, the flanking and turning movements are necessarily so slow, that the defense is able easily to meet those movements with new fronts and new fieldworks. In effect, the defense can nearly always make its own choice of position where it can turn every flanking movement into an attack on its front.

The next point that we have to consider is the immense difficulty of any substantial advance by either existing line of railway.

Four lines of railway are the only ones in existence. They are: the line from Lourenco Marquez to Pretoria; the line from Durban through Colenso, Ladysmith, Charlestown and Standerton to Pretoria; the three lines, which virtually form only one, from East London, Port Alfred and Port Elizabeth, through Middelburg and Molteno, to Springfontein, and thence through the Free State to Pretoria; and the fourth line from Cape Town, through DeAar and Hopetown to Kimberley and Mafeking.

The first line from Lourenco Marquez is not within the immediate possibilities, inasmuch as it goes through Portuguese territory. If that fact, however, were absent, that line is essentially like the one on which Sir Redvers Buller has already been making his futile efforts. It goes through the same kind of country. It admits the same kind of defense.

The second line, from Durban through Colenso and Ladysmith, has already been demonstrated to be practically impossible. From Colenso to Charlestown it runs virtually through one continuous defile. General Buller has already found it impossible to advance beyond Colenso. An examination of the map shows that in addition to numerous other difficult positions, there is between Mt. Prospect and Charlestown a long tunnel. Between Mt. Prospect and Ingogo is a reversing station, where the curves are very sharp, for the purpose of carrying the railroad up a very steep incline. At all these points

destruction of the railroad is a matter of the greatest ease, while its re-construction and preservation would be a practical impossibility. In addition to those points there are many others, where the railroad crosses streams, as has already been mentioned, any one of which points is a point of vulnerability.

But the possibilities of the British army on those lines of railway have already been exhausted. Advance along those lines, for any considerable distance, with the present British forces, has already been shown to be a practical impossibility. Even if the British troops had to-day succeeded in relieving the beleaguered forces at Ladysmith, the position as to an advance through Charlestown towards Pretoria would not be changed in its essentials. The distance from Ladysmith to Charlestown by rail is 115 miles. Since the first of October the British troops have hardly advanced a single mile. It is easy to see that the accomplishment of any considerable distance along these lines of railway, with the forces now at the command of the British Government, or with any force which will be at their command within a year, is a practical impossibility.

The next line to the west through Colesburg and Bloemfontein, so far as concerns an advance on Pretoria, is even more impracticable than the shorter line from Durban through Colenso and Ladysmith. On the Bloemfontein line the British troops have not yet succeeded in getting north of the Orange River. In all human probability the Orange River would be found to be a more serious obstacle to their advance than they have already experienced in the Tugela. Assuming, however, that the British troops could succeed in forcing the Orange River, an assumption quite beyond the bounds of reasonable military probabilities, thereafter their advance would be one over a distance of over eight hundred miles. From their experience hitherto, the possibility of the British forces accomplishing that distance, within any reasonable time, is a matter upon which every man can form his own opinion.

The same considerations that have already been presented apply with even greater force to the line of railway from Cape Town through DeAar, Kimberley and Mafeking. If we assume that any considerable British force could succeed in reaching Mafeking, from that point they would have a march to

Pretoria overland through a country full of streams, without roads, without any railway line. If the considerations here previously presented are sound, that is a possibility not seriously to be considered.

The conclusion on this point of our study, then, is that the advance by either line of railway considered separately, is a practical impossibility for any force at the command of the British government.

We have next to consider the possibility of any advance by several lines simultaneously.

This possibility is one easily comprehended.

If the available forces at the command of the British government are inadequate to the accomplishment of any advance, even if those forces be concentrated on a single line of railway, it is evidently a mere matter of mathematical demonstration that the same force distributed on different lines would be even more unable to accomplish any substantial result.

This statement, of course, is made with the proviso that any military situation may be at any moment completely transformed by unforeseen accidents.

At the same time it is to be noted that nearly all of those accidents will operate in the large majority of cases to the advantage of the defense.

But here we come on the most vital consideration of all, the unwillingness of the British people to make the expenditure of men and money, which will undoubtedly be necessary in order to complete the Transvaal conquest.

The British press to-day is full of protestations of the determination of the British public to see this war through to the bitter end. Those protestations, however, go upon the assumption, that British success can be achieved within a reasonable time, and with a reasonable expenditure of men and money. So far as the indications have yet gone, the British people have given no practical consideration to the cost in men and money that the war will entail. Thus far there has been one appropriation of money for purposes of the war, of ten million pounds. It needs a very slight consideration of the existing situation, to see that any such amount will be utterly inadequate to a prosecution of the war for any considerable period,—even with the

forces now in the field. When, however, we go further, and consider the vast expenditure of money alone, that will be required in order to organize and equip any large body of re-enforcements and put those re-enforcements in the field in South Africa, the gross disproportion of any amounts of money that have thus far been mentioned in the English press will strike every reasonable and well-informed person. Two hundred millions of pounds would, in all probability, not cover the expenditure of a single year. A loss of ten thousand men in killed and wounded down to the present day is the cost in men alone, that has already ensued upon these comparatively small operations, which have only been the preliminaries to the war. Judging from the present accomplished results, and the present existing situation, a loss of fifty thousand men is not at all beyond the reasonable probable requirements of a final British success,—unless the Republics are overwhelmed by the failure of supplies. Such a failure does not now seem probable. The probabilities, therefore, are that an expenditure of many millions of money and of many thousands of men will be required by the British government before any conquest of the Republics.

Will the British people be ready to make that sacrifice for success in a war which has been begun, as the best Englishmen are aware, simply to promote the designs of a great stock speculator and a professional politician?

That question is one which has not been yet answered. It is one which cannot to-day receive a certain answer. The probability, however, judging from the past of the British people, and from the main features of the present situation, are very large, that the sober second sense of the English people will follow the same lines followed in the year 1881. On this point we are to consider the temper existing on the other side. The two Republics are determined to fight this war through to the death. For them it is a struggle for existence. It is a struggle which has been forced upon them. The war, as they look upon it, and as it actually exists, on the real facts, is a war of unjustifiable aggression. The two Republics rightly look upon it as a war for freedom. Their determination, as nearly as we are able to judge, will suffer no change. The war must be a war of complete subjugation, of final and absolute conquest, practically a

war of extermination, before it can be crowned with a British victory.

But at all times it must be repeated, defense by the Boers depends on the adequacy of their supplies, of ammunition, and food. It is understood, that their supply of both is ample. But on this vital essential point, no outsider can have knowledge. This is the key to the entire military situation. If the Boers can hold out on the question of supplies, their position is one of immense strength.

Any advantages of position may, of course, be thrown away by bad generalship. But the bad generalship thus far has all been on the side of the British. It will probably remain there, until they get rid of their immense superincumbent mass of dead wood.

But that would require a long time.

These features of the situation lead us to a consideration of a further point,—the question whether the British Government will be allowed to carry through a war of extermination, without an effectual protest on the part of other nations.

At this point we start with the well known fact, that all of the continental nations warmly sympathize with the Boers; that they thoroughly desire British failure; and that British misfortune will not only satisfy their present sentiments, but will serve, in their opinion, their present and future interests. The public policies of nations are almost invariably dominated by the view that they entertain of their own interests. The view entertained of their own interests by all of the continental nations to-day is, that those interests will be best served by British failure. The probability then is very strong, that before allowing the completion of a war of extermination against the two Republics, some one or all of the Continental powers will commit themselves to a policy of intervention in one or another form.

This possibility of foreign intervention is further complicated by the possibilities of Russian policy. For more than a century there has been a steady Russian advance over the Asiatic continent. Russian policy has been one of continuous Asiatic absorption. Has that policy yet reached its end? Even if it has not, has it yet reached a point which satisfies Russian aspirations? The most prominent Russian enterprise of to-day is the

completion of the so-called Trans-Siberian railway. That railway, euphemistically termed Trans-Siberian, is at present, so far as concerns Siberia, largely a project of the future. If, on the other hand, we look at the actual accomplished results of to-day, we shall find that actual construction has proceeded up to the borders of India, or, to speak more definitely, up to the borders of Afghanistan. So that, if the great Russian railway enterprise were more correctly named, it would be called the "Railway to India." In this connection is to be noted the fact that very recently movements of Russian troops have been reported on the frontier of Afghanistan. Those movements, if accurately reported, can have only one purpose. It is extremely improbable, so improbable as to seem almost impossible, that the Russians, if the British government is involved in a long war, and especially if the British government is involved in an unsuccessful war, will lose so promising an opportunity of stirring up revolt in India. In India, the opinion of the highest British authorities is that the British people is sleeping on a volcano. Lord Roberts has set forth in his Recollections with great force the serious dangers impending in India. Mr. Steevens, the London correspondent, in his book entitled "In India," has given utterance to the almost universal consciousness on the part of the British Indian officials, of the extreme danger of insurrection. It is well known, that there has been widespread discontent among the inhabitants of that country for the last few years. It has been frequently stated by prominent Englishmen, that disaster in the South African war would bring a large probability of revolt in the east.

What are the probabilities, then, of peace in India, if the British government should become involved in South Africa in a long war, and especially if that war should result in great disaster? These are questions which admit of no certain answer.

On this branch of our study we have the further fact that the gold and diamond mines in South Africa at present yield no return to their owners; and that it was the owners of those mines who really started this present war, for the purpose of getting control of the government of the Transvaal Republic, and of the Orange Free State. Those mine owners counted on

a speedy success of the British arms. They assumed that victory was certain, and would come quickly; and that the profitable working of their mines would have only a short interruption.

As soon as the mine owners see that the resumption of the working of their mines will come only at the end of a very long and uncertain war, what are the probabilities as to the direction in which their influence would be exercised? It would seem highly probable that they will make an effort to have a speedy peace. A speedy peace can come apparently only by cessation of the present attempt at conquest.

Some weight, moreover, must be given to the sentiment of the civilised world. The sentiment of the European Continent is already well known. The only first class power as to which in this respect there is any doubt is the United States. The feeling of the people of the United States is rapidly changing. The indications of that fact are not far to seek. Even with the present widespread ignorance of the real facts of the political situation between Great Britain and the Republics, the sympathies of the American people are largely with the Republics. When, however, the real facts of the political situation become known, as those facts exist in the British Blue Books, there can be little doubt that the sympathies of our people, now wavering in the balance, will turn strongly on the side of the Republics. With such turning, it will be a matter of grave doubt whether the British Government will venture to resist for any considerable time the combined and concentrated sympathy of the entire western world.

The latest cable advices as to the British operations in South Africa mention the occupation by British troops of a situation at Theebus, just west of Steynsburg, between Steynsburg and Middleburg. This movement, taken in connection with General Buller's reported proclamation to his troops of his intention to renew his advance on Ladysmith, would seem to indicate very possibly an attempt on the part of the British forces to operate on another line of invasion, the one through the Orange Free State by Springfontein and Bloemfontein.

An advance on this line through the Orange Free State appears to present difficulties of precisely the same nature with those attending the advance along the line of railroad through

Colenso and Ladysmith, and quite as insuperable. Bear in mind that General Buller's movement in retreat, or if that be deemed an expression hardly warranted by the facts, his suspension of any movement in advance, is virtually equivalent to a confession of failure. It is an admission that an advance along the line of railroad from Colenso is now impracticable. Even if General Buller should succeed in his advance to Ladysmith, and should relieve the force at present confined there, the military situation would not be essentially altered. British prestige would be for the time to a slight extent rehabilitated. The essential fundamental difficulties, however, of an advance on that line of railway into the Transvaal would still remain. It would still be the fact that the advance of the British troops could be resisted at an almost indefinite number of points, by lines of field works well armed and well manned, so that the cost in time and men of a movement into the Transvaal Republic on that line must be deemed under existing circumstances to constitute a virtually impossible barrier.

The military situation with reference to an advance through Springfontein and Bloemfontein is practically identical with the one applicable to the advance by Colenso and Ladysmith. A mere glance at the map makes it evident that concerted cooperation between the forces operating on the Springfontein line and forces on the line between Durban and Charlestown, is an impossibility. There is no communication between those two districts, by rail or road. Any movement of troops from one district to the other is impossible, that is for the purposes of concerted military action. The advance along the Bloemfontein line, therefore, must stand or fall on its own merits as an independent operation.

Considering it from this point of view, we have to note the following facts. The line of supply from either Port Elizabeth, Port Alfred or East London to Middleburg and Molteno is very long, and has heavy grades. Transportation, therefore, will be slow and difficult. The altitude at Queenstown on the line from East London to Molteno is 3,400 feet. The altitude of Cradock on the line from Port Alfred or Port Elizabeth to Middleburg is 3,028 feet. At Colesberg the altitude is 4,000 feet. From Colesberg and Burghersdorp the railroads descend

to the Valley of the Orange River. The Orange River without doubt furnishes a line of advance which can be made very strong. If, however, the British troops should succeed in advancing through Molteno and Burghersdorp or through Naauwport and Colesberg to the Orange River, and should thereafter succeed in forcing a passage across the Orange River, then their advance could be indefinitely delayed by destroying the bridges over the Orange River and over the many streams to the north of it. In this district the British forces would be even more dependent upon the railway for their supplies than elsewhere. The maps at my command indicate no wagon roads whatever in the district from Burghersdorp and Colesberg to the northward until we get to Edenburg on the railway line to Bloemfontein, with the exception of a road from Bethulie through Welkom to Etonburg. Even this is probably a very poor road, inasmuch as it appears on some of the maps as only a telegraph line. The probability therefore is that it is practically worthless for the purposes of transportation or the movement of troops in any considerable number. An advance along the Colenso and Ladysmith line has at any rate this in its favor, that there is a main wagon road there which has been long in use, which it is fair to assume, therefore, may be available for wagon transportation. On the Bloemfontein line, however, so far as is indicated by the maps, there is an entire absence of ordinary wagon roads. The British forces, therefore, would be entirely dependent upon the railway for supplies, and consequently their line of communication could be interrupted with ease at any moment which should suit the convenience of the Republicans. Basing our computations as to the possibility of any advance along the Bloemfontein line within any reasonable period of time on the rapidity of General Buller's operations along the Colenso line, it would seem that there is no substantial ground for apprehending any different result to a movement of the British forces into the Orange Free State than has come from General Buller's attempt, which has thus far been a complete failure.

The fundamental fact which underlies the entire military situation, by whatever line the attempt may be made to invade the Transvaal Republic, is simply the impregnability under

all ordinary circumstances of the Republican position. It is virtually one large fortress. The approaches to that fortress lie through a country impassable for military operations on any large scale. This fact seems thus far to be wholly ignored by the British military writers. They virtually make no allowance for the peculiar topography of the field of operations. They virtually assume, that movements of troops can be made over any part of the South African territory in almost the same manner, and with almost as much ease, as would be possible in the plains of Flanders. They have not studied topography. It is a matter of common report that the British War Office has been inadequately supplied with maps. This is merely a single point which shows the ignorance and incapacity of the British War Office, and their ignorance of the fundamental conditions of modern warfare. Their methods are still medieval.

The difficulties of the British situation, so far as any one can judge, are too deep to be eradicated within any period of time which will be practicable for the needs of this present war. The Marquis of Salisbury in his speech in the House of Lords, shows a consciousness of the nature of the real difficulty. His language is reported by cable as follows:

"The Prime Minister declared that he regarded the *British system* rather than individuals to be *at fault. He did not think the British Constitution as it now worked was a good fighting machine.* It was unequalled for producing prosperity and liberty in times of peace, but in times of war, when the great powers, with enormous armies, were watching Great Britain with no gentle or kindly eye, it became Englishmen to think whether they must not in some degree modify existing arrangements so as to enable themselves to meet dangers which might at any moment arise to menace them." * * * *

"'We must all,' he said, 'join together and exercise all our powers in order to extricate ourselves from a situation that is full of humiliation and not free from danger. We must defer the pleasing task of quarrelling among ourselves until the war is satisfactorily concluded'"

The Prime Minister has his hand upon the real seat of the trouble. It is a fact that "the British Constitution as it now works is not a good fighting machine." It is the fact that "in times of war when the great powers with enormous armies are watching Great Britain with no gentle or kindly eye, it becomes

Englishmen to think whether they must not in some degree modify existing arrangements so as to enable themselves to meet dangers which may at any moment arise to menace them."

But in order to make the British Constitution "a good fighting machine," will require a fundamental reconstruction, and reorganization, of the entire British political fabric. Government by the members of a few favored familits will have to be abandoned. The political system under which the control of the army and navy is placed in the hands of a Committee of parliamentary politicians, whose members change from year to year, or month to month, whose time and labor must necessarily be given, and always is given, to the retention of their working majority in the House of Commons, must be thoroughly reconstructed. It is not here contended, that the delvelopment of democracy on this side of the water has yet reached its final form. It is not here contended that our own national constitution gives us as yet the perfection of administration. We do, however, have one inestimable advantage, that the War Office is in the hands of a single man, who is under a high degree of responsibility for its action, who is under responsibility for nothing else, who has at least a term of four years, on which he can depend as a practical certainty, for the learning and the doing of his official work. During those four years, at least, he can give his time and thought to the affairs of the army. He is not compelled to be answering questions in the House of Commons, or looking after a working majority from day to day, in order to prevent the loss of his official place. So it is, therefore, that in spite of the many imperfections of our own present system of government, we have some great advantages which go far towards protecting us from the extreme inefficiency and incompetency that invariably attends the workings of the British War Office. It is the fact, as the Marquis of Salisbury begins dimly to understand, that the parliamentary system will have to go by the board. The British people will have to devise a new regime, under which they can get brains at the head, under which the men at the head of the public administration will be selected for their own ability, and not in the main because they are the sons of their ancestors. In short, government by younger sons, by family favorites, by men who are selected

in the main for birth and not worth, must be thrown overboard, finally and forever in England, if they wish any serious reform in the management of their War Office, their Naval Office, or of any of their great offices of administration. Routine work of a common place order can be done fairly well by country gentlemen who give to public affairs the intervals between golf and grouse. Public work of the highest order calls for men of brains, who have learned how to do hard work, who approach politics with something other than the temper of dilettantes, who take their official work seriously, and give to it their entire energies. The Marquis of Salisbury is undoubtedly right. His views quite thoroughly coincide with those of Lord Rosebery, who is reported as having very recently delivered himself of the following remarks:

"The war will be cheap if it teaches the nation that it has lived too much from hand to mouth and that it must place things on a scientific or methodical basis. In commerce, education and war Great Britain is not methodical and not scientific. The task ahead is the greatest which ever lay before a nation, and will occupy the present Government and many future Governments. But it will have to be faced. The country has yet to bring the war to a triumphant conclusion. When that is done, it must *set to work and put the Empire on a business footing*, and strive to make it realize the British ideal of an Empire, without menace, without oppression—a model State ruled by institutions and inhabited by a model race."

THE CAUSE OF THE BOERS.

The cause of the Boers is the cause of all that is best in British history. For the time—the English people have forgotten their high mission, the diffusion of the blessings of civil and religious freedom. By the strange irony of events, they have allowed the helm of State to get into the hands of a cheap Birmingham demagogue, who has in his nature nothing whatever that is noble or magnanimous. The English people, in their temporary neglect of public affairs, has allowed itself to drift into a policy of wanton aggression—into an attempt at mere mediæval Spanish conquest—for land, and gold. It has—in effect—placed its army, and its navy, at the beck and call of a speculator in mining stocks, and a professional machine politician. England's statesmen have been—for the time—guilty of the crime of abdication.

England must correct her errors. Those errors cannot be corrected by mere persistence in wrongdoing. England must suffer—to some extent—the consequences of her own neglect of her own public affairs. By an oversight, she has allowed the supreme control of her foreign policy to fall into unworthy hands. Her Prime Minister has been unduly confiding. The House of Commons leader in Her Majesty's Government has been unduly confiding. Their confidence has been betrayed—by a man who has been using the great powers of his public office for personal ends. It is by no means the first time, that the same man has been guilty of the same offense. It is needless at this moment to recall from the pages of their chosen organ the veracious utterances of the feelings of loathing and disgust, which the Marquis of Salisbury and Mr. Balfour have felt in the past for Mr. Joseph Chamberlain. Those feelings have never changed. The exigencies of party politics have—for the time—compelled the two Conservative statesmen to treat with an appearance of friendliness, in public, and probably in private, a man for whom they have always had feelings of supreme con-

tempt. Those feelings were due to the man's real character. That character has never changed. He will sell out any friend, or any cause.

No obligations, which the statesmen of the Conservative party in England have any right now to consider, bind them to give a longer support to a man who has betrayed the confidence of his colleagues, of his Sovereign, and of the English people.

All three of these, the statesmen of the Conservative party, Her Majesty our Sovereign Lady the Queen, and the English people, owe it to themselves, and to the rest of the civilised world, to depose from his high place the man who is—thus far—almost solely responsible for the existence of a war of unprovoked lawless aggression on a poor and small people, a people that has thus far been commonly deemed weak, even for the mere purposes of self defense.

Further persistence in this unholy and unrighteous war, by the English people, will make them accessories to the crimes of Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Rhodes—will make them accessories before the fact. In law, subsequent ratification is equivalent to previous authorisation. If the English people ratifies the action of Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Chamberlain—and an omission to disavow and undo that action will be a ratification—then the English people will be—in legal effect—the originators—from the outset, and the pursuers—to the close—of this policy of lawless aggression, of wholesale robbery and murder.

In that case, the rest of the civilised world will know how to deal with England.

We Americans have good memories. We were willing to forget the past. We were willing to forget the cruelty and barbarism of the persecution which drove our ancestors into exile, and compelled them in their days of poverty and distress to seek an asylum with the Dutch. We were ready to forget the years of cold neglect, tempered with tyranny, which we endured in our colonial period. We were ready to forget the further periods of oppression and misrule, which drove us into armed rebellion, into a reluctant declaration of our independence, and a protracted war to achieve our national existence. We were ready to forget the barbarous methods used by England in that contest, and her cruel and inhuman treatment of our cap-

tured prisoners. We were ready to forget the later acts of insolence and cruel barbarity, which a second time drove us to take up arms against the mother country. We were ready to forget the occurrences of our Civil War; the indecent speed, with which she seized the first opportunity to jump on us when we were down, the alacrity with which she threw aside all her previous protestations against the horrors of slavery, and the glee with which her official class gloated over each fresh misfortune, which they fancied made another step towards the final result of defeat and disruption. All these things we were ready to relegate to the realm of the forgotten past—on the first manifestation by the British people of any feeling of genuine friendliness or affection.

But when we see the same policy followed, persistently and relentlessly, against another race of kinsmen beyond the sea, the kinsmen who gave us shelter in the time of our weakness and misery, when we remember that the manifestations of friendly feeling for ourselves were delayed till the period when we are rich and strong beyond the dreams of ancient statesmen, then we are compelled to think. Then we are compelled to recall the fact, the never-ceasing fact, that English officialism, the English hereditary governing class, has at all times, with all peoples, been brutal, insolent, and cruel. We are compelled to realise, that the English hereditary governing class to-day—with many noble individual exceptions—is, as a class, precisely what it has been for centuries. The leopard has not changed his spots. To-morrow, if that policy would better serve its interests, and especially its money interests—and if it dared—the English hereditary governing class would turn upon us and rend us.

Let us make no mistake. As to the English *people,* this American people has always had a longing for its affection. That was the real reason, why we were, in years gone by, somewhat unduly sensitive to criticism from the English. Comparatively speaking, we cared little or nothing for criticism from other sources. But we were hurt by unkind words from Englishmen. The reason was, that we had a longing for their love. We did not get it. We did not get treatment that was

reasonably considerate or decent. And then—in our time of sorest need—we had England on our back.

Nevertheless, if this war on the part of England had been a war of self defense, a war for freedom, a war in a just cause, our hearts and our sympathies would have gone out, tumultuously, to our ancestral kinsmen.

But then, when we look at the facts, we are struck with the remarkable resemblance between the story of the Transvaal Burghers and that of certain Englishmen, of the faith of Milton and Cromwell, who came to New England in the seventeenth century. They, too, were driven into exile to escape the cruelty and oppression of the British King, and the British oligarchy, of that day. They took refuge with the Dutch. They found shelter with the Dutch. Thereafter they conquered new homes in a wilderness. Thereafter they suffered continued acts of oppression and tyranny at the hands of the British government of that day. Finally, they, too, were forced by the British oligarchy into war, a war of self defense, a war for liberty. In that war they won, quite contrary to the expectations of the British ministers of the time. That fact, however, did not protect them from further acts of British aggression.

Really, the two stories have a remarkable resemblance—thus far.

To the Boers, to-day, is committed the guarding of the Temple of Liberty. To them, to-day, is committed the contest for the right of self government, the struggle for free institutions. They are the representatives, to-day, of the highest traditions of the English people. At present, the British Government is engaged in the work, in which it has often engaged outside its own territory, of unholy conquest. It is false to its own highest ideals.

Are we to-day to give any weight, in matters of international politics, to the question of right and wrong?

This unholy and unrighteous war ought to stop. It ought to stop at once. It can come to an end within any reasonable period, only by the withdrawal of the party who is in the wrong.

If that party persists in a war of lawless wanton aggression, who can say when the war will end, or how it will end?

But the British people ought to well comprehend the fact, that they are sitting on a volcano.

IV.

POSTSCRIPT.

At the time of this writing the news comes of the relief of Kimberley.

The hand is the hand of Roberts. The strategy is of Rhodes and Rothschilds.

Also, we have a report to the effect that General Cronje is in full retreat, pursued by the British cavalry, with a strong probability of his capture with an army of several thousand men.

The latter part of the report is to be scrutinized with care. Evidently, there was an attempt to cut off Cronje's withdrawal towards Bloemfontein. That attempt has—thus far—apparently failed. The British accounts—thus far—make no mention of captured guns, or of prisoners. Nor do they state with clearness, that there has been any serious engagement. Thus far, then, it would seem, that General Cronje in due season fully appreciated Lord Roberts' intentions, made full provision to meet them, decided wisely on a policy of concentration, and proceeded to execute that policy with speed.

Every mile in advance now made by Lord Roberts only puts him in a position of greater danger—assuming that the Boers are handled with reasonable skill.

So far, therefore, as is indicated by the reports to the moment of this writing, the result of the first movement on the part of Lord Roberts is to place a large portion of his army in a position of imminent danger, of danger far greater than that of General White at Ladysmith.

Even if Lord Roberts were to succeed in reaching Bloemfontein, Bloemfontein might well become another Moscow.

No doubt, there is always the possibility that any situation, the most promising, may be thrown away. Thus far—the Boer generals have not seen fit to interfere with British communications to the rear. It is a possibility—that the Boer generals, with their continental advisers, have not in mind the most abundant lessons of our Civil War as to the art of cutting railways. But there is at least one West Point man in the Boer army. And it is almost incredible, that the Boer generals will now omit an operation of such extreme ease, which would, under all ordinary contingencies, place at their mercy the armies of both Lord Roberts and General Buller, and inflict on the British Army a disaster for which its previous records afford no parallel.

As a strategic point, Kimberley is not of the slightest importance. No doubt, it was desirable, that Colonel Baden-Powell, with the troops in his command, who had been making a very stubborn resistance for a considerable period, should be saved from capture, if that result could be accomplished without a sacrifice of other more important considerations. But as a matter of strategy, at this point of the campaign, it is difficult to conceive of a more unwise move, one more full of danger to the British arms, one more likely to result in great disaster, if the Boer commanders now act with skill, than this advance of Lord Roberts on Kimberley with a large force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery.

Of course, no one who is not on the ground, with a complete and accurate knowledge of actual positions, can venture to state with any degree of confidence the purposes of the commanding General on either side. A late report, however, is that the Boer forces have been making their appearance near De Aar Junction. The wisest of the English military writers are already expressing grave apprehensions as to the safety of Lord Roberts' communications. As nearly as one can judge at this distance, the opportunity for a brilliant achievement on the part of the Boers would now seem to be presented by the fact, that the only two prominent British soldiers, who have shown any capacity whatever for high command, Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener, are entirely dependent for supplies on a railway line of great length, most easy of severance;

a situation which offers the easiest conceivable opportunity for putting the picked officers and picked soldiers of the British army now in South Africa in a state of siege, from which, under ordinary circumstances, and with ordinarily skillful generalship on the Boer side, it is almost possible that they can be extricated.

It was apparently Lord Roberts' purpose to capture the considerable force of Boers which he supposed was occupying the strong position between Modder River and Kimberley on the line of the railroad and its parallel wagon road. It was for that purpose, apparently, that a portion of his force moved by the way of Jacobsdal. The accomplishment of such a purpose, with a commander as alert as General Cronje has shown himself to be thus far, was not reasonably to be expected, with troops so unaccustomed to actual campaigning as General Roberts' command. Nevertheless that was, apparently, his purpose.

That purpose appears, thus far, to have been easily defeated. Inasmuch as we in New York have been apprised for many days of the intention of Lord Roberts to make an advance on the Kimberley line, it was quite too much to expect, that the movements of the British general should not have been apprehended by the Boer commander, who has thus far been thoroughly well informed of every movement of his antagonist, and has been remarkably successful in making adequate provision to meet such movements in advance. It was so improbable, as to rise almost into the realm of impossibility, that General Cronje would have been caught napping, and that Lord Roberts would have been able to cut off any considerable portion of Cronje's force between Modder River and Kimberley. Of course, there is the possibility, that Lord Kitchener may succeed in capturing a portion of General Cronje's command. Up to this day, however, there is no indication that there is any reasonable probability of such a result. It is is to be noted, moreover, that the British troops have suffered a loss of only a very few men, which makes it certain, that they have taken no position that Cronje considered it at all important to defend. The probability, therefore, is extremely large, that Lord Roberts' movement, as has been the case in the former British operations, was apprehended

by General Cronje in advance, that he made very adequate preparations to meet it, and that he has withdrawn the main portion of his forces for operations in other directions, and probably for operations on Lord Roberts' line of communications. It was too much to expect, that even General Cronje should succeed in carrying away absolutely the whole of his supplies.

In any event, it is evident that Kimberley, the position which Lord Roberts has now taken, was one to which General Cronje attached no considerable military importance.

In this he was quite correct.

These features of the military situation are well appreciated by one of the London military writers, by far the ablest among them, Mr. Spencer Wilkinson. Mr. Wilkinson says:

"The same day the troops from the old camp at Modder River Station opened communication with Jacobsdal, which had already been taken. Thus Lord Roberts had a semi-circle around the Boer position of Magersfontein, from Kimberley in the north to Modder River Station on the south, and possibly the line was prolonged from Modder River Station to the northwest so that Gen. French might hope by passing through Kimberley to complete the circle, and thus enable Lord Roberts to envelop and capture Cronje's whole force.

"This was the result hoped for. The plan was brilliantly conceived and vigorously executed, but Cronje has been able to evade the blow. When Gen. French reached Kimberley it was found that Cronje, with the bulk of his force, had moved off toward Bloemfontein, apparently by the Boshof road, or by a shorter route along the north bank of the Modder.

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"There can be no doubt that Kimberley is relieved, and that the railway will soon be reopened. This is a success. But the *more valuable result—the destruction of a part of the Boer army—has not been secured.* It cannot be said in the circumstances that this is attributable to weakness in British generalship, which seems to have been excellent.

" *There are disquieting features in the news.* The capture by Boers, said to have come from Colesberg, of a large British convoy, may diminish the mobility of the British force, and is a proof of the judgment and energy of the Boer leaders. The vigorous attack on the British post at Rensburg shows that the Boers mean to reply to Lord Roberts' advance by *striking at his communications.*

" Until the issue of the operations around Kimberley is fairly known it is useless to speculate upon the next move of Lord Roberts. The fact that Kimberley has been relieved and that Cronje has had to make a hasty retreat are to the good side of the account, but the fact that Cronje has not, at any rate up to the date of the latest telegrams I have seen, been well beaten in a fight, is a disappointment.

"The opinion is widespread that the invasion of the Free State will bring the Boer army or at least the Free State contingent, out of Natal. Upon this point I am less sanguine than most of the English observers, even those whose judgment most deserves confidence; but the news of Roberts' advance will encourage White and his men to prolong their defence."

It cannot be inferred, from the fact that the Boers have not seen fit to interfere with the British railway communications down to this date, that they have not considered this feature of the military problem, or that they are not prepared to handle it with skill. Any such idea would go upon a radical misunderstanding of the military situation. It is hardly possible that generals of the adroitness and fertility of resource that the Boer commanders have thus far displayed, could have omitted from their catalogue of military operations the cutting of the British communications to the rear. Already they have shown that they know enough to have destroyed the railway at Colenso, for the purpose of preventing a British advance at that point. But we must bear in mind that the policy of the Boers has been thus far, and wisely, to exercise the most careful economy in the loss of men. For that reason, they have thus far avoided any engagements, except when they were behind earthworks, which they could compel the British troops to attack in front. It is probable, too, that they have intended to allow the British generals to collect large numbers of troops at a great distance from the sea, with the express purpose of penning them afterwards in positions such as General White now occupies at Ladysmith, and as Col. Baden-Powell has hitherto occupied at Kimberley. If this be their policy, it is easy to see, that the concentration of any large force by the Boers in front of Lord Roberts' advance would have been a great military mistake. It was much better, for their purposes, that Lord Roberts should be led to collect a large army on that line of advance, at a great distance from Capetown, with the Orange and Modder Rivers in his rear, where his railroad communications can be cut with the utmost ease, whereby the capture of his entire army may well be brought within the range of military possibilities.

No one, of course, can say what the actual plans of the Boer

commanders are. Moreover the destruction, and reconstruction, of railroad communications is a branch of the military art in which European officers have had no experience. For it has never been practiced by any troops except by our armies in the civil war. As stated before, that class of military operations was discovered, and developed, by the Union and the Confederate armies. The matter of railway *reconstruction* was developed almost entirely by the Northern army. The great perfection, which it reached, has already been made apparent in these pages. But that branch of military operations is a thing practically unknown to European soldiers. Neither side showed the slightest apprehension of its existence in the Franco-Prussian war. General Sheridan often said, that, with ten thousand of his old cavalrymen, he could have made Moltke's Franco-Prussian campaign an impossibility. Ten thousand of our old cavalrymen would have severed the railways in Moltke's rear, and destroyed his communications, with great ease. Nothing of the kind was attempted by the French army. So far as the writer is aware, no preparations were ever made for meeting any such contingency. Certain it is, that no European army then possessed, or now possesses, any considerable body of men who could make the faintest approach to accomplishing the work of railway reconstruction that was done by Sherman's army in the Atlanta campaign. Consequently, it is possible, that the Boer commanders, with their advisers from the French and Prussian armies, have even to-day not realized the possibilities, which easily lie at their command, of making the question of supply for the British troops, now so far from the seaboard, one that is practically an impossibility.

Thus far, both in the Jameson raid and in the present campaign, the completeness of preparation on the part of the Boers has been most remarkable. At every important point, down to this time, they have had an ample supply of men and material. Strategy, according to the late General Forrest, one of the most brilliant soldiers on either side during our Civil War, consists mainly in "getting there first, with the biggest number of men." This definition is not altogether complete, in that it omits to give the full significance of the word "there." If the definition be amended, so as to read "getting at the right

point, at the right time, with the right supply of men and material," the requirements of accuracy would be more fully met. Taking for the moment this definition of the term "strategy," we have to notice that down to this time, on every occasion, the Boers have been at the right place, at the right time, with the right supply of men and material. It is, therefore, somewhat reasonable to assume, that the completeness of preparation, combined with the thoroughness of comprehension of the military situation, which has characterized all of the Boer operations down to date, will continue to characterize them through the remaining period of hostilities.

We must always remember, that war is full of unforeseen and unforeseeable contingencies. Bearing that fact fully in mind, however, the cardinal features of the military situation in South Africa still remain as they have already been stated. The advantages of the situation are overwhelmingly with the Boers. It is almost an impossibility—that the difficulties in face of the British commanders should be surmounted by any practicable combination of men and material, which can be brought about by the British authorities within any reasonable period.

But here we come to another distinct difficulty in the way of a substantial advance into the Orange Free State or the Transvaal at this particular time.

The arid season in South Africa is now about to begin. In the conditions that will then exist, it is scarcely too much to say, that the larger the numbers of British troops in the interior of South Africa, the greater is their danger of heavy losses, from inability to supply food, forage, and water. A London correspondent of the New York Times, who is apparently well informed as to climatic conditions in South Africa, writes as follows:

"If the advance of these troops [British] could only be delayed until the dry season had fairly set in (*as it has done*) then all that would be necessary for the Freestaters and their allies in the south to do, would be to leave the British troops to *flounder about among the burning sand hills and valley* and the great practically *waterless desert* and devote all their energies to preying upon the British line of communication."

The success of all military operations depends on speed—in the movement of men and of material. This has always been the key to successful operations, in modern as well as in ancient war. There has been no change in this respect.

It is for this reason, that so much stress has been laid, in what has been here written, on the absence of good roads in South Africa; and upon the consequent impossibility of conducting military operations, even for only moderate distances, away from the lines of railway.

These matters, of supply and roads, are so vital, that it is well at this point, at the risk of repetition, to give two extracts from General Hamley's treatise on the "Operations of War." In the first, he gives some utterances of the Duke of Wellington.

p. 18.

"A starving army," he says to his brother, in narrating the privations of his troops, "is actually worse than none. The soldiers lose their discipline and spirit. They plunder even in the presence of their officers. The officers are discontented and are almost as bad as the men; and with the army which a fortnight ago beat double their numbers, I should *now hesitate to meet a French corps of half their strength.*

"To carry on the contest with France to any good purpose the labor and services of every man and of every beast in the country should be employed in support of the armies, and these should be so classed and arranged as not only to secure obedience to the orders of the Government but regularity and efficiency in the performance of the services required from them. *Magazines might then with ease be formed and transported* wherever circumstances might require that armies should be stationed.

"But as we are now situated 50,000 men are collected upon a spot which cannot afford subsistence for 10,000 men and there are *no means of sending to a distance to make good the deficiency.*

Again he says: "If we had had 60,000 men (British) instead of 20,000, in all probability we should not have got to Talavera to fight the battle for want of means and provisions. But if we had got to Talavera we could not have gone further and the armies would probably have separated for want of means of subsistence, probably without a battle but certainly afterwards."

And lamenting the opportunities thus lost, he tells Lord Castlereagh: "If we could have *fed and have got up the condition of our horses* we might probably after some time have struck a brilliant blow with Soult at Placenia or upon Mortier in the centre." "I have no motive," he says to a Spanish minister, "for withdrawing the British army from Spain, whether of a political or military nature, excepting that which I have stated to you in conversation—namely, a desire to relieve it from the *privations of food,* which it has suffered since the 22d of last month; privations which

have reduced its strength, have destroyed the health of the soldiers, and have *rendered the army comparatively inefficient.*

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(p. 20).

The *fortified lines of magazines* constituting the base being formed, it is indispensable to a sustained and dubious enterprise that *good roads should exist between the magazines and the army as it moves away from its base.* In mountainous districts where the roads are so rugged and steep as to be unfit for wheeled vehicles, the necessary supplies must be carried on pack-horses or mules. But the quantity which an animal can draw is so much greater than that which it can carry, that the *number of animals and the extent of road they occupy must be immensely increased.* It is, therefore, very difficult, almost *impossible, to supply a very large army, under such circumstances,* for a long campaign; and *roads* practicable for carriages are *indispensable to all operations,* except those which aim at attaining results in a brief and definite time. And not only must the roads be good in the ordinary sense, but they must be *great main arteries* of the region, solidly constructed. Anybody who lives in the neighborhood of a newly-established brick-field, will see how quickly the parish roads are broken and wrought into hollows by the *passage of the heavy brick-carts.* The trains that follow an army, laden as they are with ammunition, pontoons, platforms for guns, siege-artillery, and other ponderous materials, soon *destroy all but the best roads.* In order, then, that the enormous streams of supply may not be interrupted, it is necessary that the roads should be of the best construction, *like our own highways and the great paved chausses of the continent.* The proof of this is found in the difficulties under which armies begin to labour directly they are thrown on bad roads for their supplies. Our own experience in the Crimea shows that *even seven miles of soft soil* interposed in winter between an army and its depots, may be almost a fatal obstacle; and General McClellan, in his report of his campaign in the Yorktown Peninsular, tells us—"On the 15th and 16th, the divisions of Franklin, Smith, and Porter, were with great difficulty moved to Whitehouse, *five miles* in advance, so bad was the road that the train of one of these divisions required thirty-six hours to pass over this short distance." And again, speaking of the movement from the York River to Williamsburg, he says—"The supply-trains had been forced out of the roads on the 4th and 5th to allow the troops and artillery to pass to the front, and the roads were now in such a state after thirty-six hours' continuous rain that it was almost impossible to pass even empty wagons over them."

But it is not only on account of the supplies that great armies operate by great roads. It is also because the march of the troops and artillery on bad roads becomes so slow and uncertain that all the calculations on which a general bases, a combined operation, are likely to be falsified, and the rapidity necessary for a movement intended to surprise or foil an adversary is lost, so that the design is seen and frustrated by the enemy. An example of the different rate at which troops move over a good and a bad

road is afforded by the campaign of Waterloo. Napoleon followed Wellington, and Grouchy followed Blucher ; both quitted the field of Ligny on the afternoon of the 17th June. The Emperor, marching by the great paved *chaussees* of Namur and of Brussels, assembled his army that night in the position of Waterloo, seventeen miles from Ligny. Grouchy, moving by country roads, had great difficulty in bringing his 30,000 men to Gembloux, five miles from Ligny, by ten o'clock the same night. And, to quote a more modern instance, General McClellan says : "On the 14th of March, a reconnaissance of a large body of cavalry with some infantry, under command of General Stoneman, was sent along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad to determine the position of the enemy, and, if possible, force his rear across the Rappahannock ; but the roads were in such condition that, finding it impossible to subsist his men, General Stoneman was forced to return."

The conditions in South Africa are essentially different from those which have existed in European wars; consequently, from those which have been the chief subjects of study of European writers. We hear much in the discussions of the present war in South Africa of flanking movements and turning movements. The conditions, however, in South Africa are so different from those which have ever existed in European wars, that many of the ordinary military considerations become inapplicable and useless. Flanking movements, and turning movements, to have any practical value, must be executed so near to the enemy, and with so much celerity, as to make it impossible for him to make new formations to meet the movements on his flank. Generally, this is impossible, where the roads are so few, and so difficult, as they are in South Africa. The principles of war always remain the same. Their application has fundamental differences. Military operations must always be adapted to the field in which they are carried on. Topography is the first essential in planning those operations. It was invariably the first object of the study of Napoleon in deciding upon the form of his military operations. Topography appears to-day to have been the one thing essentially ignored by the British War Office, and the British officers in high command.

All these facts must be taken into consideration, in judging of the probable results of the present conflict. It is easily seen, that mere superiority in numbers, however large, becomes almost wholly immaterial, where the field of operations is of such a character, as to prevent the speedy movement of troops from

point to point. Especially, too, is the matter of numbers of less importance in a mountainous region, with few and poor roads, a situation which gives a position of comparative impregnability to the defense, especially when the defending force is made up of men who are bred to the methods of partisan warfare, who cover long distances with great ease, who are consequently able to make sudden and unexpected attacks on vital points in an enemy's rear, and who will find it especially easy to operate on his lines of communication.

Events have now gone so far as to make it as near to a certainty as it is often possible to reach in military affairs, that the war will, at any rate, be a long and costly one for the British, and that British final success is a matter of grave doubt. Grave consideration must now be given to the fact, that the sympathies of all the European peoples are against the British Government. The indications are also large, that the sympathies of the American people will soon become pronounced in favor of the Republics.

Let me add a few words as to the disparity between the two contending powers in numbers and wealth. No doubt the disparity is immense.

The population of the South African Republic proper, commonly called the Transvaal, according to the latest report for 1898, was—Whites, 345,397 (137,947 males and 107,450 females); Natives, 748,759 (148,155 men and 183,280 women, and 417,324 children). Total population, 1,094,156.

The population of the Orange Free State, according to the census of 1890, which is the latest report at this moment available to me, is stated to be as follows: White population, 77,716—40,571 males and 37,145 females. There were, besides, 129,787 natives in the Orange Free State—67,791 males and 61,996 females; making a total population of 207,503.

On the other hand, the latest report of the population of Great Britain and Ireland at this moment available to me, given for the year 1891, is

Total for England and Wales.....	21,413,989
do for Scotland.....	4,025,647
do for Ireland.....	4,704,750
Total.....	30,144,386

In wealth, the discrepancy is even greater.

Wealth alone, however, for the purposes of war, is limited in its power to the bearing which it has on the possibilities in men and material, that can be placed in the field of operations, properly drilled, disciplined, and organized, within a practicable period of time.

So, too, with population. Population, as an element of strength for any particular actual war, is limited, in its effect, to the number of men who can be placed in the field of operations, properly armed, drilled, disciplined, organized, and officered, within a practicable period of time.

These considerations tend strongly to show, that the enormous preponderance in population and wealth which is held by Great Britain over the two South African Republics is to a great extent unavailable, for the purposes of the present war, within any reasonable period. In many military situations, the larger the number of men, the worse it is for the party employing them. Men must be armed, drilled, disciplined, officered, and organized. In short, they must be converted into an efficient army, before they can have any value whatever for actual military operations. Now, will any competent judge venture to assert, that Great Britain can, within six months, add to her forces in South Africa so much as twenty-five thousand real soldiers? Will any one go so far as to assert, that she can add fifty thousand real soldiers to her present army in South Africa within a year? For it must be borne in mind, that Great Britain has at present practically no available officers, of either technical training or practical experience, who can be used for the purpose of turning new levies into fighting troops. As has been already stated, she is at the end of her available resources—as to men—for a considerable period of time. When the term "men" is used in this connection, it is of course understood to mean soldiers; and not merely so many individual soldiers, but soldiers properly drilled, disciplined, organized, and officered. It is to-day an absolute impossibility, for Great Britain to put in South Africa any considerable number of additional troops that deserve to be called soldiers. It is extremely improbable, that she can add to her forces in South Africa, at

any time within a year, twenty-five thousand troops capable of active aggressive service.

Even now, the great British Empire is the first of the two combatants to show signs of distress. In the daily press this morning appears the appeal for more men, by Her Majesty Queen Victoria, at present still styled Empress of India, who is "advised that it would be possible to raise for a year an efficient force from her old soldiers who have already served, as officers, non-commissioned officers or privates; and confident in their devotion to the country and loyalty to her throne, the Queen appeals to them to serve her *once more* in place of those who, for a time, side by side with the peoples of her colonies are nobly resisting the *invasion of her South African possessions.*"

This "appeal" is the act of the British Government. THEY ARE ALREADY AT THE END OF THEIR RESOURCES IN MEN.

The immense difference, therefore, in population and wealth between Great Britain and the Transvaal Republic becomes, under all the circumstances, well nigh unimportant. The Transvaal authorities apparently have, for the present needs, men in abundance. Apparently, too, they have an ample supply of the munitions of war. The question of food supply, so far as now appears, is one of chief danger. But thus far, there are no indications of any serious difficulty on that ground.

We may therefore dismiss from our minds, for immediate practical purposes, the discrepancy which might seem at first sight to be almost appalling, between the resources of the two contending powers in men and wealth.

But here we come on the dominating feature of the entire situation,—the large possibility of other complications, and other wars, unless the conquest of the Republics should be accomplished almost immediately. The wisest English politicians are well aware of their danger in this respect. They are well aware of the danger in India.

The "Transvaal Outlook" cannot limit its range of vision by the confines of Natal and the South African Republics. It must go much further, must extend to the eastward, at least as far as the frontier of India.

The danger in India is two-fold. It is not limited to the

perils existing from the mere spirit of hatred and revolt on the part of the native population. On the northwest frontier there is already reported the massing of a large body of Russian troops within fifty miles of Herat. What are they there for? No reasonable man can doubt, that it is the present purpose of Russia, whatever may be her pretentions and protestations, to take speedy advantage of British difficulties elsewhere, and especially of British defeats elsewhere, to foment a rising in India, and to intervene actively with troops to assist any such rising. So, again, we must bear in mind, and we may be assured that British statesmen do bear in mind, the dangers in India.

So vital, so essential, so fundamental, is this feature of the situation in the Transvaal, that it is important to lay before my readers some evidence on the real nature of British rule in India, the real results it has thus far accomplished, and the greatness of the dangers at present there existing. The evidence comes from two most competent sources, both British. Those sources are Mr. George W. Steevens, the British correspondent of the London papers who died lately in South Africa, and Lord Roberts of Kandahar.

Mr. Steevens gives us the following statement as to the situation:*

"It is only natural that the tremendous experience of 1857 should still be something of a nightmare to the Indian Government. '*We are living on a volcano.*' 'It has happened once ; it may again.' You hear such phrases nearly every day. I have even heard it said that if all the ryots were ever to rise in a body *British rule would collapse utterly and in a day.*

"There is no danger of a second mutiny in India unless the British dominion should ever be seriously challenged. But if there should ever come *a great and doubtful war* in the north—what then ! *If Russia came against us on the frontier it is certain she would also do her utmost to stir up risings behind us.* Even so, in our own provinces good officers, with police and volunteers, would *probably* keep their districts together. The critical point would be the rajah. Nearly all native princes to-day are all irreproachably loyal ; but you cannot guarantee a hereditary house against a disloyal son in the moment of supreme temptation."

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"India is governed by natives of India. The last word, doubtless, is with us—with the Secretary of State and the Viceroy, and Atkins in his

* NOTE—"In India" by G. W. Steevens, p. 352, *et seq.*

gray flannel shirt. But then the last word in government is hardly ever said. The first word and the second and the third are those that make the difference to the subject. The minor, every-day machinery of rule is the native's. Nearly all the lesser magistrates are natives, and a large proportion of the judges. In the executive part of government—revenue assessment and collection, engineering and public works, the medical services, the forest department, the salt department—there are a handful of white men to order, and a host of brown ones, *half supervised*, to execute. At the centres of Government—the provincial capitals, and Calcutta or Simla itself—where you would expect to find British influence at its strongest, the babu clerks in the Government offices exert a veiled but paramount influence. And the very heads of everything—Lieutenant-Governors, and sometimes very Viceroys—uninfluenced by clerks, bow before the prattling philippics of the native press. *Theoretically*, India is helplessly dominated by Britons ; *actually*, native influence is all but supreme.

"You will call these assertions preposterous, and I shall not be able to call leading officials of the Indian Government to corroborate them. The cause of the British in India is not a popular one, either there or here ; yet there is hardly a Briton of experience in India, if I may judge by samples, who will not admit privately that these assertions are mainly true. To the stranger from England, it is far the most striking and disquieting discovery that India has to offer. The cry of recent years has been for more Indian influence in India's Government. Then you find Englishmen admitting the existence of *abuses, incompetence, corruption in the services they are supposed to direct, lamenting them, breaking their hearts over them, but utterly powerless to purge them away.* You find men giving orders which they all but know will not be executed, because it is physically impossible to go themselves, and watch over their execution. Higher up you find men longing to get work done for India's benefit, but clogged and strangled by meshes of routine, which exist solely to *furnish salaries for more and more brothers and nephews of native clerks.* You find a Lieutenant-Governor refusing to take measures against plague solely for fear of abuse in the native press. Then you realize that it is not more native influence that is wanted in India, but less ; not fewer Britons in the services, but more.

"The white man's say becomes daily less, the black man's daily more. The reasons are not on the surface, but, when stated, they make things clear enough. The first, perhaps the most potent, is the new swiftness of communication between England and India. You would expect that to increase English influence, but in India you soon grow inured to paradoxes. The nearer India comes to England, the less will Englishmen have to do with it. When Warren Hastings went out in 1750, the voyage to Calcutta lasted from January till October. Hastings, once in India, had to make India his home, his career, his life. It was worth his while to study the ways of the natives and to write Persian verses. At this time there were none of the conveniences—the ice, the railways, the hill-stations—which make life in India tolerable to white women ; most of the

Company's servants lived with native mistresses and some married native wives. It was not edifying, but it made for comprehension of the East. Money was plentiful, Europe and retirement were far away ; the Company's servants spent their income in India and lived in style. Old natives will still tell you of residents and collectors who kept more elephants than now men keep polo-ponies. Above all, the white man in the Company's days was something apart and mysterious and worshipful in native eyes. No man knew whence he came or whither he went ; no man pretended to know his ways. He was a strange and superior being—all but a god.

"Now London is sixteen days from Calcutta. The modern civilian takes three months' leave every third year and a year's furlough every ten or so. He is married to a white wife, and his white children are at home ; he looks forward to reuniting his family when he gets his pension, and then he will be but forty—to letters or politics—a new career. For this and his periodical flights homeward he saves his money, so that the native is less impressed by the white man's magnificence. The British merchant and barrister expect an even shorter period of exile—*a competence in five or ten years*, and then the beginning of their real work at home. Nowadays the great Indian merchant lives in London ; in Bombay and Calcutta are only salaried partners and managing clerks ; Parsis are far richer and more influential than these. Instead of a man's life, India has become an apprenticeship, a string of necessary, evil interludes between youth, leave, furlough, and maturity. *You might imagine a burglar so regarding the intervals which the exigencies of his profession compel him to spend in Dartmoor.*

"*The consequences of the new order are inevitable and pernicious.* The Anglo-Indian does not shirk his work ; to say so for a moment would be the grossest slander. No class of men in the world toil more heroically, more disinterestedly, more disdainfully of adverse conditions. But while his zeal does not flag, his *knowledge fails to keep pace with it.* Partly this is due to the dislocation of his work by frequent returns to England ; partly, and more, to the fatal tendency of the Indian departments towards red tape and writing. The officer knows well enough that the more time he spends at his writing-table the less efficient he will be among the men he has to rule. He knows that if ever our rule were in danger, the man who kept his district together would be the man who knew his subordinates and whom his people knew ; but he also knows that his future career depends far more on his reports than on his personal influence. Can you wonder that he devotes himself to what pays him best? He would be more than human if he did not. Being only human, he has to pay for his devotion to forms and minutes in loss elsewhere. The *new generation of Anglo-Indians is deplorably ignorant of the native languages; after a dozen years' service the average civil servant can hardly talk to a cultivator or read a village register.* Of the life, character, and habits of thought of the peasantry—always concealed by Orientals from those in authority over them—the *knowledge grows more and more extinct year by year. Statistics accumulate and knowledge decays. The longer we rule over India, the less we know of it.*

"Summarily, our knowedge of the natives grows less and less, as the natives' knowledge of us grows more and more. * * *

'*The divinity that hedges a sahib is slowly breaking down.* There are so many sahibs nowadays that they have ceased to be wonderful. And they are not all like the old sahibs: there are little sahibs, countrybred sahibs, hardly better than Eurasians, globe-trotting sahibs, whom a child can deceive, and who let you come into their presence with shod feet. And then remember the other side—that the babu has often been to England. The 'Europe-returned,' as they proudly call themselves, are usually of the inferior native races, and are of small account even among them. Yet they have been received in London or Oxford or Cambridge as equals sometimes, on the strength of bold and undetected claims to social importance in India, almost as superiors. They have lost all respect for the European as a master, and acquired no affection for him as a friend. Every young Hindu who returns from England is a fresh stumbling-block to government in the interests of the Indian people.

"For the babu does not govern for the people, whom he despises from the height of his intelligence, and whom it is his inherited instinct to fleece, but for himself, his relatives, and his class. To him mainly—helped by British pedantry—India owes the impenetrable buffer of files and dockets and returns which interposes itself between the white ruler and the brown millions of the ruled. The first impulse of the native who gets an appoint ment is to get some of the swarm of brothers and cousins who live in the same house with him to fatten under his shadow. He cares nothing for efficient work—why should he? But he cares very much for his family. Instead of making less work, he strives always to make more. He sits a lifetime in the office and knows its workings as do few of his fleeting European superiors. Everything—in the public offices, the army, the railway offices, it is all the same—must be copied out in the triplicate, in quadruplicate, in quintuplicate. If a new and energetic European attempts to cut away the hamper, 'We cannot do this,' he murmurs,' 'under rule 12,345, section 67,890.' The Briton sighs, but life, he thinks, is not long enough to try to move the limpet babu. But the babu, when he likes, can easily make out a case for the addition of sub-sections 67,890 a, b, c———z—and there is more work for his nephews. 'Your accounts have come up quite correct,' wrote the leading clerk at Calcutta to the leading clerk in a provincial government; 'do not let this occur again.'

"So the white man in the district sits at his desk writing papers which babus will docket and nobody will read; and, outside, his underlings oppress the poor. * * *

"Into this maze of contradiction to rule this blend of good and evil, steps Britain. And not content with ruling him—which is easy, for he accepts any master that comes—we have set ourselves to raise him, as we put it. Which means to *uncreate him, to disestablish what has grown together from the birth of time, and to create him anew* in the image of men whom he considers mad. This is surely the most audacious, the most heroic, the *most lunatic enterprise*, to which a nation ever set its hand.

"How, now, have we succeeded! Let it be said first that we have deserved success. If any enterprise in the world's history has deserved success it is the British empire in India. Our connection with the country began as most legitimate and mutually beneficent commerce. *It developed into conquest*—not through any lust of dominion, but almost accidentally, and certainly against our will; it was the inevitable consequence of the weakness and dissensions of the Indian races themselves." * * *

"And on this comes in the hideous, if most inevitable irony, that the reward of our work is largely *failure*, and the thanks for our unselfishness mainly unpopularity. *You might almost imagine there was a curse on British India, which ever turns good endeavours into bad results.* The great gifts which we are supposed to have given India are justice and eternal peace—and *each has turned to her distress. The one is driving her peasantry off the land, the other is preventing an effete race from the renovation brought in by alien conquerors.*

"When we say we have given justice, we only mean that we have *offered* it—*tried to force it upon peoples which dislike and refuse it.* What we have really given is a handful of incorruptible judges, whose experience enables them to strike a rough balance between scales piled up with perjury on either side. Often and often a litigant comes to the European judge and says, 'You were wrong to give that case against me, Sahib. The other side were all lying, and we—well, of course, we lied too; but the truth was such and such, and we were right. But of course you could not tell which was lying most, and we knew you did your best to decide rightly, only you were wrong.' The litigant believes absolutely in the honesty of the sahib, and accepts it as part of his inexplicable idiosyncrasy; he does not seek to emulate it. As for the great mass of native judges, subordinate and supreme, who do the greater part of the ordinary business of justice, some are incorruptible; there were incorruptibles in India before we came. But the mass of them, as of the other native officials, are just as they ever were, and with the whole country leagued to screen them, it is impossible that they shall be otherwise.

"The difference under our rule is *not so much that justice is done*, as that the law is enforced. *The rich man benefits under this;* for a Rajah's Government would seldom let a rich man get out of a lawsuit with a full pocket; but the *poor man suffers in the same proportion.* In the old days the *poor debtor was protected* by the rapacity of judges and Government. The usurer dared not go before the Rajah for leave to attach the peasant's stock and crops and land. 'Aha,' His Majesty would say, 'you must have been making money, my friend. We must look into this.' But in a British court the sacred contract must be upheld, and *the ryot is ruined.*

"The irony of peace is as bitter. Peace is sometimes a blessing, no doubt; but, then, so sometimes is war. War was the salt that kept India from decay. It caused horrible suffering, presumably, though in India not perhaps much more than peace; at least, it conspired with famine and pestilence to keep the population down. All three have been greatly

mitigated under our rule ; and now a prodigiously increasing multitude is a dead weight on the general prosperity of native India, and a nightmare to her foreseeing statesmen. But that is not the only, nor the direst, curse of peace. India is effete. It strikes you as very, very old—burned out, sapless, tired. Its people, for the most part, are small, languid, effeminate. Its policies, arts, industries, social systems stagnate ; and the artificial shackles of caste bind down their native feebleness to a completer sterility. Now the old wars periodically refreshed this effeteness with strains of more vigorous blood. Most of the greatest names of Indian history, the wisest policies, the bravest armies, the noblest art, belong to races of newcomers. It seems that the soil and climate of India need but three or four generations to sap the vitality of the most powerful breed.

"Now that Britain keeps the peace in the plains, and guards the passes of the hills, there will come in no invaders to renew the energies of the weakened stocks. With each generation of firm and just rule the ill effects will percolate deeper and deeper. Failing some new process of quickening, the weary races of India must inevitably dwindle and die of sheer good government.

Whence is the new life to come? From us? *The gulf between Briton and native yawns no less deep to-day—perhaps deeper—than when the first Englishmen set up their factory at Surat.* Our very virtues have increased the gap that was in any case inevitable between temperaments so opposite as Britain's and India's. *Justice India can do without ; for peace she does not thank us. This, too, will grow worse and worse with time, instead of better.* The men who knew the sufferings of intestine war are long since dead ; their grandsons, not knowing wherefrom we have delivered them, are naturally not grateful for deliverance. Even the best educated natives are very ignorant of Indian history ; they simply do not know from what we have saved them. Even if they did, things would be little better ; for, although it is a silly fiction that no native of India can be grateful, political and national gratitude is a watery feeling at the best.

"What else have we to count on for the regeneration of India? Christianity? It has made few converts and little enough improvement in the few. Is it not,too exotic a religion to thrive in Indian soil? Actual fusion of blood has done as little. It is usual to sneer at the Eurasian as combining the vices of both parents, but this appears to be a slander. In the days when generals married begums Eurasians counted many men of ability and character ; that you hear of few now is more likely due to the fact that the modern breed is almost necessarily of a low type on both sides. As it is, Eurasians fill a place most creditably which nobody else could fill. Industrially, as overseers, foremen, railway guards, and the like, they are an almost indispensable link between white and native. But to expect them to form a link in a deeper sense, even though a Viceroy expresses the hope, is over-sanguine. It may be unjust, but there remains a prejudice against them among white and native alike.

"And after all, what link could bind together such opposites? *Lan-*

guage and education and assimilation of manners are powerless to bridge so radical a contradiction. What close intercourse can you hope for, when you may not even speak to your native friend's wife? Native men are antipathetic to European women; native women must not be so much as seen by European men. A clever and agreeable Brahman told me that he would not let even his own brother see his wife. I do know one white man who did once see his native friend's wife. 'This is my study,' said he; 'that'—as a swathed figure shuffled silently and rapidly across the room from door to door—'is my wife; that is the presentation clock from my pupils at the college.' And he was an exceptionally broad-minded man. Those who know and like the natives best tell you that you can never speak with the best-known and best-liked of them for any time without a constraint on both sides which forbids intimacy. 'Of all Orientals,' says the one Englishman who has come nearest to knowing them, 'the *most antipathetical companion to an Englishman* is, I believe, an *East Indian.* * * * Even the experiment of associating with them is almost too hard to bear. * * * I am convinced that the natives of India cannot respect a European who mixes with them familiarly.' Nature seems to have raised an *unscalable barrier between West and East.* It has lattices for mutual liking, for mutual respect; but *true community of mind it shuts off inexorably.*

"*Every loophole of optimism seems closed*—except one. When all is said and done, we have only been in India a little over a hundred years—in many parts of it hardly fifty. To immemorial India that is like half an hour; and when we first went to India we were, after all, not very much less corrupt—whether there or at home—than India is to-day. To move the East is a matter of centuries; and yet it moves. Often it seems that to mean the right thing only ends in doing the wrong one. We have made, and are making, *abundant mistakes; in administration and education we seem to be running further and further off the right lines.*"

Lord Roberts, too, gives us in his "Forty-one years in India" in some detail, evidently carefully considered, with well weighed words, the following diagnosis of Indian conditions:

"When the Mutiny broke out, the whole effective British force in India only amounted to 36,000 men, against 257,000 native soldiers, a fact which was not likely to be overlooked by those who hoped and strived to gain to their own side this preponderance of numerical strength, and which was calculated to inflate the minds of the Sepoys with a most undesirable sense of independence. An army of Asiatics, such as we maintain in India, is a faithful servant, *but a treacherous master; powerfully influenced by social and religious prejudices* with which we are imperfectly acquainted, it requires the most careful handling; above all, it *must never be allowed to lose faith in the prestige or supremacy of the governing race.* When *mercenaries* feel that they are *indispensable to the maintenance of that authority which they have no patriotic interest in upholding,* they begin

to consider whether it would not be more to their advantage to aid in overthrowing that authority, and if they decide that it would be, they have little scruple in transferring their allegiance from the government they never loved, and have ceased to fear, to *the power more in accordance with their own ideas, and from which, they are are easily persuaded, they will obtain unlimited benefits.*

"*A fruitful cause of dissatisfaction* in our native army, and one which pressed more heavily upon it year by year, as our acquisitions of territory in northern India became more extended, was the Sepoy's liability to service in distant parts of India, entailing upon him a life among strangers differing from him in religion and in all their customs, and *far away from his home, his family, and his congenial surroundings*—a liability which he had never contemplated except in the event of war, when extra pay, free rations and the possibility of loot, would go far to counterbalance the dis advantages of expatriation. Service in Burma, which *entailed crossing the sea*, and, to the Hindu, consequent loss of caste, was *especially distasteful.* So great an objection, indeed, had the Sepoys to this so-called "foreign service", and so difficult did it become to find troops to relieve the regiments, in consequence of the bulk of the Bengal army not being available for service beyond the sea, that the Court of Directors sanctioned Lord Canning's proposal that, after the 1st of September, 1856, 'no native recruit shall be accepted who does not at the time of his enlistment undertake to serve beyond the sea whether within the territories of the Company or beyond them.' This order, though absolutely necessary, caused the *greatest dissatisfaction amongst the Hindustani Sepoys,* who looked upon it as one of the measures introduced by the Sirkar for the forcible, or rather fraudulent, conversion of all the natives to Christianity."

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"The India of to-day is altogether a different country from the India of 1857. Much has been done since then to improve the civil administration, and to meet the legitimate demands of the native races. India is more tranquil, more prosperous, and more civilized than it was before the Mutiny, and the discipline, efficiency, and mobility of the native army have been greatly improved. *Much, however, still remains to be done, to secure the contentment of the natives with our rule.*

"Our position has been materially strengthened by the provision of main and subsidiary lines of communication by road and railway; by the great network of telegraphs which now intersects the country; and by the construction of canals. These great public works have largely increased the area of land under cultivation, minimized the risk of famine, equalized the price of agricultural produce, and developed a large and lucrative export trade. Above all, while our troops can now be assembled easily and rapidly at any centre of disturbance, the *number of British soldiers has been more than doubled* and the number of native soldiers has been materially reduced. Moreover, as regards the native equally with the British army of India, I believe that a better feeling never existed throughout the ranks than exists at present.

"Nevertheless, *there are signs that the spirit of unrest and discontent which sowed the seeds of the Mutiny is being revived.* To some extent this state of things is the natural result of onr position in India, and is so far unavoidable, but it is also due to *old faults reappearing*—faults which require to be carefully watched and guarded against, for it is certain that, however well disposed as soldiers the men in our ranks may be, their attitude will inevitably be influenced by the feelings of the people generally, more especially should their hostility be aroused by any question connected with religion.

"For a considerable time after the Mutiny we became more cautious and conciliatory in administrative and legislative matters, more intent on doing what would keep the chiefs and rulers satisfied, and the masses contented and the country quiet, than on carrying out our own ideas. *Gradually this wholesome caution is being disregarded.* The government has become more and more centralized, and the departmental spirit very strong. *Each department,* in its laudable wish for progress and advancement, *is apt to push on measures which are obnoxious to the natives,* either from their not being properly understood, or from their being opposed to their traditions and habits of life, thus entailing the sacrifice of many cherished customs and privileges. Each department admits in theory the necessity for caution, but in practice presses for liberty of action to further its own particular schemes.

"*Of late years, too, the tendency has been to increase the number of departments and of secretariat offices under the supreme government,* and this tendency, while causing more work to devolve on the supreme government than it can efficiently perform, results in lessening the responsibility of provincial governments by interference in the management of local concerns. It is obvious that a country like India, composed as it is of great provinces and various races differing from one another in interests, customs and religions, each with its own peculiar and distinct necessities, administrative details ought to be left to the people on the spot. The government of India would then be free to exercise a firm and impartial control over the Empire and Imperial interests, while guiding into safe channels, without unduly restraining, intelligent progress.

In times of peace the administration is apt to fall too exclusively into the hands of officials whose ability is of the doctrinaire type; they work hard, and can give logical and statistical reasons for the measures they propose, and are thus able to make them attractive to, and believed in by, the authorities. *But they lack the more perfect knowledge of human nature, and the deeper insight into, and greater sympathy with, the feelings and prejudices of Asiatics,* which those possessed in a remarkable degree who proved by their success that they had mastered the problem of the best form of government in India. I allude to men like Thomas Munro, Mountstuart Elphinstone, John Malcolm, Charles Metcalfe, George Clerk, Henry and John Lawrence, William Sleeman, James Outram, Herbert Edwardes, John Nicholson, and many others. These administrators, while fully recognizing the need for a gradual reform, understood the peculiar-

ities of our position in the East, the necessity, for extreme caution and toleration, and a 'live and let live' policy between us and the natives. The *sound and broad views of this class of public servant are not always appreciated either in India or England, and are too often put aside as impracticable, obstructive, and old fashioned.*

"Amongst the *causes which have produced discontent of late years,* I would mention our *forest laws* and *sanitary regulations,* our *legislative and fiscal systems* measures so necessary that no one interested in the prosperity of India could cavil at their introduction, but which are so *absolutely foreign to native ideas, that it is essential they should be applied with the utmost gentleness and circumspection.*

"I think, also, that the *official idea of converting the young Princes and nobles of India into English gentlemen* by means of English tutors and English studies should be carried out with *great care and caution.* It has *not hitherto invariably succeeded and the feeling in many States is strongly opposed to it.* The danger of failure lies in the wholesome restraint of the tutor being suddenly removed and in the young Prince being left at too early an age to select his advisers and companions. The former, perhaps not unnaturally, are interested in proving that the training of their young ruler by his European governor or tutor has not resulted in good either to himself or his people, while the latter are too often of the lowest class of European adventurers.

"The *proceedings and regulations of the Forest Department* desirable as they may be from a financial and agricultural point of view, *have provoked very great irritation* in many parts of India. People who have been accustomed from time immemorial to pick up sticks and graze their cattle on forest lands, cannot understand why they should now be forbidden to do so, nor can they realize the necessity for preserving the trees from the chance of being destroyed by fire, a risk to which they were frequently exposed from the native custom of making use of their shelter while cooking and burning the undergrowth to enrich the grazing.

"*The action taken by the Government in sanitary matters has also aroused much ill-feeling and apprehension.* Sanitary precautions are entirely ignored in Eastern countries. The great majority of the people can see no good in them, and no harm in using the same tank for drinking purposes and for bathing and washing their clothes. The immediate surroundings of their towns and villages are most offensive, being used as the general receptacles for dead animals and all kinds of filth. Cholera, fever and other diseases, which carry off hundreds of thousands every year, are looked upon as the visitation of God, from which it is impossible, even were it not impious to try to escape; and the precautionary measures insisted upon by us in our cantonments, and at the fairs and places of pilgrimage, are viewed with aversion and indignation. Only those who have witnessed the personal discomfort and fatigue to which natives of all ages and both sexes willingly submit in their struggle to reach some holy shrine on the occasion of a religious festival while dragging their weary limbs for many hundreds of miles along a hot, dusty road, or being huddled for

hours together in a cramped and stifling railway carriage can have any idea of the bitter disappointment to the pilgrims caused by their being ordered to disperse when cholera breaks out at such gatherings, without being given the opportunity of performing their vows or bathing in the sacred waters.

"*Further, our legislative system is based on western ideas,* its object being to mete out equal justice to the rich and poor, to the prince and peasant. But *our methods of procedure do not commend themselves to the Indian peoples.* Eastern races are accustomed to a paternal despotism and they conceive it to be the proper function of the local representatives of the supreme power *to investigate and determine on the spot* the various criminal and civil cases which come under the cognizance of the district officials. *Legal technicalities and references to distant tribunals confuse and harass a population* which, with comparatively few exceptions is illiterate, credulous and suspicious of underhand influence. An almost unlimited *right of appeal from one Court to another, in matters of even the most trivial importance, not only tends to impair the authority of the local magistrate, but gives an unfair advantage to the wealthy litigant whose means enable him to secure the services of the ablest pleader, and to purchase the most conclusive evidence in support of his claim.* For it must be remembered that in India evidence on almost any subject can be had for the buying, and the difficulty, in the administration of justice, of discriminating between truth and falsehood is hereby greatly increased. *Under our system a horde of unscrupulous pleaders has sprung up, and these men encourage useless litigation thereby impoverishing their clients, and creating much ill-feeling against our laws and administration.*

"*Another point* worthy of consideration is the extent to which, under the protection of *our legal system, the peasant proprietors of India are being oppressed and ruined by village shop keepers and money lenders.* These men advance money at a most exorbitant rate of interest, taking as security the crops and occupancy rights of the cultivators of the soil. The latter are ignorant, improvident, and in some matters, such as the marriage ceremonies of their families, inordinately extravagant. The result is that a small debt soon swells into a big one, and eventually the aid of the law courts is invoked to oust the cultivator from a holding which, in many cases, has been in the possession of his ancestors for hundreds of years. The money lender has his accounts to produce, and these can hardly be disputed, the debtor as a rule being unable to keep accounts of his own, or, indeed, to read or write. *Before the British dominion was established in India, the usurer no doubt existed, but his opportunities were fewer, his position more precarious and his operations more under control than they are at present.* The money lender then knew that his life would not be safe if he exacted too high interest for the loans with which he accommodated his customers, and that if he became too rich, some charge or other would be trumped up against him, which would force him to surrender a large share of his wealth to the officials of the state in which he was living. I do not say that the rough-and-ready methods of native justice in dealing

with money lenders were excusable or tolerable, but at the same time, I am inclined to think that, in granting these men every legal facility for enforcing their demands and carrying on their traffic, we may have *neglected the interests of the agriculturists, and that it might be desirable to establish some agency under the control of government, which would enable the poor landholders to obtain, at a moderate rate of interest advances proportionate to the securities they had to offer.*

"*Another danger to our supremacy in India* is the license allowed to the native press in vilifying the government and its officials, and persistently misrepresenting the motives and policy of the ruling power. In a free country, where the mass of the population is well educated, independent and self reliant, a free press is a most valuable institution, representing as it does, the requirements and aspirations of important sections of the community, and bringing to life defects and abuses in the social and political system. In a country such as Great Britain, which is well advanced in the art of self-government, intolerant and indiscriminate abuse of public men defeats its own object, and misstatements of matters of fact can be at once exposed and refuted. Like most of the developments of civilization which are worth anything, the English press is a plant of indigenous growth, whereas in India the native press is an exotic which, under existing conditions, supplies no general want, does nothing to refine, elevate or instruct the people, and is used by its supporters and promoters —an infinitesimal part of the population—as a means of gaining its selfish ends, and of fostering sedition, and racial and religious animosities. There are, I am afraid, very few native newspapers actuated by a friendly or impartial spirit towards the government of India and to Asiatics it seems incredible that we should permit such hostile publications to be scattered broadcast over the country unless the assertions were too true to be disputed, or unless we were too weak to suppress them. We gain neither credit nor gratitude for our tolerant attitude toward the native press—our forbearance is misunderstood, and while the well-disposed are amazed at our inaction, the disaffected rejoice at being allowed to promulgate baseless insinuations and misstatements which undermine our authority and thwart our efforts to gain the good-will and confidence of the native population.

"*Yet another danger to the permanence of our rule in India* lies in the endeavors of well-intentioned faddists to *regulate the customs and institutions of Eastern races in accordance with their own ideas.* The United Kingdom is a highly civilized country and our habits and convictions have been gradually developed under the influences of our religion and our natural surroundings. Fortunately for themselves, the people of Great Britain possess qualities which have made them masters of a vast and still-expanding empire, but *these qualities have their defects as well as their merits,* and one of the defects is a certain *insularity of thought or narrow-mindedness—a slowness to recognize that institutions which are perfectly suitable and right for us may be quite unsuited, if not injurious to other races, and that what may not be right for us to do is not necessarily wrong*

for people of a different belief, and with absolutely different traditions and customs.

"Gradually the form of government in the United Kingdom has become representative and democratic, and it is therefore assumed by some people, who have little, if any, experience in the East that the government of India should be guided by the utterances of self-appointed agitators, who pose as the mouthpieces of an oppressed population. Some of these men are almost as much aliens as ourselves, while others are representatives of a class which, though intellectually advanced, has no influence amongst the races in whom lies the real strength of India. Municipal self-government has been found to answer well in the United Kingdom, and it is held, therefore, that a similar system must be equally successful in India. We in England consume animal food and alcoholic liquors, but have no liking for opium. An effort has accordingly been made to deprive our Asiatic fellow-subjects, who, as a rule, are vegetarians, and either total abstainers or singularly abstemious in the matter of drink, of a small and inexpensive stimulant, which they find necessary to their health and comfort. British institutions and ideas are the embodiment of what long experience has proved to us to be best for ourselves; but suddenly to establish these institutions and enforce these ideas on a community which is not prepared for them, does not want them, and cannot understand them, must only lead to suspicion and discontent. The government of India should, no doubt, be progressive in its policy, and in all things be guided by the immutable principles of right, truth and justice; but these principles ought to be applied, not necessarily as we should apply them in English, but with due regard to the social peculiarities and religious prejudices of the people whom it ought to be our aim to make better and happier.

"It will be gathered from what I have written that *our administration*, in my opinion, suffers from *two main defects*. First, it is internally *too bureaucratic* and *centralizing* in its tendencies, and, secondly, it is liable to be forced by the *external pressure of well-meaning but irresponsible politicians and philanthropists* to adopt *measures* which may be disapproved of by the authorities on the spot, and *opposed to the wishes, requirements and interests of the people.* It seems to me that for many years to come the best form of government for India will be the intelligent and benevolent despotism which at present rules the country. On a small scale, and in matters of secondary importance, representative institutions cannot perhaps do much harm, though I am afraid they will effect but little good. On a large scale, however, such a system of government would be quite out of place in view of the fact that ninety-nine out of every hundred of the population are absolutely devoid of any idea of civil responsibility, and that the various races and religious sects possess no bond of national union.

"In reply, then, to the question "Is there any chance of a mutiny occurring again?" I would say that the best way of *guarding against* such a calamity is:

"By *never allowing the present proportion of British to native soldiers*

to be diminished or the discipline and efficiency of the native army to become slack.

"By taking care that men are selected for the higher civil and military posts, whose self-reliance, activity, and resolution are not impaired by age, and who possess a knowledge of the country and the habits of the peoples.

"By recognizing and guarding against the *dogmatism of theorists and the dangers of centralization.*

"By rendering our administration on the one hand firm and strong, on the other hand *tolerant and sympathetic*, and last but not least, by doing all in our power to gain the *confidence of the various races*, and by convincing them that we have not only the determination, but the *ability to maintain our supremacy* in India against all assailants.

"*If* these cardinal points are never lost sight of, there is, I believe, little chance of any fresh outbreak disturbing the stability of our rule in India, or neutralizing our efforts to render that country prosperous, contented and thoroughly loyal to the British Crown."

But here comes a most important question. When was the rule of a subject race by the younger sons of the British hereditary oligarchy ever "tolerant and sympathetic?" If the permanence of British rule in India depends on Englishmen being " tolerant and sympathetic," then British rule in India is near its end.

Certain passages in this quotation from Lord Roberts deserve the most serious consideration. The first point, which he makes apparent, is the extreme danger arising from the native soldiers unless they are overawed by an adequate number of British regular troops, and especially, unless they are kept in subjugation by the apprehended certainty of British supremacy. Let us carefully note the following most significant words from Lord Roberts:

"When mercenaries feel that they are indispensable to the maintenance of that authority which they have *no patriotic interest in upholding*, they begin to consider *whether it would not be more to their advantage to aid in overthrowing that authority* and if they decide that it would be, they have *little scruples in transferring their allegiance from the government they never loved*, and have *ceased to fear*, to the power *more in accordance with their own ideas* and from which they are easiest persuaded they will obtain unlimited benefits."

Could it be possible to describe more correctly the situation existing in India to-day, with reference to her native army? Russian intrigue, always a most potent influence with Asiatics,

will have little difficulty, in case of British reverses in South Africa, or in case of a delay in large British successes, in persuading the Indian population, and the Indian army, that "they will obtain unlimited benefits" by "transferring their allegiance from the government they never loved, and have ceased to fear, to the power more in accordance with their own ideas."

We have heard of late utterances on the part of high British officials, of something like a threat, that they would use Indian Sepoys in the South African war. After reading the foregoing extract from Lord Roberts, it is easily apparent, that such a thing is quite impossible. Any attempt to transfer the Sepoys to South Africa would probably be the signal for immediate open revolt. Even if such an attempt should succeed, the Sepoys would be practically worthless, for service in a different country, and a different climate. Lord Beaconsfield's transfer of seven thousand Sepoys at the time of the Russian difficulties was quite in keeping with the character of that most sensational parliamentary politician. It answered well enough for the British House of Commons. To the mind of any soldier, it was grotesquely ridiculous. The Sepoys, as a military force, have no value to the British Government outside of India; and within India, at the present day, under present circumstances, they are an element rather of danger than of strength.

So it will be well for England to be warned. Many prominent Englishmen have spoken of the dangers to British prestige, and to British supremacy, which would result from a concession of the independence of the South African Republics. They will do well to consider the probability of far greater dangers, from the other course of conduct. A prudent man will carefully abstain from prophesies. A wise statesman, however, will make his most earnest effort, to take into consideration all the features of the political and military situation, not merely in the House of Commons at London, and in the present field of military operations in Natal, but all over the world—and especially in India. He will consider, that it is utterly impossible, to tell how the South African military operations will end, unless they end quickly. He will consider, that in South Africa alone, if war could be certainly limited to that region, the war as yet has scarcely had its beginning.

To say that this present contest is one between free institutions as represented by England, and an ignorant oligarchy as represented by the Boers, is a gross misuse of language. The government of the Transvaal is no doubt a government by a few men. In that sense it is an oligarchy. In that sense, the government of every country is an oligarchy, whether its form be monarchic or republican. The few men, however, who now govern the Transvaal, are men selected by the free choice of the Transvaal people. The government is thoroughly republican, in the correct sense of the word. It secures the expression of the will and judgment of the Transvaal people. It is no doubt the fact, that the Boers have not been willing to allow the rights of full citizenship to the Johannesburg miners. The Transvaal people has, no doubt, been unwilling to be overborne, in the administration of their public affairs, by the denizens of a mining camp, who have come into their territory for the mere purpose of exploiting mines of diamonds and of gold, with a view to extracting wealth from the bowels of the earth in the shortest possible number of years, and then returning to their former homes to enjoy their hastily gotten gains. Those newcomers have no just claim to any voice in the government of the Transvaal Republic. They have never intended to serve it. They have never intended to take upon themselves citizens' burdens. The present government of the Transvaal Republic, headed by President Kruger, is the creation of the people who settled the country; who own the country; who are entitled to all the benefits which can be extracted from the soil; who tax the mines heavily, as they ought to be taxed; and who have rightly compelled men who have been simply digging gold, and thereby depleting the mineral wealth of the country, to pay the largest share of the revenues of that State. Those revenues have been rightly applied in providing for the national defence. It was a certainty, that Mr. Chamberlain's first attack upon the independence of the Transvaal in January, 1896, would be followed by a second, as soon as he and Mr. Rhodes, backed by the Rothschilds, should find a fitting opportunity. President Kruger and his associates were well aware of this impending assault. They would have been false to their trusts, if they had

not made the fullest provision to meet it. They made full provision therefor, with a wisdom and completeness which must gain the admiration of the entire civilized world. They well deserve our approval, and sympathy with every form of encouragement which we can possibly give them, in making their stand for the cause of freedom and republican government, in opposition to a combination between European bankers, a stock speculator, and a venal politician, who have now for the second time embarked upon an enterprise of robbery and murder. Can anything be more grotesquely absurd, than to say that this combination, headed by Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, represents the cause of freedom so far as England is concerned? The success of the British in the present war will forward no real interest of the British people. At most it will continue—for a time—the opportunity for the British hereditary oligarchy to provide rich places and salaries for a large number of its members, the salaries to be paid by people whose interests will not be well served to men of another blood unfamiliar with their political methods. It is not denied, that in India and in the British Colonial world there have been many very estimable men, who have with all sincerity endeavored to serve the interests of the people over whom they have been placed. But it is easy to see, from the testimony of Lord Roberts and Mr. Steevens, that British rule in India has by no means been the success which it is generally supposed to be. My own individual opinion is, that is has been quite the reverse. Mr. Lincoln said, that no people could wisely govern any other people. It was a saying, the accuracy of which is well established by the facts to-day existing in British India. If the result of the present Transvaal war should be the end of British rule in India, it is at least a matter of great doubt, whether that result would not be better for both India and England. It is not for the highest interests of England, that a large number of her sons should be provided with rich salaries at the expense of subject populations.

But the main fundamental fact of this entire situation, military and political, is that this present war, to which for the present the British Government is a party, is an act of pure aggression, a war of mere conquest, waged on two Republics,

who are fighting for their homes, and their right to free democratic government. It is a war, promoted and directed, by the Rothschilds, and their two hired servants, Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Joseph Chamberlain. Mr. Rhodes is a servant of the ordinary kind, bought, and paid, in money. Mr. Chamberlain is a servant of another kind, bought, and paid, by political influence, with money at its back. It is well understood in London—and in New York—by what means the Rothschilds have been able to secure the most powerful family influence, in the highest circles of the British hereditary oligarchy, and thereby enable themselves to become the dominating factor—for the time—in the action of the British Government. Well informed men are still willing to believe, that the Marquis of Salisbury and Mr. Balfour are—thus far—acting for what they think, on the whole, to be the interests of the British nation. But what a position for the Cecils! To be doing the work, and serving the bidding, of a stock speculator and a paid political mercenary!

The end of the whole matter is—THIS WAR OF THE ROTHSCHILDS—IS A WAR FOR GOLD. In the latest map of the Republic that has come to my hand from London, which is stated to have had already a sale of one hundred and forty thousand, there is among the "Explanations" the designation of "Gold Fields" by a patch of yellow. Thereupon, upon examining the part of the map which represents the Transvaal, we find it thickly covered with patches of yellow. The Johannesburg gold district there appears only as one of many, and one of the less important.

Here we have the veritable cause of this war, in behalf of what Mr. Joseph Chamberlain now calls "British paramountcy." A few months ago he called it a war for the civil and religious rights of the Uitlander!

But who ever looked for the truth from Mr. Joseph Chamberlain?

GOLD! GOLD! GOLD!

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